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Introduction
Liquidity is a complex concept. Stated simply, liquidity is the ease of trading a security. One
source of illiquidity is exogenous transaction costs such as brokerage fees, order-processing
costs, or transaction taxes. Every time a security is traded, the buyer and/or seller incurs a
transaction cost; in addition, the buyer anticipates further costs upon a future sale, and so
on, throughout the life of the security.
Another source of illiquidity is demand pressure and inventory risk. Demand pressure
arises because not all investors are present in the market at all times, which means that if
an investor needs to sell a security quickly, then the natural buyers may not be immediately
available. As a consequence, the seller may sell to a market maker who buys in anticipation
of being able to later lay off the position. The market maker, being exposed to the risk of
price changes while he holds the asset in inventory, must be compensated for this risk - a
compensation that imposes a cost on the seller.
Also, trading a security may be costly because the traders on the other side may have
private information. For example, the buyer of a stock may worry that a potential seller has
private information that the company is losing money, and the seller may be afraid that the
buyer has private information that the company is about to take off. Then, trading with an
informed counterparty will end up with a loss. In addition to private information about the
fundamentals of the security, investors can also have private information about order flow.
For instance, if a trading desk knows that a hedge fund needs to liquidate a large position
and that this liquidation will depress prices, then the trading desk can sell early at relatively
high prices and buy back later at lower prices.
These costs of illiquidity should affect securities prices if investors require compensation
for bearing them. In addition, because liquidity varies over time, risk-averse investors may
require a compensation for being exposed to liquidity risk. These effects of liquidity on asset
prices are important. Investors need to know them in designing their investment strategies.
And if liquidity costs and risks affect the required return by investors, they affect corporations
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cost of capital and, hence, the allocation of the economys real resources.
Liquidity has wide ranging effects on financial markets. It has been previously shown in
the literature that liquidity can explain the cross-section of assets with different liquidity,
after controlling for other assets characteristics such as risk, and the time series relationship
between liquidity and securities returns. Liquidity helps explain why certain hard-to-trade
securities are relatively cheap, the pricing of stocks and corporate bonds, the return on
hedge funds, and the valuation of closed-end funds. It follows that liquidity can help explain
a number of puzzles, such as why equities commanding high required returns (the equity
premium puzzle), why liquid risk-free treasuries have low required returns (the risk-free rate
puzzle), and why small stocks that are typically illiquid earn high returns (the small firm
effect).
This thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the effect of liquidity risk
on firm’s capital structure and bond yield spreads, Chapter 2 studies how liquidity risk
affects the assessment of the performance of hedge funds, and the object of Chapter 3 is to
investigate the correlations between investors’ heterogeneous beliefs and the trading volume,
price volatility and liquidity of stocks.
In particular, in Chapter 1 we extend the structural model of Leland and Toft (1996) by
incorporating liquidity risk. It is expected that introducing liquidity risk into the structural
model can generate optimal capital structure and bond yield spreads which are more consis-
tent with empirical findings in the financial markets. We model liquidity risk by assuming
that liquidity shocks follow a Poisson process. When bondholders face a liquidity shock, they
have to immediately sell the bonds they hold because of borrowing constraints. Transaction
costs are assumed to be proportional to bond price, and the proportion is either constant or
time-varying. Our results show that incorporating liquidity risk into the structural model
can help generate optimal capital structure and yield spreads which are more in line with
empirical findings. For some reasonable parameter inputs, the issuance maturities of corpo-
rate bonds are 7-8 years, and the optimal leverage ratio can be as low as around 23%. These
numbers are closer to the empirical values than those obtained in Leland and Toft (1996).
In the meanwhile, the yield spreads of both investment-grade and ′junk′ bonds increase. In
particular, the yield spreads of investment-grade bonds of short maturities are not negligible
anymore when one accounts for the effect of liquidity risk.
Chapter 2 presents a joint work with Rajna Gibson (University of Geneva) on the as-
sessment of the performance of hedge funds. Hedge funds have been becoming an important
investment vehicle in the financial markets since the 1990s. The crucial issue that investors
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should take into account in investment decisions is whether hedge funds can deliver signifi-
cant excess return over the benchmark? In other words, do hedge funds possess any special
skills in market timing and asset selection? There are not identical answers to this question.
Recently, leveraging on the Bayesian framework proposed by Avramov and Wermers (2006),
Avramov et al. (2007) have studied the performance of optimal portfolio strategies in hedge
funds. They find that there exist subgroups of hedge funds who possess higher managerial
skills, and incorporating predictability in managerial skills can help investors select such
hedge funds. We extend this study by examining the joint impact of predictability and of an
important omitted risk factor, namely liquidity risk, on the assessment of the performance
of hedge funds. Liquidity risk factor is constructed using the liquidity measure developed
by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). We use the Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) six-factor model
to evaluate the ex-post out-of-sample performance of a large number of hedge fund portfolio
strategies some of which account for predictability in managerial skills. The main out-of-
sample results suggest that once we account for the effect of the omitted liquidity risk factor,
the significance of alphas generated by a large number of hedge fund portfolios disappears
or is vastly reduced in more than half of TASS hedge fund styles even when predictabil-
ity in managerial skills is considered. Our empirical results are robust to: (i) the choice
of an alternative performance evaluation model (The Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor
performance evaluation model), (ii) the choice of an alternative liquidity risk proxy derived
from Amihud (2002) liquidity measure, (iii) the exclusion of the January effect, and (iv)
the exclusion of the recent financial crises impact. These results indicate that introducing
predictability in managerial skills is not sufficient to generate a “pure” and economically
significant alpha within most hedge funds investment styles and that liquidity risk plays an
important role within many hedge funds styles while a large fraction of the hedge funds su-
perior performance documented by previous performance models actually represents a mere
compensation for their liquidity risk exposures.
In Chapter 3, the effects of investors’ heterogeneous beliefs on the trading volume, price
volatility and liquidity of stocks are investigated. Stock liquidity is one of the most impor-
tant topics in the Market Microstructure literature. Previous studies suggest that inventory
risk and information asymmetry are two key factors which mostly influence stock liquidity:
stock liquidity decreases with the inventory risk of dealers and/or market makers and in-
formation asymmetry. Following Kurz and Motolese (2008), we propose a model to show
that, in addition to inventory risk and information asymmetry, investors’ beliefs also have a
significant impact on stock liquidity. In particular, we show that stock liquidity is negatively
xcorrelated with the volatility of market belief, with liquidity being defined as price pressure
and market belief as the average of investors’ individual beliefs. Meanwhile, the volatility of
market belief also affect the trading volume and price volatility of stocks: higher volatility of
market belief is followed by lower trading volume and higher price volatility. We empirically
examine these theoretically predicted relations with the analyst forecast data on quarterly
earnings per share (EPS) provided by the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S).
Empirical results well confirm our theoretical findings although the empirical correlation be-
tween the volatility of market belief and trading volume is not that significant as predicted
in the theoretical model. Our results are robust to diverse methods of estimating market
belief and its volatility and to alternative liquidity measure.
Contents
1 Optimal Capital Structure and Yield Spreads under Liquidity Risk 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Review of Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1 Without Liquidity Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.2 With Liquidity Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.1 Optimal Capital Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.2 Yield Spreads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.6.1 The Valuation of Illiquid Bonds of Maturity t . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 Hedge fund alphas: do they reflect managerial skills or mere compensation
for liquidity risk bearing? 37
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3 The hedge funds portfolio allocation model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.3.1 The dogmatist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3.2 The agnostic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3.3 The skeptic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3.4 Optimal portfolios formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3.5 Performance evaluation model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3.6 Liquidity risk factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.5 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
xi
xii CONTENTS
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5.2 Analysis of the optimal portfolios’ components . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.5.3 Performance evaluation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.5.4 Robustness tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.5.5 Hedge fund return smoothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.5.6 Financial crises and the effect of liquidity risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3 Heterogeneous Beliefs, Trading Volume, Price Volatility and Liquidity 83
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.2.1 The Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.2.2 The Equilibrium without Heterogeneous Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.2.3 Modeling Heterogeneous Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.2.4 The Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.2.5 Trading Volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.2.6 Price Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.2.7 Liquidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.3 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3.2 Time-Series Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.3.3 Market State of Belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.3.4 Volatility of Market Belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.3.5 Trading Volume, Price Volatility and Liquidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.3.6 Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.5 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.5.1 Proof of Proposition II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.5.2 Some Moments of Absolute Normal Random Variables . . . . . . . . 116
Bibliography 135
Curriculum Vitæ 143
Chapter 1
Optimal Capital Structure and Yield
Spreads under Liquidity Risk
1
2 CHAPTER 1. CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND SPREAD
1.1 Introduction
Credit risk has been intensively explored in modern finance during the past several decades.
One of the most widely employed frameworks of credit risk is the structural approach pi-
oneered by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1994), and subsequently extended by
many researchers. The main theoretical structural models include Anderson and Sundare-
san (1996), Black and Cox (1976), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), Duffie and Lando
(2001), Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Mella-Barral
and Perraudin (1997) and Zhou (2001). However, a widespread view amongst financial
economists is that the structural models of credit risk, although theoretically appealing,
generate yield spreads lower than the actual ones.
The reduced-form approach, developed by Duffie and Singleton (1999), Jarrow et al.
(1997) and Madan and Unal (1994), treats default as an unpredictable Poisson event and
generates the rich dynamics of the term structure of yield spreads. It is not clear from
this approach what economic mechanism is behind the default process and therefore few
theoretical insights on the causes of the term structure dynamics of yield spreads can be
provided.
A number of papers have studied the determinants of corporate yield spreads and found
that credit risk alone could not explain total yield spreads observed. Among them, Jones et
al. (1984) is probably the first paper which shows that the large yield spreads of corporate
bonds could not be explained by the default risk. Huang and Huang (2003) shows that credit
risk accounts for only a small fraction of the observed yield spreads of investment-grade
corporate bonds of all maturities - typically around 20%, with an even smaller fraction for
bonds of shorter maturities, and that it accounts for a much higher fraction of yield spreads
for ′junk′ bonds. Longstaff et al. (2004) shows that credit risk component represents the
majority of corporate yield spreads, however, they also find evidence of a significant non-
default component in corporate bonds in the meanwhile. More evidence can be found in Yu
(2000) and Ericsson et al. (2006).
The other problem which is important but less intensively discussed in the structural
models is the optimal capital structure of a firm. The optimal capital structure implied by
the structural models is not consistent with what is observed in financial markets. Leland
and Toft (1996) predict that the optimal leverage ratio of a firm increases with the maturity
of corporate bonds and can be as high as 50%, which is much higher than the actual one.
In addition, their results also show that firms prefer to issue bonds of long maturities. In
reality, the average maturity of corporate bonds has been declining since the 1990’s and
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was around 7 years in 20051. Although Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) reduces the size of
leverage ratio by considering an EBIT-based model of a dynamic capital structure, it still
remains too high.
In this paper, we extend the structural model of Leland and Toft (1996) by incorporating
liquidity risk. We believe that integrating liquidity risk into the structural model can yield
capital structure and yield spreads which are more consistent with empirical findings.
Indeed, liquidity risk has long been perceived as one of the main justifications for the
existence of yield spreads above benchmark Treasury notes or bonds since Fischer (1959).
Recently, Longstaff et al. (2004) and Ericsson et al. (2006) both find that the non-default
component of corporate yield spreads is closely related to the liquidity of corporate bonds.
Furthermore, as explained by Longstaff et al. (2004), liquidity risk is important since it may
also help explain why firms tend to issue less debt in their capital structure than models
that only consider the trade-off between the costs of financial distress and the tax benefits
of debt. Despite of its importance, liquidity risk remains a relatively unexplored topic, in
particular, liquidity risk for defaultable securities2.
We model liquidity risk by assuming that bondholders may encounter liquidity shocks
during the lifetime of the bonds and that the probability of liquidity shocks follows a Poisson
distribution. When facing a liquidity shock, bond holders are assumed to immediately sell
the bonds they hold at a discounted price. Liquidity costs are first assumed to be constant
and then to follow a mean-reverting diffusion process.
Our results show that incorporating liquidity risk into the structural model can help
generate optimal capital structure and yield spreads which are more in line with empirical
findings. For some reasonable parameter inputs, the issuance maturities of corporate bonds
are greatly shortened to 7-8 years and the optimal leverage ratio is reduced to as low as
around 23%. These numbers are closer to the empirical ones mentioned above. In the mean-
while, the yield spreads of both investment-grade and ′junk′ bonds increase. In particular,
the yield spreads of investment-grade bonds of short maturities are not negligible anymore
when one considers liquidity risk.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: a brief review of literature on
the effects of liquidity and liquidity risk on asset returns is given in Section 2; section 3
first repeats the basic results of Leland and Toft (1996) and then extends this model to
1Here, corporate bond includes all non-convertible corporate debt, MTNs and Yankee bonds, but excludes
all issues with maturities of one year or less, CDs and federal and agency debt. The statistics can be found
in the website of www.bondmarkets.com.
2In Section 2, we summarize some recent empirical and theoretical papers about the effects of liquidity
risk on the prices and yield spreads of securities.
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incorporate liquidity risk; the numerical results can be found in Section 4; Section 5 is the
conclusion.
1.2 Review of Literature
Liquidity is a complex concept. Stated simply, liquidity is the ease of trading a security.
There exist three main sources of illiquidity: One is exogenous transaction costs such as
brokerage fees, order-processing costs, or transaction taxes; another is demand pressure
and inventory risk, which is due to the temporary imbalance between intended buying and
selling; the third is private information, some investors having more information than others.
Liquidity is usually associated with the fact that the holding horizon is known in advance.
In a seminal paper, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) examine the effect of liquidity on
asset pricing. With the bid-ask spread as a liquidity measure, they analyze a model in which
investors with different expected holding periods trade assets with different relative spreads
and find that asset returns to their holders, net of trading costs, increase with the spread.
Importantly, the liquidity effect is significant. However, in the meanwhile, Constantinides
(1986) shows that transaction costs have only a second-order effect on the liquidity premium
implied by equilibrium asset returns since investors are able to accommodate large transac-
tion costs by drastically reducing the frequency and volume of trade. Aiyagari and Gertler
(1990), Vayanos (1998) and Vayanos and Villa (1998) obtain similar results.
The results in Huang (2003) show that some securities have high liquidity premium
despite low turnover frequency. Huang (2003) achieves this by considering a more realistic
assumption that investors are constrained from borrowing against future income shocks. He
shows that the randomness of the holding horizon (i.e. liquidity risk) has a large effect on
the equilibrium liquidity premium in an economy with borrowing constraints.
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) investigate the various channels through which liquidity
risk may affect asset prices and find that a security’s required return depends on its expected
liquidity as well as on the covariances of its own return and liquidity with the market return
and liquidity. Furthermore, they empirically find that the major part of the effect of liquidity
risk arises from the covariance between the security liquidity and market return.
As for bond markets, few theoretical models have been developed to examine how liquid-
ity and liquidity risk affect the expected returns of non-defaultable and defaultable bonds.
Boudhoukh and Whitelaw (1993), motivated by the fact that almost identical Japanese gov-
ernment bonds can trade at large price differentials, study the issue of the value of liquidity
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in markets for non-defaultable bonds. They show that the observed price segmentation is
the consequence of the liquidity differentials of bonds provided by the issuers who are able
to charge for the liquidity services provided.
Tychon and Vannetelbosch (2005) develop a binomial bond valuation model that takes
into account both the risk of early default and liquidity risk. They use a strategic bargaining
setup in which transactions take place because investors have heterogeneous prior beliefs
about bankruptcy costs. They show that liquidity risk can generate large yield spreads
and the rich dynamics of the term structure of yield spreads. The on-the-run phenomenon,
which has been documented in the empirical workings like Sarig and Warga (1989), can be
explained by this model.
Ericsson and Renault (2007) is the first model which takes into account liquidity risk
in the structural bond pricing framework. They extend Fan and Sundaresan (2000) by
incorporating the influence of the liquidity risk of the market for distressed bonds on the
renegotiation in financial distress. For some parameter inputs, substantial yield spreads are
generated even for short term bonds. In addition, they find that levels of liquidity spreads
are likely to be positively correlated with credit risk.
Empirically, the effects of liquidity and liquidity risk on asset returns have been intensively
explored as well. Whether liquidity is priced in securities depends on the fact of whether
it is a systematic risk. If it is not systematic, we can diversify it and then there will be no
liquidity premia. For stock markets, Chordia et al. (2000), Huberman and Halka (2001)
and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) document the existence of common factors of liquidity3.
Amihud (2002) adopts the liquidity measure of ’ILLIQ’ to show that over time, expected
market liquidity positively affects ex ant stock excess returns, suggesting that expected stock
excess return partly represents a liquidity premium4.
As for bond markets, Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Goldreich et al. (2003), Longstaff
(2001) and Wang et al. (2005) study the effects of liquidity on U.S. Treasury bonds. They
3Note that the common factors documented in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) are less significant
4This so-called ILLIQ measure for stock i in month t is estimated as follows:
ILLIQi,t =
1
Dt
Dt∑
d=1
∣∣∣rdi,t∣∣∣
V di,t
where Dt denotes the number of trading days in month t, r
d
i,t denotes the return on the stock i in the d
th
day of month t, and V di,t denotes the dollar trading volume for stock i in the d
th day day of month t, as a
percentage of the dollar market capitalization of the stock. The basic intuition is to measure the daily price
impact of order flow: the more liquid a stock, the smaller the ILLIQ measure.
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show that the yields to maturities on notes, Refcorp bonds5 and off-the-run Treasury securi-
ties are respectively higher than those on bills, Government bonds and on-the-run Treasury
securities. They attribute this to the fact that notes, Refcorp bonds and off-the-run Treasury
securities are respectively less liquid than bills, Government bonds and on-the-run Treasury
securities.
Ericsson et al. (2006), Huang and Huang (2003) and Longstaff et al. (2004) try to answer
one question: how much of the corporate yield spreads is due to credit risk? Ericsson et al.
(2006) and Longstaff et al. (2004) use the data on the prices of Credit Default Swaps (CDS)
which are commonly thought to be less influenced by non-default factors, while Huang and
Huang (2003) use the data on default probabilities and loss rates provided by the rating
agencies such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. Their common observation is that only
part of corporate yield spreads can be attributed to default risk and the remaining is due to
other factors. Liquidity premium is shown to be an important non-default component.
De Jong and Driessen (2005) and Chacko (2006) directly study liquidity premia in cor-
porate bond markets. With data from both U.S. and European corporate bond markets for
the period from 1993 to 2002, De Jong and Driessen (2005) find that liquidity is a priced
factor for the expected returns on corporate bonds. In terms of expected returns, the total
estimated liquidity premium is around 45 basis points for investment-grade bonds with long
maturity. For speculative-grade (′junk′) bonds, which have higher exposures to liquidity
factors, liquidity premium is about 1%. Chacko (2006) adopts a new liquidity measure la-
tent liquidity6 which measures the turnover frequency (or accessibility) of corporate bonds,
he uses data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in U.S.
corporate bond markets. His results show that liquidity is not only important in explaining
returns, but more importantly that it is also priced.
5Refcorp bonds are issued by the Resolution Funding Corporation, a government agency created by the
Financial Institutions Reforms, Recovery, and Enforcement act of 1989 (FIRREA). Refcorp bonds literally
have the same credit risk as Government bonds for their principal is fully collateralized by Government
bonds
6For a securities dealer, what really determines the liquidity of a security is the ease in which a dealer
can access a security. If a bond is more accessible by dealers, we can say that it is more liquid. The turnover
frequency measures exactly how accessible a security is: the higher turnover frequency, the more accessible.
The measure of latent liquidity can help us overcome the difficulty of extremely low trading activity in bond
markets.
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1.3 The Model
As mentioned above, we wish to extend the structural model of Leland and Toft (1996)
to incorporate liquidity risk. An advantage of this model is that it generates closed-form
solutions for equity value, debt value and firm value. It can be seen later on that closed-form
solutions are still available even when liquidity risk is included.
This section builds a continuous-time valuation framework for illiquid bonds. Basic as-
sumptions are listed and discussed below, some of which paralleling those in Merton (1974),
Black and Cox (1976), Brennan and Schwartz (1978) and Leland and Loft (1996).
ASSUMPTION 1: The firm has productive assets whose unleveraged value V follows a con-
tinuous diffusion process with constant proportional volatility σ1:
dV
V
= (µ(V, t)− δ) dt+ σ1dW vt (1.1)
where µ(V, t) is the total expected rate of return on asset value V; δ is the constant fraction
of value paid out to security holders; and dW vt is the increment of a standard Brownian
motion;
ASSUMPTION 2: As in Leland and Toft (1996), we assume that the debt structure of a firm
is stationary;
To be precise, this assumption means that a firm continuously issues certain amount
of new bonds (principal) with maturity T (years) from issuance when the same amount of
principal is retired such that its total understanding bond principal, denoted by P, is fixed
over time. P is uniformly distributed over maturities in the time interval [0, T], so new bond
principal is issued at a rate p=P/T per year. While the total annual coupon rate is C, bond
with principal p continuously pays a constant coupon rate c=C/T per year. The total bond
service payments are therefore time-dependent and equal C+P/T per year.
ASSUMPTION 3: The firm will be forced to bankruptcy as soon as the firm value V falls below
the bankruptcy-triggering value VB, which is assumed to be constant and will be endogenously
determined;
In practice, the firm will not be immediately bankrupt in financial distress: either eq-
uity holders have an out-of-court negotiation with bond holders or firm enters into court-
supervised proceedings (Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code). If out-of-court negoti-
ation is successful or firm survives court-supervised proceedings, then bankruptcy can be
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avoided. Fan and Sundaresan (2000) have a detailed discussion about how this affects the
optimal capital structure and dividend policy of a firm.
ASSUMPTION 4: The strict absolute priority holds. When bankruptcy occurs, the remaining
value is distributed to bondholders and equityholders receive nothing. The fraction of firm
asset value lost in bankruptcy is α, which is exogenously given in this paper. For simplicity,
we assume that all bonds of different maturities from 0 to T have the same seniority over
the remaining value in bankruptcy.
ASSUMPTION 5: The risk-free interest rate, denoted by r, is constant over time;
This assumption is made for convenience. Shimko et al. (1993), and Longstaff and
Schwartz (1995) discuss how stochastic interest rates affect the pricing of risky debts.
When liquidity risk is considered later in this paper, the condition that financial markets
are complete and frictionless does not hold any more since liquidity, as mentioned above, is
associated with transaction costs and private information. In this case, risk neutral valuation
principle does not apply. In order to solve this problem, we assume that investors are risk
neutral. This assumption makes us ignore the market risk premium required by investors,
which may be important in explaining the yield spread puzzle, however it should not affect
our results.
ASSUMPTION 6: Investors are risk neutral.
1.3.1 Without Liquidity Risk
Consider a perfectly liquid bond issuance with maturity t, which continuously pays a constant
coupon flow c and has principal p, let ρ = (1 − α)/T denote the fraction of asset value V LB
which remains for the holders of this bond in bankruptcy, where index L denotes the fact
that the bond is perfectly liquid (the same hereinafter). Using risk-neutral valuation and
letting f(s, V, V LB ) denote the density of the first passage time s to V
L
B from V when the drift
rate is (r − δ) gives the value of risky bond with maturity t as:
dL
(
V, V LB , t
)
=
∫ t
0
e−rsc
(
1− F (s, V, V LB )) ds
+
∫ t
0
e−rsρV LB f
(
s;V, V LB
)
ds+ e−rtp
(
1− F (t;V, V LB )) (1.2)
F (s) is the cumulative distribution function of the first passage time to bankruptcy. The
first and third terms in Eq. (1.2) represents the expected discounted values of the coupon
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flow and principal if no default, the second term represents the expected discounted value
of the fraction of the assets which will go to bond with maturity t, if bankruptcy occurs.
Integrating the first and second terms by parts and using the results from Harrison (1990)
and Rubinstein and Reiner (1991) give:
dL(V ;V LB , t) =
c
r
+ e−rt
[
p− c
r
]
[1− F (t)] +
[
ρV LB −
c
r
]
G(t) (1.3)
where
F (t) = N(h1(t)) +
(
V
V LB
)−2a
N(h2(t)) (1.4)
G(t) =
(
V
V LB
)−a+z
N(q1(t)) +
(
V
V LB
)−a−z
N(q2(t)) (1.5)
where a, b, z, q1(t) and q2(t) can be obtained by replacing V
I
B with V
L
B in the equations for
aI , bI , zI , qI1(t) and q
I
2(t) in the Appendix in Section 1.6, and
h1(t) =
(−b− aσ21t)
σ1
√
t
; h2(t) =
(−b+ aσ21t)
σ1
√
t
(1.6)
With the assumptions of a stationary capital structure and strict absolute priority, the
value of all outstanding bonds, when maturity of newly issued bonds is T, is determined as:
DL
(
V ;V LB , t
)
=
∫ T
0
dL(V ;V LB , t)dt
=
C
T
+
[
P − C
r
] [
1− e−rT
rT
− I(T )
]
+
[
(1− α)V LB −
C
r
]
J(T ) (1.7)
where
I(T ) =
1
rT
[
G(T )− e−rTF (T )] (1.8)
J(T ) =
1
zσ1
√
T
[
−
(
V
V LB
)−a+z
N(q1(T ))q1(T ) +
(
V
V LB
)−a−z
N(q2(T ))q2(T )
]
(1.9)
As in Leland (1994), the total firm value is given by:
vL(V ;V LB ) = V +
τC
r
[
1−
(
V
V LB
)−(a+z)]
− αV LB
(
V
V LB
)−(a+z)
(1.10)
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where τ is the tax rate. In order to determine the endogenous bankruptcy-triggering value
V LB , we invoke the smooth-pasting condition, V
L
B solves the following equation:
∂EL(V ;V LB , T )
∂V
|V=V LB = 0 (1.11)
where EL(V ;V LB , T ) is equity value and equals the difference between total firm value
vL(V ;V LB ) and the value of bond D
L(V ;V LB , T ). The solution to Eq. (1.11) is indepen-
dent of time and equals:
V LB =
C
r
(
A
rT −B
)− APrT − τxCr
1 + α(a+ z)− (1− α)B (1.12)
where
A = z − a+ 2ae−rTN(aσ1
√
T )− 2zN(zσ1
√
T )− 2
σ1
√
T
[
n(zσ1
√
T )− e−rTn(aσ1
√
T )
]
(1.13)
B = z − a−
[
2z +
2
zσ21T
]
N(zσ1
√
T )− 2
σ1
√
T
n(zσ1
√
T )− 1
zσ21T
(1.14)
The result is consistent with ASSUMPTION 3 since V LB is constant with respect to ma-
turity T. Using the above result of V LB in the equations (1.7) and (1.10) yields closed-form
solutions for bond value and firm value in the case when there is no liquidity risk.
1.3.2 With Liquidity Risk
Leland and Toft (1996), along with other structural models, ignores an important risk factor:
liquidity risk. As stated in Section 1.2, many theoretical and empirical papers have shown
that liquidity risk is statistically and economically important in explaining asset returns.
To model liquidity risk, we now assume that bondholders may encounter liquidity shocks
during the lifetime of corporate bonds. The reasons for liquidity shocks may be that either
there are other better investment opportunities or bondholders just want to adjust their
portfolio asset allocation. When liquidity shocks occur, investors sell their bonds at a dis-
count price.
ASSUMPTION 7: Bondholders may encounter liquidity shocks during the lifetime of the bonds
and the probability of liquidity shocks follows a Poisson distribution of intensity λ per year;
With Poisson distributed liquidity shocks, the bond-holding horizon of investors is un-
known in advance and hence liquidity risk arises.
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ASSUMPTION 8: Bondholders will immediately sell the bonds they hold when they face liq-
uidity shocks;
In other words, this means that investors are constrained from borrowing when they face
liquidity shocks. As explained by Huang (2003), this is a realistic assumption due to the
randomness of the holding horizon. Technically, such an assumption is made for obtaining
tractable closed-form solutions in this paper.
ASSUMPTION 9: When a liquidity shock occurs at time s in the interval [0, t], bonds will
be sold at a discounted price: ζ(s)dL(Vs;V
I
B , t − s), where t-s is the time to maturity, 0 <
1− ζ(s) < 1 is the discount fraction at time s and dL(Vs;V IB , t− s) is the value of identical
but perfectly liquid bonds with initial value Vs and maturity t-s.
7.
In the traditional structural models, the cash flows to bonds of maturity t have three
sources: coupon rate until the maturity if the issuer is always solvent before the maturity
or until the time when the issuer is bankrupt before the maturity, the principal if the is-
suer survives until the maturity or the remaining value of firm which can be distributed to
bondholders in bankruptcy if the issuer is bankrupt before the maturity. When liquidity
risk is incorporated, the sources of cash flows to bonds of maturity t change: first, if there
is neither bankruptcy nor a liquidity shock before bond maturity, then bondholders will re-
ceive a continuous coupon c until t and principal p at maturity; second, if bankruptcy takes
place before liquidity shock and maturity, bondholders will continuously receive coupon c
until bankruptcy time when they will also receive the remaining asset value of firm ρV IB in
bankruptcy; third, if a liquidity shock takes place before default and maturity, bondholders
will continuously receive coupon c until the time of the liquidity shock when they will sell
bonds at a discount price ζ(s)dL(Vs;V
I
B , t − s). Therefore, mathematically, the presence of
liquidity risk makes the value of bonds of maturity t become:
dI
(
V ;V IB, t
)
=
∫ t
0
e−rsc
(
1− F (s;V, V IB))Pr (N [0, s] = 0) ds
+
∫ t
0
e−rsρV IBf
(
s;V, V IB
)
Pr (N [0, s] = 0) ds
+E
[∫ t−
0
e−rs
(
ζ(s)dL(Vs;V
I
B, t− s)
) (
1− F (s;V, V IB))λe−λsds
]
+e−rtp
(
1− F (t;V, V IB))Pr (N [0, t] = 0) (1.15)
where Pr(N [0, s] = 0) is the probability that there is no liquidity shock until time s and
7Index I means that bonds are not perfectly liquid or illiquid (the same hereinafter)
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λe−λs the density function of the first liquidity shock time8. With the results in the Appendix
in Section 1.6, the value of illiquid risky bonds is simplified into:
dI(V ;V IB, t) =
c
r + λ
+ e−(r+λ)t
[
p− c
r + λ
]
[1− F (t)]
+e
− bI (r−rI )
σ2
1
[
ρV IB −
c
r + λ
]
GI(t)
+λE
[∫ t−
0
e−(r+λ)sζ(s)dL(Vs;V IB, t− s)(1− F (s))ds
]
(1.16)
where rI and bI are defined in the Appendix in Section 1.6; F(t) is the same as in Section
1.3.1; GI(t) is similar to G(t) except that the riskless interest rate r and b in the expression
for G(t) are now replaced by rI and bI .
1.3.2.1 Case 1: Constant ζ(t)
We first assume that ζ(t) is a constant and we denote it by ζ, this assumption will be relaxed
in the next subsection to check whether the variance of ζ(t) and its correlation with firm
value influence optimal capital structure and yield spreads. The value of all outstanding
illiquid risky bonds, when bond of maturity T is issued, is determined as:
DI(V ;V IB, T ) =
∫ T
0
dI(V ;V IB, t)dt
=
C
r + λ
+
[
P − C
r + λ
][
1− e−(r+λ)T
(r + λ)T
− I(T )
]
+e
− bI (r−rI )
σ2
1
[
(1− α)V IB −
C
r + λ
]
JI(T )
+λζE
[∫ T
0
∫ t−
0
e−(r+λ)sdL(Vs;V IB, t− s)[1− F (s)]dsdt
]
(1.17)
The presence of liquidity risk will only affect total firm value by changing the endogenous
bankruptcy triggering level from V LB into V
I
B . Therefore, total firm value becomes:
vI(V ;V IB, T ) = V +
τC
r
[
1−
(
V
V IB
)−(a+z)]
− αV IB
(
V
V IB
)−(a+z)
(1.18)
8The probability that the first liquidity shock takes place before time s (including s) is 1-Pr(N[0,s] = 0),
taking derivative with respect to time s yields the intensity.
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The equity value is equal to total firm value minus the value of all outstanding illiquid
risky bonds:
EI(V ;V IB, T ) = V
I(V ;V IB, T )−DI(V ;V IB, T ) (1.19)
Again, using the smooth pasting condition, we obtain the optimal endogenous bankruptcy
triggering value V IB as follows:
V IB =
AI − E
(∫ T
0
∫ t−
0 ω(s)M(W
v
s , t, s)dsdt
)
BI + ρE
(∫ T
0
∫ t−
0 ω(s)N(W
v
s , t, s)dsdt
) (1.20)
where ω(s) = λζe−(r+λ)s
AI =
τ(a+ z)C
r
− (r − r
I)C
(r + λ)σ21
+
1
rT
[
P − C
r + λ
]
×
{
z − a− 2zΦ(zσ1
√
T )− 2φ(zσ1
√
T )
σ1
√
T
+ e−rT
[
2aΦ(aσ1
√
T ) +
2φ(aσ1
√
T )
σ1
√
T
]}
− C
(r + λ)
[
aI − zI + 2zIΦ(zIσ1
√
T ) +
2φ(zIσ1
√
T )
σ1
√
T
+
2Φ(zIσ1
√
T )− 1
zIσ21T
]
(1.21)
BI = −1− α(a+ z)− (r − r
I)(1− α)
σ21
− (1− α)
×
[
(aI − zI) + 2zIΦ(zIσ1
√
T ) +
2φ(zIσ1
√
T )
σ1
√
T
+
2Φ(zIσ1
√
T )− 1
zIσ21T
]
(1.22)
M(W vs , t, s) =
c
r
(1− (Φ(q∗1(t− s)) + Φ(q∗2(t− s))))
[
2aΦ(aσ1
√
s) +
2φ(aσ1
√
s)
σ1
√
s
]
+ e−r(t−s)
×
(
p− c
r
)
(1− (Φ(h∗1(t− s)) + Φ(h∗2(t− s))))
[
2aΦ(aσ1
√
s) +
2φ(aσ1
√
s)
σ1
√
s
]
(1.23)
N(W vs , t, s) = (Φ(q
∗
1(t− s)) + Φ(q∗2(t− s)))
[
2aΦ(aσ1
√
s) +
2φ(aσ1
√
s)
σ1
√
s
]
(1.24)
where aI and zI are defined in the Appendix in Section 1.6, h∗1,2(t − s) and q∗1,2(t − s) are
defined as follows:
h∗1,2(t− s) =
− ((r − δ − 12σ21) s+ σ1W vs )∓ aσ21(t− s)
σ1
√
t− s (1.25)
q∗1,2(t− s) =
− ((r − δ − 12σ21) s+ σ1W vs )∓ zσ21(t− s)
σ1
√
t− s (1.26)
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Note that V IB is independent of time again. Substituting V
I
B into the equations (1.17),
(1.18), and (1.19) yields the values of equities and bonds and firm value.
1.3.2.2 Case 2: Time-Varying ζ(t)
In practice, the assumption of constant ζ(t) is not realistic. For example, Fujimoto (2003)
examines the macroeconomic sources of systematic liquidity and finds that various macroeco-
nomic factors, including inflation and monetary policy, not only influence liquidity directly,
but also indirectly through their effects on the market variables such as market return,
volatility and share turnover that are found to be other important drivers of liquidity. Obvi-
ously, macroeconomic factors and market variables are not deterministic and they fluctuate
over time. Therefore, liquidity should change over time as well. Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) have documented that aggregate liquidity does
change over time and liquidity tends to drop when the market is down and volatility is high.
In this paper, we assume that time-varying ζ(t) follows a mean-reverting stochastic pro-
cess as:
dζt = κζ(ζm − ζt)dt+ σ2dW ζt (1.27)
where ζm is the long-term value of ζ(t); κζ is the mean-reverting speed; σ2 is the constant
volatility of ζ(t) and dW vt dW
ζ
t = ρ1 (ρ1 6= 0). A nonzero correlation coefficient ρ1 allows us
to incorporate the influence of the overall state of the economy on both a firm’s asset value
and ζ(t). For example, if ρ1 > 0, then during economic recessions, firm value would tend to
decrease while discount factor 1− ζ(t) increases.
With such a time-varying ζ(t), the values of equities and bonds and firm value are similar
to those in the case of constant ζ except that ω(s) changes into:
ω(s) = λe−(r+λ)s
[
(ζ0 − ζm)e−κζs + ζm + σ2
∫ s
0
eκζ(u−s)dW ζu
]
(1.28)
1.4 Numerical Results
This section summarizes the numerical results of how liquidity risk affects the optimal capital
structure of a firm and yield spreads of corporate bonds. The base-case scenario parameters
chosen here are: V = 100, r = 0.06, δ = 0.07, σ1 = 0.20, α = 0.50, τ = 0.35, λ = 0.5
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9, ζ = 0.997310. The coupon rate c is exogenously given and equals 0.075 per year for one
dollar principal.
For each firm, the principal of bonds is chosen such that firm value is maximized. To
determine the endogenously determined bankruptcy-triggering value V IB , which will be used
to compute the bond value DI , equity value EI and firm value vI , we use Monte Carlo
method to simulate and calculate the expected terms in the expression for V IB . For each
maturity T, we simulate 2,000 standard normal random variables and calculate the double
integral for each simulation and then take average. The simulation method can also be
adopted in calculating dI and DI , while the numbers of simulation increase to 100,000 for
the purpose of ensuring stable results. For maturities less than 20 years, simulated results are
quite stable. The yield to newly issued bond of maturity T is obtained implicitly through
dI(V ;V IB, T ) =
∫ T
0
e−Rtcdt+ e−RT p (1.29)
and the yield spread is defined via:
Y S = R− r (1.30)
1.4.1 Optimal Capital Structure
When liquidity shock density λ = 0.5 and ζ(t) is constant: ζ = 0.9973, firm value is
plotted in Figure 1 as a function of leverage ratio (D/v and DI/vI) for firms issuing bonds
with maturities T which are respectively 0.5, 5, 20 in Panel A, B and C. The long dashed
lines represents functions of firm values for model without liquidity risk, and the solid lines
represents functions of firm values for model with liquidity risk. For those three different
maturities, firm value is always smaller when there is liquidity risk and the difference increases
with maturity. Firm value increases with maturity if we do not take into account liquidity
risk, however, this does not hold any more as long as liquidity risk is incorporated into the
structural model. With liquidity risk, firm value first increases from 103.1 to 105.4 when the
maturity of bonds increases from 6 months to 7.5 years and then decreases to 103.27 when
maturity further increases to 20 years. As indicated in Table 1, when considering liquidity
risk, it is optimal for firms to issue bonds whose maturity is around 7.5 years (less than 10
years) but not 20 years since firm value is maximized (around 105) with such bonds.
9Chacko (2005) observes that the median age of trading corporate bonds is 4.3 years in 2004. Considering
the fact that corporate bonds can be repeatedly traded, we take λ = 0.5.
10Schultz (2001) empirically finds that average corporate bond trading costs are about $0.27 per $100 of
par value.
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This result is consistent with empirical finding. As stated in the introduction, the average
maturity of corporate bonds has been declining since the 1990’s and was around 7 years in
2005. However, Leland and Toft (1996) shows that the longer the bond maturity, the larger
the firm value, and therefore firms would prefer to issue bonds of possible long maturity.
The well accepted reason for firms not to issue many bonds with long maturity is that there
exist agency conflicts between shareholders and bond holders and short-term bonds can be
used to limit shareholders to deviate for riskier projects. In this paper, we provide another
possibility to explain why firms on average do not issue long-term bonds: the longer the bond
maturity, the higher the probability that bondholders will encounter liquidity shock during
the lifetime of the bonds, and hence bondholders will require higher returns on long-term
bonds to compensate for costs associated with liquidity shock. This will raise costs from
issuing bonds of long maturity and then reduce firm value.
Similarly, Figure 1 also shows that the relationship between maturity and optimal lever-
age ratio is not monotonic. As seen in Table 1, the optimal leverage ratio with liquidity
risk, which maximizes firm value over time, is around 23%. During the 1990’s, the average
leverage ratio was approximately 30% in the United States and even lower in some other
countries like Canada or Singapore. Recently, the average market leverage ratio of S&P500
index firms has declined to below 15%. The reason why the leverage ratio of a firm is low can
be found in Figure 2, which plots the value of all outstanding bonds as a function of leverage
ratio for different issuance maturities T which are respectively equal to 0.5, 5 and 20 years
in Panel A, B and C under both cases without and with liquidity risk. The bond capacity
(value) is clearly reduced when there exists liquidity risk for corporate bonds. When firm
value is maximized, bond capacity is approximately 24 with liquidity risk and 54 without
liquidity risk. The big difference between bond capacities makes optimal leverage ratios
distinct.
When liquidity shock density λ increases to 2 and ζ remains unchanged, the optimal
leverage ratio of a firm decreases by 4%, this is shown in Table 2. Obviously, when λ
changes from 0.5 to 2, the probability that liquidity shocks take place increases, therefore
the costs from issuing bonds are higher.
Now suppose that ζ(t) is stochastic and follows the process defined in Eq. (1.27) and λ
again equals 0.5. It is implicitly embedded in Eq. (1.27) that ζ(t) could be greater than 1,
this, according to the definition of ζ(t), is impossible. When simulating ζ(t), we limit it to
the range between 0.99 and 1. The lower bound is chosen since transaction costs are rarely
more than 1% in practice. Whether do the variance of ζ(t) and its correlation with firm
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value affect the optimal capital structure of a firm? The results can be found in Table 3
which compares the characteristics of optimally leveraged firms under different combinations
of σ2 and ρ1. For the sake of ease comparison, we assume that both ζ0 and ζm are equal
to 0.9973. As shown in Panel A, when σ2 = 0.1 and ρ1 = 0.2, the variance of ζ(t) and
its correlation with firm value almost have no effect on the optimal capital structure of a
firm. The conclusion holds even when the variance and the correlation increase to some high
levels, this is shown in Panels B and C where σ2 (or ρ1) increases to 0.3 (or 0.6).
1.4.2 Yield Spreads
First, consider the base-case scenario with λ = 0.5 and ζ = 0.9973. Figure 3 plots the
yield spreads of newly issued investment-grade bonds as a function of maturities T11. For
liquid bonds, yield spreads are almost negligible when maturities are less than 4 years and
then become significant when maturities are enough long. However, if we take into account
liquidity risk, yield spreads are not negligible any more even for short-term bonds. For
illiquid bonds of 6 months, yield spread is approximately 12 basis points, much higher than
zero implied by Leland and Toft (1996). Interestingly, liquidity yield spreads decrease with
maturities12. The possible reason for this phenomenon is: given that liquidity shocks have
taken place, the expected time of liquidity shocks is shorter for short-term bonds and then
the discounted liquidity costs will be larger. When maturity increases, credit risk will become
more important and gradually dominate over liquidity risk. As a consequence, the relative
size of liquidity yield spreads decreases with maturity.
The yield spreads for newly issued ′junk′ bonds are shown in Figure 4. In the case of
′junk′ bonds, liquidity risk also increases yield spreads. For ′junk′ bonds with short-term
maturities, the relative size of liquidity yield spreads is small. When investing in short-term
′junk′ bonds, investors mostly worry about credit risk and hence liquidity yield spreads
are low. When the maturity of ′junk′ bonds increases, investors become very sensitive to
liquidity shocks. To keep the leverage ratio of 60%, a firm has to issue bonds with lower prices,
therefore yield spreads significantly increase. Liquidity yield spread is maximized when
maturity is around 11 years and then decreases with maturity. Liquidity risk contributes to
11We define investment-grade bonds as those bonds which are issued by firms with relatively low leverage
ratios (20% in our case). In contrast, ′junk′ (or speculative) bonds are those bonds which are issued by firms
with relatively high leverage ratio (60% in our case). Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) uses a similar
category method.
12Liquidity yield spread is defined as the difference between the yield spreads with and without liquidity
risk. To be careful that liquidity yield spread is not equal to the expected discounted liquidity cost.
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around 30% of total yield spreads for long-term (20 years) ′junk′ bonds, with the absolute
size being slightly more than 1%. For ′junk′ bonds, credit risk always dominates over
liquidity risk.
To have more insights about how liquidity risk affects yield spreads of corporate bonds, we
present, in Table 4, the characteristics of firms with 20% and 60% leverage ratios. Whatever
debt maturity is, V IB is always larger than V
L
B and the difference increases with maturity.
Moreover, not like V LB , V
I
B is not monotonically decreasing. When debt maturity is longer
than 7.5 years (or 5 years in the case of 60% leverage ratio), V IB starts to increase and is more
than doubled compared with V LB when T = 20. It is now clear that liquidity risk greatly
raises the bankruptcy-triggering value which moves up the default probability, so firms have
to issue bonds in lower prices and yield spreads increase.
Figure 5 shows what will happen for the yield spreads of investment-grade bonds if we
change liquidity shock density λ from 0.5 to 2. The mostly influenced bonds are those whose
maturities are less than 5 years. For bonds which will expire in 6 months, yield spread is
almost tripled. Intuitively, to increase λ will raise the probability that liquidity shocks take
place within short periods. When maturity becomes enough long, liquidity shocks will take
place almost surely regardless of λ if it is not too small, hence the effect of increasing λ is
very limited.
For λ = 2, the leverage ratio of a firm with positive equity value will not be as high as
60% when its bond maturity is long since the costs from issuing such bonds are too high.
Now suppose that ζ(t) is stochastic and follows the process defined in equation (27)
and λ again equals 0.5. As above, we limit ζ(t) to the range between 0.99 and 1 and take
ζ0 = ζm = 0.9973. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the effects of the variance of ζ(t) and its
correlation with firm value on the yield spreads of investment-grade bonds.
In Figure 6, ρ1 is fixed to 0.2 and σ2 varies among 0, 0.1 and 0.3. First, we note that the
term structure of yield spreads, which initially decrease and then increase with maturities,
does not change. The explanation above works here as well, that is, given that liquidity
shocks have taken place, the expected time of liquidity shocks is shorter for short-term
bonds and then the discounted liquidity costs will be larger. Second, yield spreads for
σ2 = 0.1, 0.3 are very close to each other but higher than those for σ2 = 0. However, it is
worth noting that the yield spread difference is not due to the variation of σ2. When σ2 = 0,
the expected value of ζ(t) equals 0.9973 and is higher than the expected ζ(t)s obtained in the
case of σ2 = 0.1, 0.3 because of the asymmetric lower and upper bounds around the mean of
ζ(t). It is likely that different expected discount factors generate the yield spread difference.
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The variance of ζ(t) has therefore rather weak effects on liquidity yield spreads. Similar
results are shown in Figure 7 where σ2 = 0.1 and ρ1 varies among 0, 0.2 and 0.6, hence the
correlation between ζ(t) and firm value almost does not affect liquidity yield spreads neither.
As ′junk′ bonds, the effects of the variance of ζ(t) and its correlation with firm value on
yield spreads are shown in Figures 8 and 9 in which we find that both σ2 and ρ1 have little
effects. The results are similar as in the case of investment-grade bonds.
Compared with Duffie and Lando (2001) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), our
model is better since it generates yield spreads, which are significantly different from zero,
for short-term investment-grade bonds. Although Zhou (2001) has better results than us.
This assumption that the values of investment-grade firms may jump a lot within very short
time like 6 months is however not that much realistic.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we extend the structural model of Leland and Toft (1996) by incorporating
liquidity risk. We hope that incorporating liquidity risk into the structural model can help
generate the capital structure and yield spreads which are more consistent with empirical
findings.
We model liquidity risk by assuming that bond holders may encounter liquidity shock
during the lifetime of corporate bonds and the probability of liquidity shock follows a Poisson
distribution. When facing a liquidity shock, bond holders are assumed to immediately sell
the bonds they hold at a discounted price, which is first assumed to be constant and then
relaxed to follow a mean-reverting diffusion process.
Our results show that incorporating liquidity risk has indeed generated better capital
structure and yield spread:
• It is optimal for firms to issue bonds with medium maturity (around 7-8 years) rather
than with long maturity;
• The optimal leverage ratio implied by our model is approximately 23% and close to
the actual one in the financial markets;
• With liquidity risk, the yield spread of short-term investment-grade bonds is not neg-
ligible any more. The relative size of liquidity spread for investment-grade bonds is
decreasing with maturity;
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• The yield spread of ′junk′ bonds with liquidity risk is higher. For long-term ′junk′
bonds, liquidity yield is slightly higher than 1%.
Despite that our results are very suggestive and more consistent with empirical findings,
the yield spreads predicted in this model are still very low for both short- and long-term
investment-grade bonds. For example, Amato and Remolona (2003) find that, during the
period from 1997 to 2003, triple-A rated bonds with maturities from 1 to 3 years have an
average yield spread of 49.50 basis points, with 88.82 basis points for the average yield spread
of single-A rated bonds of similar maturities13. One way of improving our results is to take
into account liquidity jumps which may significantly increase yield spreads for short-term
bonds. In practice, liquidity often dries up during economic recession and financial crisis (like
the Asian financial crisis in 1997). However, according to Zhou (2001), jump risk does not
affect the yield spreads of long-term bonds very much. One important issue not considered
in this paper is that investors can sell bonds any time before expiration, this may mitigate
the effects of liquidity shocks.
13See Table 1 in Amato and Remolona (2003) for more details
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 The Valuation of Illiquid Bonds of Maturity t
After integration by parts and simplification, the first term in Eq. (1.15) becomes:
c
r + λ
[
1− (1− F (t)) e−(r+λ)t −
∫ t
0
e−(r+λ)sf(s)ds
]
(1.31)
Harrison (1990) shows that the density function f(s, V, V IB) of the first passage time s to V
I
B
from V is:
bI
σ1
√
2pis3
exp
−1
2
(
bI + (r − δ − σ212 )s
σ1
√
s
)2 (1.32)
where
bI = ln
(
V
V IB
)
; (1.33)
With this density function at hand, the integral of the last term inside the bracket of Eq.
(1.31) can be written:
∫ t
0
e−(r+λ)sf(s)ds = e
− bI (r−rI )
σ2
1
∫ t
0
e−r
Isf I(s)ds (1.34)
where f I(s) is
bI
σ1
√
2pis3
exp
−1
2
(
bI + (rI − δ − σ212 )s
σ1
√
s
)2 (1.35)
and
rI =
1
2
[
−(σ21 − 2δ) +
(
(σ21 − 2δ)2 + 4(r2 − 2rδ + rσ21 + 2λσ21)
)1/2]
(1.36)
Directly applying the result of Eq. (8) in Leland and Toft (1996) gives:
∫ t
0
e−r
Isf I(s)ds =
[(
V
V IB
)−aI+zI
N [qI1(t)] +
(
V
V IB
)−aI−zI
N [qI2(t)]
]
(1.37)
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where
aI =
(
rI − δ − (σ21/2)
)
σ21
; zI =
[(aIσ21)
2 + 2rIσ21]
1/2
σ21
; qI12 =
(−bI+zIσ21t)
σ1
√
t
(1.38)
Applying the same method as in calculating the first term, we obtain that the second term
of Eq. (1.15) equals:
ρV IBe
− bI (r−rI )
σ2
1
[(
V
V IB
)−aI+zI
N [qI1(t)] +
(
V
V IB
)−aI−zI
N [qI2(t)]
]
(1.39)
The third term of Eq. (1.15) remains unchanged:
E
[∫ t−
0
e−rs
[
ζ(s)dL(V, V IB, t− s)− Cs
]
[1− F (s)]λe−λsds
]
(1.40)
The fourth term of Eq. (1.15) is equal to:
e−(r+λ)tp[1− F (t)] (1.41)
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Table 3:
Characteristics of Optimally Leveraged Firms under Different σ2 and ρ1
This table compares the characteristics of optimally leveraged firms issuing debts with
maturities ranging from 6 months to 20 years under different combinations of σ2 and
ρ1. Other model parameters take values as follows: V=100, r=0.06, δ=0.07, σ1=0.2,
α=0.5, τ=0.35, λ=0.5, ζ0=0.9973 and ζm=0.9973. The bankruptcy-triggering values are
endogenously determined. The coupon rate c is exogenously given and set equal to 0.075 per
year for one dollar principal. BV, DV, EV, FV, LR and YS are respectively abbreviations
for Bankruptcy value, Debt value, Equity value, Firm value, Leverage Ratio and Yield
Spread (in basis points).
Panel A: σ2 = 0.1; ρ1 = 0.2
T P BV DV EV FV LR YS
0.5 13.490 20.930 13.534 89.605 103.139 0.131 20.85
1 15.389 21.922 15.488 88.096 103.584 0.149 18.86
2 18.259 23.274 18.493 85.758 104.250 0.177 15.33
5 22.722 24.995 23.419 81.887 105.306 0.222 11.06
7.5 23.088 25.032 24.043 81.378 105.421 0.228 12.57
10 22.285 24.885 23.365 81.824 105.188 0.222 14.26
20 14.250 21.391 15.304 88.001 103.305 0.148 11.17
Panel B: σ2 = 0.1; ρ1 = 0.6
T P BV DV EV FV LR YS
0.5 13.482 20.866 13.492 89.647 103.139 0.131 20.79
1 15.383 21.914 15.482 88.102 103.584 0.149 18.83
2 18.271 23.292 18.504 85.745 104.249 0.178 15.35
5 22.695 24.970 23.391 81.913 105.304 0.222 11.07
7.5 23.131 25.087 24.084 81.334 105.419 0.228 12.64
10 22.336 24.952 23.415 81.770 105.185 0.226 14.33
20 14.126 21.236 15.197 88.107 103.304 0.147 10.99
Panel C: σ2 = 0.3; ρ1 = 0.2
T P BV DV EV FV LR YS
0.5 13.487 20.924 13.530 89.609 103.139 0.131 21.67
1 15.395 21.929 15.493 88.092 103.585 0.150 19.44
2 18.276 23.293 18.508 85.743 104.251 0.178 15.73
5 22.585 24.840 23.276 82.031 105.307 0.221 11.21
7.5 23.339 25.299 24.296 81.127 105.423 0.230 13.07
10 22.238 24.827 23.315 81.875 105.190 0.222 14.31
20 14.144 21.198 15.178 88.129 103.306 0.147 11.08
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Chapter 2
Hedge fund alphas: do they reflect
managerial skills or mere
compensation for liquidity risk
bearing?
1
1A revised version of this manuscript is accepted to publish in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Finance (JFQA).
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2.1 Introduction
Do hedge funds deliver superior performance rooted in their managers’ skills? This question
has attracted a lot of attention ever since the late 1940s when Alfred Winslow Jones, a
sociologist turned fund manager, established an investment fund as a general partnership
with several characteristics which now define hedge funds. He developed the notion of hedge
fund as a market-neutral strategy, by which long positions in undervalued securities would
be offset and partially funded by other short positions. This “hedged” position effectively
leveraged investment capital and allowed large bets with limited private resources. The
term “hedge fund” has since then been extended to a wide variety of funds that rely on
short-selling, leverage and dynamic portfolio strategies to yield superior performance. Given
that hedge funds typically charge quite a high performance fee, averaging 20% of annual
their gross returns2, it is important to determine whether the latter is typically justified in
light of their risk-adjusted performance. Indeed, investors should be willing to pay such fees
if they believe that hedge fund managers have the ability to offset these additional costs.
Judging by the tremendous growth of the asset under management by hedge funds since
the late 90s, one may be tempted to conclude that yes, hedge funds have outperformed and
delivered “net” alphas exceeding those realized by mutual funds or more traditional actively
managed portfolios. Indeed, just at the start of the financial crisis, the 2008 Hedge Fund
Asset Flows & Trends Report by HedgeFund.net and Institutional Investor News estimated
that the total hedge funds’ industry assets had reached $2.68 trillion. it must be pointed out
that assessing hedge funds’ effective performance and dissociating their market timing and
selectivity skills from their pure risk bearing compensations remains quite a challenge for
most investors and fund advisors. Was this trend and this spectacular growth in assets under
management motivated by hedge funds alphas? This question is indisputably hard to assess
for most institutional and private investors as well as for most hedge funds advisors. The true
ability of hedge funds managers to generate pure alphas also remains an open debate in the
academic literature3. Recently, leveraging on the Bayesian framework proposed by Avramov
and Wermers (2006), Avramov et al. (2007) have investigated the performance of optimal
portfolio strategies in hedge funds. These strategies exploit predictability in (i) managerial
2In the hedge fund industry, the management fee is calculated as a percentage of the net asset value of
the fund at the time when the fee becomes payable. Management fees typically range from 1% to 4% per
annum, with 2% being the standard figure. A hedge fund’s performance fee is calculated as a percentage of
the fund’s profits, counting both unrealized profits and actual realized trading profits. Hedge funds typically
charge 20% of gross returns as a performance fee, but the range is again wide.
3See Section 2.2 for a literature review on the assessment of managers skills in the hedge fund industry.
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skills, (ii) fund risk loadings, and (iii) benchmark returns. By examining the ex-post out-of-
sample performance of a large number of hedge funds portfolios in this setting, the authors
conclude that there exist subgroups of hedge funds that deliver significant outperformance.
Moreover, they also show that predictability in managerial skills is the dominant source of
investment profitability, indicating that portfolio strategies incorporating predictability in
managerial skills outperform others mainly because they can choose hedge funds managers
with higher expected future skills.
In this article, we wish to extend the former study by examining the joint impact of pre-
dictability and of an important omitted risk factor, namely liquidity risk, on the assessment
of the performance of hedge funds. Liquidity refers to both the time and costs associated
with the transformation of a given position into cash and vice versa. Typically, continuous-
time arbitrage or equilibrium asset pricing models ignore liquidity since the cost and time
required to transfer financial wealth into cash is assumed to be nil and since trading is often
ruled out by most equilibrium asset pricing models. Yet, in practice, financial crises (such as
in Asia or in Russia during the nineties), the debacle of the LTCM hedge fund or the most
recent Subprime credit crisis suggest that at times of tight credit and market conditions,
liquidity can decline and even temporarily dry out. This leads investors to aggressively bid
for the safest, that is, the most liquid securities, which raises their price relative to the one
of their less liquid counterparts. If market liquidity evolves randomly, securities or portfo-
lios that covary more with liquidity, should offer a lower liquidity risk premium. Liquidity
risk has recently been acknowledged as an important systematic source of risk for equity
investments in the finance literature (see, e.g., Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); Gibson and
Mougeot (2004)). In the following study we wish to answer a very simple question, namely,
could it be that part of the superior performance reported by hedge funds is in fact a “pure”
compensation for the liquidity risk exposures these funds take by making trades and fol-
lowing strategies which bear more liquidity risk? Similarly, we conjecture that some hedge
funds strategies that take long/short bets and place one of their legs in illiquid assets or more
generally that trade in less liquid securities markets should be more prone to the liquidity
risk factor omission bias when it comes to assessing their performance.
More precisely, we shall follow Avramov et al. (2007), in that we will evaluate hedge fund
performance for portfolio strategies that explicitly incorporate predictability in managerial
skills, in fund risk loadings and in benchmark returns. We will measure the performance of
these portfolios by relying on the Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) six factor linear performance
evaluation model augmented by a liquidity risk factor. The latter factor is constructed based
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on the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure and its derived systematic liquidity
risk factor. The main out-of-sample results suggest that once we account for this omitted
liquidity risk factor, the significance of a large number of hedge fund portfolios’ alphas disap-
pears or is vastly reduced even when predictability in managerial skills is considered. More
precisely, the results show that, except for the non-equity oriented and market-neutral styles
based hedge fund portfolios, the liquidity betas are significantly positive and economically
relevant4. Furthermore, for 40% of the hedge funds style portfolios, after adjusting for the
effect of liquidity risk , the alphas turn out to be insignificant. More precisely, this trend
is observed for the Convertible Arbitrage, Fund of Funds, Global Macro and Long/Short
Equity Hedge styles portfolios whose alphas indeed become insignificant once we account
for the effect of liquidity risk, and whose outperformance over similar strategies that ignore
managerial skills effectively disappears. A similar effect of liquidity risk on the alphas of
most hedge fund portfolios in the Event Driven and Emerging Markets styles is observed
although the alphas associated with some of these portfolios when accounting for predictabil-
ity in managerial skills still remain significant but much smaller. The only hedge funds style
portfolios that yield significantly superior performance even after accounting for liquidity
risk are the Market Neutral and Multi-Strategy Funds. These empirical results are robust
to: (i) the choice of an alternative performance evaluation model (The Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven-factor performance evaluation model), (ii) the choice of an alternative liquidity
risk proxy derived from Amihud (2002) liquidity measure, (iii) the exclusion of the January
effect, and (iv) the exclusion of the recent financial crises impact.
We believe that these empirical results have a wide range of theoretical and practical
implications: First, they show that introducing predictability in managerial skills is not
sufficient to generate a “pure” and economically significant alpha within most hedge funds
investment styles. Second, they suggest that liquidity risk plays an important role within
many hedge funds styles and that a large fraction of the hedge funds superior performance
documented by previous performance models actually represents a mere compensation for
their liquidity risk exposures. Third, they invite us to reconsider and deepen our understand-
ing of the role played by a significant omitted risk factor, namely liquidity risk, in order to
help investors and fund advisors to make “informed” judgments regarding these vehicles’
potentially understated systematic risk exposures and overstated alphas.
The organization of this article is as follows: Section 2.2 provides a literature survey.
Section 2.3 explains the theoretical framework used in this article to construct hedge funds
4See the Appendix in Section 2.7 for the category of hedge fund styles.
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portfolios, to measure liquidity risk and finally to estimate the hedge fund portfolios’ per-
formance. Section 2.4 describes the data. Empirical results are analyzed in Section 2.5.
Finally, Section 2.6 provides the main conclusions.
2.2 Literature review
The identification and the quantification of hedge funds’ performance is a widely studied yet
still unresolved research issue in finance.
With a large sample of hedge fund data from 1988-1995, Ackermann et al. (1999) find
that annualized Jensen alphas are significantly positive for hedge funds and range from 6% to
8% per year and that hedge funds consistently outperform mutual funds. Brown et al. (1999)
examine the performance of off-shore hedge funds over the period 1989 through 1995 by using
an annual database that includes both live and defunct hedge funds, and find that all but
one (short-sellers) of ten hedge fund styles provide positive risk-adjusted returns. Moreover,
they do not find performance persistence using two-way winner-and-loser contingency tables.
Relying on two different excess return measures, alphas and appraisal ratios5, Agarwal and
Naik (2000) study the persistence in the performance of hedge funds using a multi-period
framework, and find maximum persistence at the quarterly horizon suggesting that the
persistence of hedge fund managers’ performance is short term in nature.
The articles above employ single-factor models to measure hedge funds’ performance.
Liang (1999) employs an eight-asset-class-factor model to estimate alphas for equally-weighted
hedge fund indexes by using a stepwise regression procedure, and his results suggest that, on
a risk-adjusted basis, most hedge fund groups earn positive unexplained returns, and some
of those unexplained returns are statistically significant. Edwards and Caglayan (2001) show
that about 25% of hedge funds earn positive excess returns (six-factor Jensen alphas) and
that the magnitude of funds’ excess returns differs markedly across investment styles. In
those two papers, it is also shown that hedge funds that pay managers higher performance
fees generate higher excess returns, which, when combined with the findings of positive ex-
cess returns, suggests that fund managers skills may be a partial explanation for the superior
performance generated by hedge funds.
Recently, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007) argue that top hedge fund performance can
5In Agarwal and Naik (2000), alpha is measured as the return of a hedge fund using a particular strategy
minus the average return for all hedge funds following the same strategy, and appraisal ratio is defined as
the alpha divided by the residual standard deviation resulting from CAPM, a regression of the hedge fund
return on the average return of all hedge funds following that strategy.
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not be explained by luck or sample variability, and that hedge fund performance persists at
annual horizons. They develop a powerful bootstrap and Bayesian procedure which helps
overcome the short-sample problem in hedge fund returns. With their estimates, sorts on
Bayesian posterior fund alphas result in a 5.5%/year increase in the alpha spread between the
top and bottom decile hedge funds. In a paper that motivated the current study, Avramov
et al. (2007) evaluate hedge fund investment strategies when returns are predictable. They
show that the strategies that incorporate predictability in managerial skills deliver signifi-
cantly higher alphas (3-5%). Their findings suggest that (i) some managers possess superior
skills, and (ii) that incorporating predictability in managerial skills allows investors to iden-
tify those well performing managers.
However, Malkiel and Saha (2005) show that the practice of voluntary reporting and
the backfilling of only favorable past returns can cause returns calculated from hedge fund
databases to be biased upwards. Moreover, the considerable attrition rate in the hedge funds’
industry results in substantial survivorship bias in the returns of indexes composed of only
currently operating funds. After adjusting for such biases, they find that hedge funds signif-
icantly underperform, on average, their benchmarks. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004)
argue that the most likely sources of serial correlation in hedge fund returns are illiquidity
exposure and return smoothing. They propose an econometric model of return smoothing
and develop estimators for the smoothing profile as well as a smoothing adjusted Sharpe
ratio. Using the return smoothing model, Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) demon-
strate that the performance persistence at quarterly horizons in hedge funds documented
by Agarwal and Naik (2000) and other papers can be simply traced to illiquidity-induced
serial correlation in hedge fund returns. Aragon (2007) uses hedge fund share restrictions
like lockup provisions and redemption notice periods as transaction costs approximation. He
shows that the relation between share restrictions and hedge fund returns is positive and
that the alphas of hedge fund returns will disappear when such transaction costs are con-
sidered. As in Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Aragon (2007) also reports the existence of
a concave relation between share restrictions and hedge fund returns, which would suggest
that long-horizon investors hold hedge funds with longer lockup provisions and redemption
notice periods and thus require higher returns on those funds.
As for liquidity risk which has been introduced into the hedge fund performance eval-
uation in this article, its role in asset pricing has been intensively discussed in the finance
literature. It is worth mentioning that liquidity risk as considered in this article is distinct
from the concepts of liquidity examined in Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and in
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Aragon (2007). Indeed, we focus on liquidity risk stemming from the fact that certain assets
held by hedge funds may covary with a systematic liquidity risk proxy. In contrast, the pre-
vious authors focus primarily on illiquidity as a cost factor which induces serial correlation
in hedge fund returns and which may require higher expected returns as well.
Most of the market microstructure studies that investigate the relation between liquidity
and asset returns focus on the level of liquidity as a trading characteristic of a financial
asset, and argue that investors holding illiquid assets are compensated for bearing this cost
through higher future expected returns. A more recent strand of the market microstructure
literature pioneered by Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and later by Chordia, Roll, and
Subrahmanyam (2000) has also emphasized that there is commonality driving stock markets’
liquidity and thus a systematic component to their liquidity cross-sectional variations. A
somewhat related strand of literature begins with studies showing that firm specific liquidity
fluctuates over time and that a market-wide component generates these liquidity fluctuations.
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) show that systematic liquidity is a priced risk factor. They
develop a measure of aggregate liquidity based on daily price reversals and show that assets
whose returns covary highly with this aggregate liquidity measure earn higher expected
returns (7.5% after adjusting for exposures for the market return as well as size, value, and
momentum factors) than do assets whose returns exhibit low covariation with aggregate
liquidity. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) explicitly solve a simple equilibrium model with
liquidity risk. In their liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model, a security’s required
return depends on its expected illiquidity as well as on the covariances of its own return
and liquidity with the market return and liquidity. Using the Amihud (2002) illiquidity
measure defined as the ratio of the daily absolute return to trading volume (in millions of
US dollars) for the day, they estimate the combined effect of illiquidity and liquidity risk to
be approximately 4.6% per year, with 1.1% due to the effect of pure liquidity risk. Recently,
Sadka (2006) successfully shows how the liquidity risk premium can explain the momentum
and post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) anomalies in portfolio returns6. Billio et al.
(2007) argue that liquidity risk is potentially a common risk factor affecting certain hedge
fund strategies in the down-state of the market, when volatility is high and returns are very
low since they find that in the high-volatility regime (when the market is trending down)
most of the strategies are negatively and significantly exposed to their Large-Small risk
6See, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Constantinides (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996),
Brennan, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (1996), Amihud and Mendelson (2001), Huberman and Halka (2001),
Amihud (2002), Chordia et al. (2002), Huang (2003), Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003), Pastor and Stam-
baugh (2003), Gibson and Mougeot (2004), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and Sadka (2006) for more dis-
cussions of liquidity measures and liquidity risk.
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factor.
A recent paper by Sadka (2009) is closely related to our paper in that it also examines
whether liquidity risk is priced in hedge funds. The results in Sadka(2009) suggest that
portfolios composed of hedge funds with larger loadings on liquidity risk factor earn higher
returns and that the return of the high-minus-low liquidity loading portfolio is significant
and around 6% annually. The main difference between our paper and Sadka (2009) is that
relying on portfolios formed by incorporating predictability in managerial skills rather than
on portfolios sorted by liquidity risk loadings, we not only investigate how liquidity risk
affects hedge fund performance, but also study whether predictability in managerial skills is
really effective in generating higher excess returns even after accounting for liquidity risk.
2.3 The hedge funds portfolio allocation model
In this article, the approach used to form optimal hedge funds portfolios follows Avramov et
al. (2007). Following the latter study, we assume that managerial skills exist in the hedge
fund industry and are predictable. Relying on predictability can help investors to select hedge
fund managers with superior skills. Therefore, within such a portfolio allocation model, we
can investigate whether predictability in managerial skills is really effective in so far as it
allows one to incorporate highly skilled hedge fund managers in portfolios that subsequently
generate higher excess returns, even after accounting for liquidity risk.
Assume that there are several types of Bayesian optimizing investors who differ from each
other with respect to their beliefs about the possibility for hedge fund managers to possess
asset selection skills and benchmark timing abilities. To be precise, these types of investors
differ with respect to their views about the parameters governing the following hedge fund
return generating model
ri,t = αi,0 + α
′
i,1zt−1 + β
′
i,0ft + β
′
i,1 (ft ⊗ zt−1) + i,t,
ft = af + Afzt−1 + f,t, (2.1)
zt = az + Azzt−1 + z,t,
where ri,t is the return of hedge fund i in excess of riskless rate in month t. zt is a vector
of M business cycle variables observed at the end of month t, ft is a vector of K zero-cost
benchmarks, βi,0(βi,1) is the fixed (variable) component of fund risk loadings and i,t is fund-
specific event, which is assumed to be uncorrelated across hedge funds and over time, and
normally distributed with mean zero and variance ψi. Business cycle variables zt are modeled
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by a vector autoregression of order one.
Hedge fund managerial skills are captured by αi,0 + α
′
i,1zt−1, which is composed of the
fixed component αi,0 and the predictable component α
′
i,1zt−1. Note that the predictability
of managerial skills is explained by public information instead of the private information
possessed by hedge fund managers. This statement is consistent with the fact that the
private information of the manager is correlated with the selected public information based
business cycle variables.
Overall, the model for hedge fund returns described by Eq. (2.1) captures the potential
predictability in managerial skills (αi,1 6= 0), in fund risk loadings (βi,1 6= 0) and in benchmark
returns (Af 6= 0).
Following Avramov and al. (2007), we consider three specific types of hypothetical
Bayesian investors, who have different views concerning the existence of hedge fund man-
agerial skills in timing the benchmarks and selecting financial securities, and compare the
performance of long-only constrained portfolio strategies for these three types of investors.
Forming hedge fund portfolio strategies based on such a methodology allows us to study
the economic significance of fund return predictability and in particular of managerial skills
predictability.
2.3.1 The dogmatist
The first type of investor considered is the dogmatist. This name is chosen to reflect the
fact that this investor has extreme prior beliefs about the potential for managerial skills.
Indeed, it is assumed that the dogmatist rules out the possibility for superior managerial
skills. In this case, αi,0 is fixed at -
1
12
expense where expense is the hedge fund’s annual
reported expense ratio7 and αi,1 is equal to zero. Thus, the dogmatic investor does not
believe that hedge fund allocation decisions can be improved through seeking managers with
private skills.
The dogmatist is further divided into three sub-types based on their beliefs about the
predictability of fund risk loadings and benchmark returns. The first sub-type rules out any
possible predictability, and we call him the no-predictability dogmatist (ND). The second
one (PD-1) is a predictability dogmatist, but he just believes in the predictability of fund risk
loadings (βi,1 6= 0). The third (PD-2) believes in the predictability of both fund risk loadings
7To our knowledge, the data on the fund’s annual reported expense ratio is not available, we therefore
set it to be 2% (the same hereinafter). Setting other values for expense does not change our results. In
Avramov and Wermers (2006), αi,0 is equal to -
1
12 (expense+turnover) where turnover is the fund’s annual
turnover which is even more difficult to obtain in the case of hedge funds.
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and benchmark returns (βi,1 6= 0 and Af 6= 0). For both PD-1 and PD-2, the predictability
in hedge fund returns based on public information can be exploited to improve hedge fund
allocation decisions.
2.3.2 The agnostic
The second type of investor is agnostic with completely diffuse prior beliefs about the exis-
tence and the level of managerial skills. Particularly, the skill level αi,0 +α
′
i,1zt−1 is assumed
to have mean - 1
12
expense and unbounded variance. For the agnostic, prior beliefs are non-
informative and hedge fund manager skills are completely determined by the data.
Unlike Avramov and Wermers (2006) and Avramov et al. (2007), we assume that there
are only two types of agnostic investors instead of five. The first investor (PA-1) believes that
only managerial skills are predictable, while the second one (PA-2) believes that managerial
skills, factor loadings and benchmark returns are all predictable. The two types of investors
respectively correspond to the investors PA-3 and PA-4 in Avramov and Wermers (2006)
and Avramov et al. (2007).
We did not consider three other types of agnostic investors for whom the predictability
in managerial skills is excluded. As shown in Avramov and Wermers (2006) and Avramov et
al (2007), the predictability in managerial skills is the main source of outperformance. The
investors who admit the existence of managerial skills, but deny its predictability, do not
outperform other investors who rules out managerial skills. Since the goal of this study is to
examine whether exploiting business cycle variables that can potentially predict the private
skills of hedge fund managers can still improve investment performance after accounting for
liquidity risk, we decided not to consider those other types of agnostic investors. The same
arguments apply to the skeptic investor types who will be discussed in the next subsection.
2.3.3 The skeptic
The skeptic is an investor who believes in the existence of managerial skills, but his beliefs
are bounded. Like in the previous subsection, we consider two types of investors. One (PS-1)
believes that managerial skills are predictable, while the other (PS-2) believes that hedge
fund allocation decisions can be improved by exploiting the business cycle variables that
potentially forecast fund risk loadings, benchmark returns and managerial skills.
When skills may vary over time, an investor’s prior belief can be modeled, like in Kandel
and Stambaugh (1996), as if the investor observed a hypothetical sample of T0 months in
which there are no managerial skills based on either private or public information, and the
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mean and variance of fund returns, benchmark returns and business cycle variables in the
hypothetical sample are equal to those in the actual sample.
Formally, for the skeptic, the prior mean of αi,1 is zero and the prior mean of αi,0 equals
- 1
12
expense. The joint prior standard errors of these parameters depend on T0. The choice
of T0 is determined by the following equation:
T0 =
s2
σ2α
(
1 +M + SR2max
)
, (2.2)
where SR2max is the largest attainable Sharpe ratio based on investments in the benchmarks
only, M is the number of business cycle variables and s2 is the cross-section average of the
sample variance of the residuals in Eq. (2.1) (the first equation). The proof can be found in
the Appendix of Avramov and Wermers (2006).
2.3.4 Optimal portfolios formation
At each time t, there are Nt hedge funds defining the investment opportunity set, with Nt
varying over time. We follow Avramov et al. (2007) in that each investor forms his portfolio
by maximizing the conditional expected value of a quadratic utility function
U (Wt, Rp,t+1, at, bt) = at +WtRp,t+1 − bt
2
W 2t R
2
p,t+1, (2.3)
where Wt denotes the time t invested wealth, bt reflects the absolute risk aversion parameter
and Rp,t+1 is the realized excess return on the optimal of hedge funds computed as Rp,t+1 =
1+rft+w
′
trt+1, with rft being the risk-free interest rate, rt+1 denoting the vector of excess fund
returns and wt denoting the vector of optimal hedge fund allocations. Taking conditional
expectations on both sides of Eq. (2.3) yields the following optimization problem
w∗t = argmaxwt≥0
{
w
′
tµt −
1
2 (1/γt − rft)w
′
tΛ
−1
t wt
}
, (2.4)
where γt = (btWt)/ (1− btWt) is the relative risk-aversion parameter, Λt = [Σt + µtµ′t]−1,
with µt and Σt being respectively mean vector and variance matrix of future hedge fund
returns. The possibility of leveraging and short selling is excluded when forming optimal
hedge funds’ portfolios.
Investors update their prior beliefs as soon as they obtain new information and the
posterior densities of the parameters are obtained by combining the likelihood functions and
the prior distributions. With such densities, investors can calculate the Bayesian predictive
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distribution of hedge fund returns (vector) rt+1, from which the mean vector µt and variance
matrix Σt of hedge fund excess returns are derived.
For each of the seven types of investors, we use the excess return on the value-weighted
S&P500 index as the benchmark factor to derive his optimal portfolio. Other benchmark
specifications with more factors can be considered, however, the limitation due to a limited
hedge fund data sample makes it less convenient to use those multi-factor specifications. In
addition, using the excess return on the value-weighted S&P500 index as the benchmark
factor allows us to compare the results with the ones obtained by Avramov and al (2007).
2.3.5 Performance evaluation model
We use the Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) six-factor linear model and its extension to evaluate
the hedge funds portfolios’ performance8. This choice is motivated by the fact that this model
accounts for a broad cross-section of meaningful risk exposures for the typical hedge funds
(including equity, interest rate, currencies, commodities, credit and volatility risk factors),
due to their broad investment mandates and that it is widely accepted in the recent hedge
funds literature. The six risk factors are: (1) the excess return on the S&P500 Index; (2)
the excess return on the US Dollar Index; (3) the excess return on the Goldman Sachs
Commodity Index; (4) the excess return on the Lehman Corporate AA Intermediate Bond
Index; (5) the return spread on the Lehman BAA Corporate Bond Index and the Lehman
Treasury Index, and (6) the first-difference of the month-end value of the Chicago Board
Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index.
We regress each portfolio’s monthly returns in excess of the one-month T-bill rate on the
six factors
ri,t = αi + βi,1SP500t + βi,2USDXt + βi,3GSCIt + βi,4LHCAAIt
+βi,5SPREADt + βi,6V IXt + υi,t (2.5)
This performance evaluation model is different from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor
model used in Avramov et al. (2007) which relies on the so-called primitive trend following
strategy (PTFS) risk factors to capture the well-documented option-like payoffs in hedge fund
returns. We are going to use the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model to evaluate the performance
of optimal hedge fund portfolios in the section of ‘Robustness tests’.
8Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) use the linear model in order to replicate hedge fund returns rather than to
evaluate performance.
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2.3.6 Liquidity risk factors
In what follows, we will discuss the construction of the liquidity risk factor which is added
to the performance model described in the previous section in order to examine whether a
liquidity risk factor can explain the previously documented abnormal performance of hedge
funds even after accounting for the existence of predictable managerial skills. The liquidity
risk factor is constructed by using the liquidity measure proposed by Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003). In that paper, the illiquidity of stock i in year y is defined as the ordinary least
squares estimate of γi,t in the following regression
rei,d+1,y = θi,y + φi,yri,d,y + γi,ysign
(
rei,d,y
)
vi,d,y + i,d+1,y, (2.6)
where ri,d,y is the return on stock i on day d in year y; r
e
i,d,y = ri,d,y − rm,d,y, rm,d,y being the
return on the value-weighted CRSP index on day d in year y; and vi,d,y is the trading volume
(in millions of US dollars) for stock i on day d in year y.
This liquidity measure (γi,t) focuses on an aspect of illiquidity associated with temporary
price fluctuations induced by the order flow. The idea behind this measure is that, if signed
volume is viewed roughly as a proxy for the order flow, then greater illiquidity is reflected by
a greater tendency for the order flow in a given direction on day d to be followed by a price
change in the opposite direction on day d + 1. Essentially, greater illiquidity corresponds
to stronger volume-related return reversals, and in this respect this measure follows the
same line of reasoning as the model and the empirical evidence presented by Campbell,
Grossman, and Wang (1993). They find that returns accompanied by high volume tend to
be reversed more strongly, and they explain how this result is consistent with a model in
which some investors are compensated for accommodating the liquidity demands of others.
γi,y is generally negative and larger in absolute level when liquidity is lower.
Stocks are separated into 25 portfolios p = 1, 2, ..., 25 according to their annual illiquidity
measures at the end of the previous year. The first portfolio is composed of the most liquid
stocks, while the least liquid stocks are in the last portfolio. For each portfolio p, we calculate
its return in month t as
rpt =
∑
i in p
wipt r
i
t, (2.7)
where wipt are either equal or value-based weights, depending on the specification. In the
following, we only present the empirical results estimated from equally-weighted returns, the
results estimated from value-weighted returns are quantitatively similar.
The liquidity risk factor, denoted by LIQRISKps, is then defined as the return on the
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least liquid portfolio minus the return on the most liquid portfolio, and its value in month t
can be written as
LIQRISKpst = r
25
t − r1t (2.8)
By definition, this factor can be interpreted as the return that investors are willing to give
up for holding more liquid stocks.
The liquidity risk factor LIQRISKps can then be incorporated into Eq. (2.5) to study
the effect of liquidity risk on the performance of the optimal hedge funds portfolios formed
according to the portfolio optimization scheme described in Section 2.3.4.
In order to check the robustness of the results, we also measure the performance of the
optimal hedge funds portfolios using another liquidity risk factor, denoted by LIQRISKamh,
namely based on the liquidity risk measure proposed by Amihud (2002). The illiquidity of
stock i is now defined as the ratio of its daily absolute return to the daily trading volume
(in millions of US dollars). Specifically, this measure equals |Riyd| /V OLiyd where Riyd is the
return on stock i on day d of year y and V OLiyd is the respective daily trading volume. This
ratio gives the absolute (percentage) price change per dollar of daily, or the price impact of,
the order flow. The intuition behind this illiquidity measure is as follows: a stock is less liquid
if its price moves substantially in response to a given trading volume. This follows Kyle’s
concept of illiquidity as the response of price to order flow and Silber’s (1975) measure of
thinness, defined as the ratio of absolute price change to absolute excess demand for trading.
The annual average illiquidity of stock i over year y is equal to the sum of the daily
illiquidities during this year divided by the number of available trading days, and it can be
described as
ILLIQiy =
1
Diy
Diy∑
t=1
|Riyd| /V OLiyd, (2.9)
where Diy is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in year y. Amihud
(2002) shows empirically that ILLIQ is positively related to measures of price impact and
fixed trading costs, suggesting that the illiquidity measure ILLIQ may be interpreted as
trading costs which include broker fees, bid-ask spread, market impact, and search costs.
As before, we estimate the illiquidity of each stock and then divide stocks into 25 port-
folios according to their absolute illiquidity measures at the end of the previous year. The
Amihud liquidity risk factor LIQRISKamh is defined as the return on the least liquid port-
folio minus the return on the most liquid portfolio.
In this article, we only use equity-based liquidity risk factors, which strictly speaking
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should only be relevant for assessing the performance of hedge funds strategies operating
within this asset class. This choice is motivated by the difficulty to collect analogous data
to construct the Pastor and Stambaugh or the Amihud liquidity risk factors for other asset
classes. We realize that this empirical choice is sub-optimal for non-equity based hedge
funds strategies but it can be partially justified to the extend that liquidity risk tends to
co-vary across different securities markets. In the concluding section, we mention that, as an
extension of this study, it would be worth exploring whether liquidity risk factors constructed
from the direct primary markets price and volume data in which the hedge funds operate,
could help us better explain and disentangle the performance of these non-equity hedge funds
portfolios.
2.4 Data
The hedge fund data used in this paper is taken from the Lipper TASS database which has
been intensively used in academic studies. The database is divided into two parts: Live and
Graveyard hedge funds. Although the TASS database dates back to February 1977, we start
our study in January 1994 when TASS started to report data for Graveyard hedge funds in
order to avoid the well documented survivorship bias. Fung and Hsieh (2000) estimate the
magnitude of the survivorship bias to be around 3% per year, and Liang’s (2000) estimator
is 2.24% per year9. The study thus extends from January 1994 to December 2006.
Another well known bias associated with hedge fund returns is the backfilling bias10.
This bias is due to the fact that hedge funds may choose when and whether or not to backfill
reported returns data to vendors. It is also likely that hedge funds with good historical
return data may go on to seek outside investors and report their returns to database vendors
while funds with poor records do not reach this stage. This bias likely shifts hedge fund
returns upwards. In order to mitigate the impact of the backfilling bias, we will not use the
first 12-month return data for each hedge fund.
In addition, hedge funds have been droped in the case that they: (i) did not report net-
of-fees returns, (ii) reported returns in other currencies than the U.S dollars, (iii) reported
returns less frequently than monthly, and (iv) had less than 24 monthly returns.
After adjusting for the biases and deleting some funds that do not satisfy the above
9Refer to Schneewies and Spurgin (1996), Brown et al. (1997), Fung and Hsieh (1997), Carpenter and
Lynch (1999), Horst et al. (2001), and Baquero (2005) for more studies attempting to quantify the degree
and impact of survivorship bias in the hedge fund industry.
10See Posthuma and van der sluis (2003).
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requirements, we have a total of 4698 hedge funds, of which 2743 are Live funds, in our
sample. Table 1 presents some summary statistics for the entire sample. The Event Driven,
Long/Short Equity Hedge and Multi-Strategy hedge funds yielded the highest average an-
nualized returns and Sharpe ratios (except for Long/Short Equity Hedge) during the period
from January 1994 to December 2006, this can perhaps explain the phenomenon that the
biggest inflows in US-dollar terms were experienced by these three types of hedge funds in
the first quarter of 200711. In contrast, Dedicated Short Bias performed rather poorly dur-
ing the same period, with negative average annualized return and Sharpe ratios. Comparing
Table 1 with Table 2 which only shows summary statistics for the Live hedge funds during
the same period, we find that average annualized returns and Sharpe ratios for all hedge
fund styles but Dedicated Short Bias are higher in the case of Live hedge funds, consistent
with the previous findings by Fung and Hsieh (2000) and Liang (2000).
One feature that is apparent from Table 2 is the positive average lag-one autocorrela-
tion of hedge fund returns. The autocorrelations documented for most of the hedge fund
styles, specially for Convertible Arbitrage, Event Driven, Emerging Markets, Fixed Income
Arbitrage, Fund of Funds and Multi-strategy, are significantly positive and high. We will
account for this hedge funds return characteristic subsequently when we conduct robustness
checks on the performance results.
Daily return and volume data for other financial instruments are downloaded from CRSP.
In order to construct the liquidity risk factors, LIQRISKps and LIQRISKamh, we use
common stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and on the American
Stock Exchange (AMEX). The stocks traded on NASDAQ are excluded since their volume
data include inter-dealer data which result from a different trading mechanism. A stock will
be considered in year y only if it satisfies the following criteria: (i) the stock price at the end
of year y−1 lies between $5 and $1000, (ii) the stock must be listed at the end of year y−1,
and (iii) the stock has return and volume data for more than 100 days during year y − 1.
Figure 1 plots two monthly aggregate liquidity series obtained by taking the average of
the individual-stock Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Amihud (2002) liquidity measures,
and then multiplying by mt/m1, where mt is the total dollar value at the end of month t− 1
of the stocks included in the average in month t and month 1 corresponds to August 1962.
The multiplier mt/m1 reflects the cost of a trade whose size is commensurate with the overall
size of the stock market. It is not difficult to observe that liquidity is usually significantly
lower and the return for liquidity thus significantly higher during the periods characterized
11See the Lipper TASS Asset Flows Report, first quarter 2007.
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by liquidity crises such as: 10/1987 (stock market crash), 6-10/1998 (Russian default and
LTCM crisis) and 2000-2001 (dot.com bubble crash).
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) benchmark factors
and the liquidity risk factors LIQRISKps and LIQRISKamh. We observe that the correla-
tions between the market risk factor S&P500 and both liquidity risk factors are significantly
negative: -0.609 and -0.527, implying that investors require higher returns for less liquid
securities when the market is trending down. This result is consistent with the concept
of “Flight to Quality” during market downturns. Also, the significant negative correlation
between the market risk factor and the volatility factor (-0.703) suggests that volatility in-
creases when the market goes down. Finally, the correlation between the two liquidity risk
factors is very high: 0.892, thus Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Amihud (2002) liquidity
risk measures seem to capture a similar trend in liquidity risk over time.
2.5 Empirical results
This section presents the out-of-sample performance results for the hedge funds’ portfolio
strategies that are optimal from the perspective of the seven types of investors described in
Section 2.3. At the end of each year from 1995 to 2005, the portfolio for each investor is
formed by using the previous 24-month information. Due to the fact that lockup provisions
and redemption notice periods are common in the hedge funds industry, it takes time for
investors to withdraw money from hedge funds, and we therefore reform portfolios only once
every 12 months12.
We follow Avramov et al.’s (2007) selection of the four business cycle instrumental vari-
ables, namely the treasury yield; the default spread defined as the yield difference between
Moody’s Baa rated and Aaa rated bonds; the term spread defined as the yield difference be-
tween Treasury bonds with more than 10 years to maturity and the 3 months T-Bill rate and
the contemporaneous monthly Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index.
In the finance literature, the first three variables are often used to predict stock returns. To
the extend that many hedge funds engage in volatility bets, the fourth variable should allow
investors to predict hedge fund managerial skills over the stock market volatility cycle.
12Avramov et al. (2007) argue that reforming portfolios over shorter horizon does not basically change
the results.
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2.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the seven optimal portfolio returns reported by hedge
fund styles, including mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, annualized Sharpe
ratios (SR), skewness and kurtosis. These hedge fund style statistics are not reported for
the Dedicated Short Bias style because there were too few hedge funds available for this
particular style.
Table 4 shows that the optimal portfolio strategies, which incorporate predictability
in managers’ skills into their investment decisions, earn higher average returns than the
strategies that exclude manager skills, though the difference is small for Long/Short Equity
Hedge and Managed Futures funds. For example, for Emerging Markets funds, the average
return generated by the strategy PS-1 is 2.1%/month, 1.0%/month higher than the highest
average return generated by the dogmatic investors. It is worth noting that, for Multi-
Strategy funds, the average returns generated by all the strategies PS-1, PS-2, PA-1 and
PA-2 are almost 100% higher than those generated by the strategies ND, PD-1 and PD-2.
Looking at the Sharpe ratios, the results are however mixed. For portfolios representa-
tive of the Fund of Funds, Global Macro, Long/Short Equity Hedge and Managed Futures
categories, the strategies ND, PD-1 and PD-2 generate higher Sharpe ratios. For funds in
Convertible Arbitrage, Equity Market Neutral and Multi-Strategy, the highest Sharpe ratios
generated by the strategies which do and do not incorporate predictable manager skills are
quite close.
The combination of higher average returns and relatively lower Sharpe ratios implies
that the returns generated by the strategies PS-1, PS-2, PA-1 and PA-2 are more volatile,
which is also apparent from Table 4. One potential explanation of the more volatile returns
generated by the strategies PS-1, PS-2, PA-1 and PA-2 may be due to the fact that the
number of funds in which these strategies invest is much lower over time13, indicating that
these strategies are less diversified and thus more volatile.
In addition, the returns for many hedge fund styles portfolios, such as for Event Driven,
Emerging Markets, Convertible Arbitrage, display negative skewness and are left tailed,
implying that these portfolios may suffer from infrequent but extreme losses.
13See Table 5 in the following.
2.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 55
2.5.2 Analysis of the optimal portfolios’ components
Before evaluating the out-of-sample performance of the optimal portfolios, we analyze some
characteristics of their hedge fund components in order to identify potential patterns char-
acterizing these optimal hedge fund strategies. The results are shown in Table 5.
The portfolio characteristics considered here are: the number of hedge funds, the age of
the hedge funds since their inception (in years), the redemption notice periods (in days), the
lock-up provisions (in months), and the assets under management (in hundred of millions of
dollars). At the end of each year between 1995 and 2005, the value of a portfolio characteristic
is defined as the equally-weighted average of the individual hedge funds’ characteristics. The
numbers in Table 5 correspond to the time series averages of the portfolio characteristics’
values over the period 1995 to 2005.
It is clear from Table 5 that, on average, over time the number of hedge funds in the
portfolios which exclude managerial skills are much larger for all hedge fund styles. This
feature may partially explain the phenomenon documented in the last part of Section 2.5.1,
namely that these portfolios are less volatile as they are more diversified. For example, in
Emerging Markets, the time series average number of hedge funds for the portfolios ND,
PD-1 and PD-2 is always higher than thirty while the average number of hedge funds for
the other four portfolios is lower than nine. This observation is not surprising because, as
implied by the hedge fund return generating model (2.1), the skeptic and agnostic investors
prefer to bet on the specific risks of hedge funds while the dogmatic investors try to diversify
these risks.
Hedge funds in the dogmatic portfolios usually tend to be older except that for a few
hedge fund styles, hedge funds in the portfolio PS-1 on average have longer records than those
selected by some dogmatic portfolios, in other words, the skeptic and agnostic investors prefer
younger funds.
An interesting result in Table 5 is that the portfolios taking into account managerial
skills do not necessarily choose hedge funds with more restrictive lock-up provisions and
redemption notice periods. Aragon (2007) uses hedge fund share restrictions like lock-up
provisions and redemption notice periods as transaction cost approximation and documents
a positive and concave relation between share restrictions and excess returns on hedge funds.
More precisely, he shows that the excess returns of hedge funds with share restrictions
are 4-7% higher than those delivered by other hedge funds which do not have such share
restrictions. One important implication of these results is that our conclusions about the
effect of liquidity risk on hedge fund performance are most likely not driven by hedge funds
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intrinsic liquidity restrictions.
The relation between the assets under management and the types of portfolios shows
no clear pattern. In the case of Event Driven, Emerging Markets, Equity Market Neutral,
Long/Short Equity Hedge and Managed Futures style based portfolios, the dogmatic hedge
funds generally display more assets under management. However, in the case of Multi-
Strategy or Global Macro portfolios, the average assets managed by skeptic and agnostic
hedge funds tend to be generally larger.
2.5.3 Performance evaluation results
We evaluate the out-of-sample performance of portfolios first with respect to the Hasanhodzic
and Lo (2007) six-factor model, and then using the extended performance evaluation model
that is obtained by including the liquidity risk factor LIQRISKps, which is constructed
using Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure, into Eq. (2.5).
The performance evaluation results excluding the effect of liquidity risk are reported in
the third column of Table 6. First, we corroborate Avramov et al. (2007) empirical results
since we also find that the portfolio strategies which incorporate predictability in managerial
skills perform in general noticeably better than other strategies. For example, for Emerging
Markets hedge funds, the alphas generated by the portfolio strategies PS-1, PA-1 and PA-
2 are significant at least at 10% level and about one time higher that the highest alpha
generated by the strategies ND, PD-1, PD-2. Moreover, for Long/Short Equity Hedge funds,
the significant alphas generated by both the portfolio strategies PS-1 and PA-2 are higher
than the highest alpha generated by the strategies ND, PD-1, PD-2 although the difference
is quite small. It is worth mentioning that the alphas generated by the portfolio strategies
PS-1, PS-2, PA-1 and PA-2 are surprisingly high for Multi-strategy funds, reaching between
1.54% for the PS-2 investor and 2.69% for the PS-1 investor. This may be due to the fact
that these hedge funds have the flexibility to opportunistically maneuver between strategies
based on the business cycles and can exploit this at an even greater advantage when full
business cycle induced predictability is accounted for.
Second, predictability in managerial skills matters the most for portfolio strategies be-
longing to the Event Driven, Emerging Markets, Equity Market Neutral and Multi-Strategy
styles that, except for Equity Market Neutral, can be mapped into the following alterna-
tively defined hedge fund styles: Multi-process and Directional Trader14. Avramov et al.
14See Appendix A in Agarwal et al. (2005).
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(2007) obtained similar results15. Note that, in our case, incorporating predictability in
managerial skills can even improve the performance of portfolio strategies belonging to the
Relative Value (including Convertible Arbitrage, Equity Market Neutral and Fixed Income
Arbitrage) and Fund of Funds styles, unlike in Avramov et al. (2007).
Third, compared with the alphas obtained in Avramov et al. (2007), ours are usually
higher, particularly for the portfolio strategies PS-1, PS-2, PA-1 and PA-2 belonging to the
Relative Value, Fund of Funds and Multi-Strategy styles, this result may be attributed to the
steady bull market during the 2003-2006 period which has not been considered in Avramov
et al. (2007).
The results obtained so far show that the strategies PS-1, PS-2, PA-1 and PA-2 perform
better than the strategies ND, PD-1 and PD-2 in most hedge fund styles, in other words,
the strategies that incorporate predictability in managerial skills into their investment de-
cisions are able to generate higher significant excess returns. Thus, it seems that: first,
there exist hedge fund managers who possess stock selection and benchmark timing skills;
second, investors are able to select the managers with such skills by exploiting business cycle
variables.
However, when evaluating the performance of these hedge funds’ portfolios, we have until
now ignored an important risk to which many hedge funds styles may be exposed, namely
liquidity risk. How does liquidity risk affect the performance of these portfolio strategies?
Can an omitted illiquidity risk premium explain part of the outperformance of portfolio
strategies that incorporate predictability in managerial skills? To answer these questions,
let us focus at the fourth column of Table 6, which reports the alphas and the liquidity
risk betas of the various hedge fund portfolios under the enlarged performance model with
liquidity risk factor LIQRISKps.
The main results can be summarized as follows: the estimated liquidity risk beta βps is
significantly positive at least at the 5% level for almost all portfolio strategies within the
Convertible Arbitrage, Event Driven, Emerging Markets, Fund of Funds, Global Macro and
Long/Short Equity Hedge strategies, with a unique exception for the portfolio PA-1 in the
Emerging Markets. More importantly, once the effect of liquidity risk is introduced, alphas
are reduced to insignificant levels for most hedge fund style portfolios, this result holds no
matter whether or not predictability in managerial skills is incorporated. Indeed, the number
of alphas which are significant at least at 10 % level is reduced from 43 to 22 cases once the
effect of liquidity risk is considered.
15See the results in Table 3 of Avramov et al. (2007).
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To be precise, for hedge funds in Convertible Arbitrage, Fund of Funds, Global Macro
and Long/Short Equity Hedge, when the effect of liquidity risk is introduced, the alphas
generated by the strategies PS-1, PS-2, PA-1 and PA-2 are generally insignificant. For
instance, among Fund of Funds portfolio strategies, the strategy PA-1 delivers an alpha of
1.16%/month which is significant at 10% level and 0.27%/month higher than the highest
alpha (0.89%/month and significant at 1% level) generated by the strategies adopted by
the dogmatic investors, but this result does not hold any more as soon as the effect of
liquidity risk is taken into account. Once again, for Fund of Funds, the alpha generated
by the strategy PA-1 is reduced to 0.74%/month and becomes insignificant at conventional
levels when liquidity risk premium is accounted for. Liquidity risk bears however a moderate
impact on the performance of the strategy PD-2 whose alpha decreases to 0.67%/month, but
still remains significant at 1% level. Hence, the introduction of liquidity risk reverses the
relative outperformance of these predictability based strategies. Similar results also hold for
Convertible Arbitrage, Global Macro and Long/Short Equity Hedge styles based portfolio
strategies.
For Event Driven and Emerging Markets hedge funds, although some portfolio strategies
incorporating predictability in managerial skills still perform better than other strategies
once the effect of liquidity risk is taken into account, the alphas with liquidity risk are
dramatically reduced. For example, for Event Driven hedge funds, the alphas generated by
the strategies ND, PD-1 and PS-1 turn to be insignificant after the effect of liquidity risk is
controlled for. The alpha generated by the strategy PA-2 also decreases by more than 30%
(from 1.09%/month to 0.73%/month) although PA-2 is the unique portfolio strategy whose
alpha remains significant after considering the effect of liquidity risk.
A possible explanation for these new results is that hedge funds in the Convertible Ar-
bitrage, Event Driven, Emerging Markets, Fund of Funds, Global Macro and Long/Short
Equity Hedge styles rely on securities and operate within markets which bear a significant
exposure to liquidity risk. Hence, it is not surprising that investors will require a liquidity
risk premium if they invest in these types of hedge funds16.
Finally, it should be noted that, for most portfolio strategies belonging to the Fixed
Income Arbitrage, Equity Market Neutral, Managed Futures and Multi-Strategy styles, the
effect of liquidity risk is marginal: the estimated liquidity risk beta βps are, except for the
16In a recent paper, Khandani and Lo (2007) analyze long/short equity strategies and find that their
liquidity significantly decreased over the last decade. They argue that this may be due to the rapid growth
in the number and in the assets under management of long/short equity funds as well as the likely increase
in the amount of leverage each fund now employs.
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Fixed Income Arbitrage style based portfolios, insignificantly different from zero although
positive, and the introduction of liquidity risk only has a rather limited impact on the alphas.
For example, in the enlarged performance evaluation model, the alphas generated by all port-
folio strategies in Multi-Strategy only decrease by less than 11 basis points which, compared
with the levels of the alphas, is very small, and again the skeptic and agnostic portfolio
strategies perform much better than the the dogmatic ones. These results suggest that some
of these hedge funds do not operate with a large exposure to illiquid markets, this is most
likely to be the case for managed futures portfolios, or that, as seems to be the case for Fixed
Income Arbitrage and Multi-Strategy portfolios, they are not primarily equity-oriented, and
thus do not respond and covary with a liquidity risk factor constructed using stock market
data. A noticeable conclusion form our study, is that it is only the Multi-Strategy and
the Equity Market Neutral hedge funds portfolios which seem to display consistently sig-
nificant alphas which furthermore increase when the predictability of managerial skills is
accounted for. This conclusion suggests that only managers in these two categories are able
to respectively select stocks and time markets predictably and successfully.
2.5.4 Robustness tests
2.5.4.1 Fung and Hsieh (2004) Seven-Factor model
As a robustness test, we first report the results obtained with the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model and its extension to account for the effect of liquidity risk when we
evaluate the performance of the optimal hedge funds portfolios:
ri,t = αi + βi,1SP500t + βi,2SCMLCt + βi,310Yt + βi,4CredSprt
+βi,5BdOptt + βi,6FXOptt + βi,7ComOptt + υi,t (2.10)
where SP500 =the S&P500 excess return; SCMLC =the Wilshire Small Cap 1750 - Wilshire
Large Cap 750 return; 10Y =the month-end to month-end change in the U.S. Federal Reserve
10-year constant-maturity yield; CredSpr=the month-end to month-end change in the dif-
ference between the Moody’s Baa yield and the Federal Reserve’s 10-year constant-maturity
yield; BdOpt=the return of a portfolio of lookback straddles on bond futures; FXOpt=the
return of a portfolio of lookback straddles on currency futures; ComOpt=the return of a port-
folio of lookback straddles on commodity futures. The three risk factors of BdOpt, FXOpt
and ComOpt are added to capture the fact that hedge fund returns relate to option-based
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strategy returns17.
The size factor SCMLC and the liquidity risk factor LIQRISKps are correlated with
the coefficient being 0.42, in order to separate the size component from the liquidity risk
factor, we regress the liquidity risk factor on the size factor and then use the innovations as
the liquidity risk factor proxy denoted by LIQRISKinn.
The estimated alphas and liquidity risk betas in this model and its extended version
are shown in the fourth column of Table 6. In the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model without
LIQRISKinn, the alphas αfh of the optimal hedge funds portfolios, compared with those
obtained in the Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) model, are generally lower, particularly, for
hedge funds in Global Macro and Managed Futures, no portfolio can generate significant
alpha even before controlling for the effect of liquidity risk. For hedge funds in the Fund
of Funds and Long/Short Equity Hedge styles, the agnostic and skeptic investors do not
significantly outperform the dogmatic investors since none of the portfolios PS-1, PS-2, PA-
1 and PA-2 can deliver significant positive alphas.
The second and third sub-columns of the fourth column in Table 6 show the alphas αinnfh
and the betas βfhinn of LIQRISK
inn in the enlarged Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. Similar
as in the previous case, the significance of βfhinn varies across hedge fund styles. For a major
number of portfolios belonging to the Convertible Arbitrage, Event Driven, Fund of Funds,
Global Macro and Long/Short Equity Hedge styles, βfhinn is significantly positive. In other
hedge fund styles, βfhinn is insignificant for most of portfolios. It is easy to observe that the
betas of LIQRISKinn are generally lower and less significant in the enlarged Fung and Hsieh
(2004) model, this is because the size component is separated from the liquidity risk factor,
if we use the liquidity risk factor LIQRISKps itself rather than its innovation and abstract
from the size factor, then we obtain the similar liquidity risk factor betas as in the enlarged
Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) model18.
In this model, the alphas decrease for a number of hedge fund styles based portfolios when
the effect of liquidity risk is taken into account, for example, the alphas generated by the
portfolio PA-1 for Convertible Arbitrage hedge funds and the portfolio PA-2 for Emerging
Markets hedge funds are reduced to insignificant levels, and the alphas of some portfolios
belonging to the Event Driven, Fund of Funds and Long/Short Equity Hedge styles decline
by about 20%-30% although they remain significant. Liquidity risk only has limited impact
on the alphas of the Equity Market Neutral, Fixed Income Arbitrage and Multi-Strategy
styles based portfolios.
17To avoid to be voluminous, we do not report the coefficients of BdOpt, FXOpt and ComOpt.
18The relevant results are not presented for the sake of parsimony but are available upon request
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2.5.4.2 Amihud (2002) liquidity measure
There exist several liquidity risk proxy measures used in the finance literature. It therefore
seems reasonable to examine whether our results are robust to alternative liquidity risk
measures. In the following, we conduct the previous evaluation exercise using the liquidity
risk factor LIQRISKamh constructed with Amihud (2002) liquidity measure for common
stocks.
The performance evaluation results for the seven optimal portfolios associated with
each hedge funds style are shown in Table 7. The results with the liquidity risk factor
LIQRISKamh are generally similar to those that we have obtained above although the ef-
fect of introducing the Amihud liquidity risk factor is slightly smaller in the sense that the
liquidity risk factor betas are lower and the reduction of the alphas is less pronounced. This
is not very surprising since the two liquidity risk factors are highly positive correlated, as
documented in Table 3. As before, except for non equity-oriented and market neutral fund
portfolios, the coefficients of LIQRISKamh are significantly positive at conventional levels,
and the outperformance of the portfolios PS-1, PS-2, PA-1 and PA-2 belonging to the Fund
of Funds, Global Macro and Long/Short Equity Hedge styles, after adjusting for liquidity
risk premium, vanishes. Again, for the Event Driven and Emerging Markets style portfolios,
the alphas generated by the strategies PS-1, PS-2, PA-1 and PA-2 are greatly reduced after
liquidity risk is accounted for, but some of them still remain significant. One noticeable
different result obtained with LIQRISKamh is that the alpha delivered by the Convertible
Arbitrage style based portfolio PA-1 is still significant although it decreases by almost a
quarter when the effect of liquidity risk is accounted for.
2.5.4.3 The January effect
According to studies by Keim (1983), Tinic and West (1986), and Eleswarapu and Reinganum
(1993), excluding the returns observed during the month of January has the potential of
eliminating the impact of liquidity related explanatory factors such as the size and bid-ask
spread. In order to check whether our results are driven by a seasonal component, we exclude
the month of January from our data and re-evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the
hedge funds style based optimal portfolios. The results are displayed in Table 8. The effect of
liquidity risk basically remains when we exclude the January data, hence it can be concluded
that the January effect is not driving the results observed in our sample.
It is worth mentioning that the alphas generated by most portfolio strategies in most
hedge fund styles are reduced when the January data is excluded. For instance, for the
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Fund of Funds, Long/Short Equity Hedge and Managed Futures funds, no portfolio strategy
incorporating predictability in managerial skills generates a significant alpha even before
accounting for the effect of liquidity risk. The lower alphas estimated in the absence of
January data may reflect the fact that hedge fund returns are higher in January on aver-
age than during the rest of year. Agarwal et al. (2005) show that during 1994-2002, the
average January return of hedge funds was indeed higher than the average return during
the February-December period (1.65% versus 1.04%) although it was lower than the average
December return (1.65% versus 2.52%)19. The mere fact that the January and December
returns of hedge funds are higher seems to be primarily driven by the tendency of hedge
funds to smooth their returns20.
2.5.5 Hedge fund return smoothing
As already mentioned above, some hedge fund managers have a tendency to smooth returns
and this characteristic has been well documented in the literature. Indeed, Asness, Krail, and
Liew (2001), Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) as well as Agarwal and al. (2005) argue
that reported hedge fund returns might not reflect all publicly available information that
would be reflected in a contemporaneous market index. Instead, hedge fund returns might
exhibit-deliberately or involuntarily-delayed informational adjustments and thus correlate
with lagged market index returns.
We follow Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001) in that we use a simple method to account
for the possible presence of return smoothing and modify the performance evaluation model
presented in Section 2.3.5 by adding the lagged S&P500 index returns as an additional factor.
The results for this specification of the performance evaluation model are displayed in Table
921. Surprisingly, we observe that the regression coefficients associated with the lagged
S&P500 index returns are not necessarily significant nor positive. One potential explanation
for this phenomenon is that the effect of the lagged S&P500 index returns is diversified away
19See Fig. 1 in Agarwal et al. (2005)
20A specific type of return smoothing, which is called “December Bonanza”, in the hedge fund industry
has been documented in Agarwal et al. (2005) who argue that the unusual higher returns in December may
be due to the fact that fund managers manipulate their returns at the end of the year in order to earn
incentive fees. In order to account for the effect of this type of return smoothing on the hedge funds portfolio
performance, we re-evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the hedge fund style based optimal portfolios
while dropping December data, and we find that the results obtained here are quite similar to what we have
obtained in Section 2.5.3.3, this means that the alphas are reduced after accounting for this type of hedge
fund return smoothing.
21We only report the results with one-month lagged S&P500 index returns, the results with longer horizon
lagged S&P500 index returns are similar.
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at the portfolio level. Therefore, for most types of styles portfolios, the alphas are just slightly
reduced and their significances almost remain unchanged after the lagged effect is taken into
account. The coefficients of the liquidity risk factor LIQRISKps are again significantly
positive for the portfolios belonging to the Convertible Arbitrage, Event Driven, Emerging
Markets, Fund of Funds, Global Macro and Long/Short Equity Hedge styles when the lagged
S&P500 index returns are added as an additional factor, and for most portfolio strategies in
all hedge fund styles but Equity Market Neutral, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Managed Futures
and Multi-Strategy, the alphas are once again reduced to insignificant levels after accounting
for the effect of liquidity risk.
2.5.6 Financial crises and the effect of liquidity risk
Financial crises may have an impact on the previous hedge funds portfolio performance
results. We pursue this conjecture by examining whether the lack of superior performance
documented so far for most hedge funds’ portfolios once we introduce liquidity risk is mainly
driven by large discontinuous liquidity shocks experienced by hedge funds during financial
crises. In order to test this hypothesis, we thus undertake the performance estimation
regressions during the sample period while excluding the months of July 1997, August and
September 1998, and March 2000 when the following financial crises respectively occurred:
the Asian financial crisis, the Russian Government bond default and the following debacle of
Long Term Capital Management, and the dot-com bubble burst. The results are displayed
in Table 10. This table shows that for a majority of hedge fund styles, the estimated alphas
before accounting for the effect of liquidity risk when the return data over the financial
crisis periods are excluded are higher than the alphas in Table 6. Indeed, this result is not
surprising as most types of style portfolios suffered losses during the financial crises (mainly
during the Russian financial crisis and the debacle of Long-Term Capital Management),
thus, their estimated alphas are less eroded when the return data over these crises periods
is excluded. Moreover, the estimated coefficients of the liquidity risk factor LIQRISKps
are again significantly positive for the hedge fund portfolios belonging to the Convertible
Arbitrage, Event Driven, Emerging Markets, Fund of Funds, Global Macro, and Long/Short
Equity Hedge styles although they are in general lower than those in Table 6. Third, the
effect of liquidity risk on the alphas of all types of style portfolios is almost unchanged. One
interesting exception is that now when the effect of liquidity risk is accounted for, the alpha
generated by the Managed Futures fund portfolio PA-2 is reduced to an insignificant level
while the PD-2’s alpha remains significant, which suggests that incorporating predictability
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in managerial skills could not improve the performance of the Managed Futures style based
portfolios when we drop the return data during the financial crisis periods.
Hence, following the results in Table 10, we can conclude that financial crises were not the
main liquidity events that affected the performance of hedge fund portfolios in our sample.
Frequent yet small liquidity shocks seem to matter as well and to represent an important
systematic risk factor affecting most hedge funds portfolios’ returns during the sample period.
2.6 Conclusion
In this article, we study the effect of liquidity risk on the performance of optimal hedge fund
portfolio strategies. The portfolio strategies in each hedge fund style are formed by incor-
porating predictability in: (i) managerial skills, (ii) fund risk loadings, and (iii) benchmark
returns. Like in Avramov et al. (2007), we observe that, before taking into account the
effect of liquidity risk, positive weights-constrained hedge fund portfolios that incorporate
predictability in managerial skills dominate other hedge fund styles based portfolios. How-
ever, the outperformance of these strategies disappears or weakens dramatically for six out
of ten types of hedge funds portfolios as soon as the effect of liquidity risk is incorporated
into the performance evaluation framework of Hazanhodzic and Lo (2007). That is, for these
hedge fund style based portfolio strategies incorporating predictability in managerial skills,
the “alphas” to a large extend merely reflect compensation for liquidity risk bearing. These
results are robust to the choice of: (i) an alternative performance evaluation model (The
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model), (ii) an alternative liquidity risk proxy (based on
Amihud illiquidity measure), (iii) the exclusion of the January effect, and (iv) the exclusion
of the major recent financial crises.
We believe that these results provide strong support for the fact that many hedge funds
act as liquidity providers and should be as such compensated for their exposure to liquidity
risk both during and outside of financial crises. This risk bearing compensation is however
distinct from hedge funds’ managerial ability to generate superior performance and should
be recognized as such by incorporating liquidity risk into the performance evaluation models
used to identify their skills. Hopefully, using the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) or the Amihud
(2002) liquidity risk proxies advocated in this study may help researchers and practitioners
to achieve this goal. However these two liquidity risk proxies were constructed with equity
only data and thus may not be suitable for all hedge funds styles. Indeed, we observed that
the effect of liquidity risk was very weak for some non-equity (like fixed income arbitrage or
multi-strategy) hedge funds and for market neutral hedge funds. This may be attributable
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in the former case to the fact that these hedge funds do not respond and covary with a
liquidity risk factor constructed with equity data. In the future, it would be worth exploring
whether similar liquidity risk factors that are constructed with non-equity securities price
and volume data can help us explain and disentangle the performance of these hedge funds.
Finally, to the extend that liquidity risk and its premiums may to some extend be pre-
dictable, it would be interesting to explore how predictability in managerial skills is affected
by the recognition of this additional source of predictability in securities and thus hedge
funds’ returns. The negative performance during the current dramatic liquidity crisis doc-
umented widely in the international press raises doubt regarding the ability of most hedge
funds to time and exploit liquidity shocks but such a conjecture certainly deserves further
empirical investigation.
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2.7 Appendix
The following is a list of hedge fund style descriptions, taken directly from Lipper TASS doc-
umentation, that define the criteria used by Lipper TASS in assigning funds in the database
to one of eleven possible styles22.
• Convertible Arbitrage: This strategy is identified by hedge investing in the convertible
securities of a company. A typical investment is to be long the convertible bond and short
the common stock of the same company. Positions are designed to generate profits from
the fixed income security as well as the short sale of stock, while protecting principal from
market moves.
• Dedicated Short Bias: Dedicated short sellers were once a robust category of hedge funds
before the long bull market rendered the strategy difficult to implement. A new category,
short biased, has emerged. The strategy is to maintain net short as opposed to pure short
exposure. Short bias managers take short positions in mostly equities and derivatives. The
short bias of a manager’s portfolio must be constantly greater than zero to be classified in
this category.
• Emerging Markets: This strategy involves equity or fixed income investing in emerging
markets around the world. Because many emerging markets do not allow short selling, nor
offer viable futures or other derivative products with which to hedge, emerging market in-
vesting often employs a long-only strategy.
• Equity Market Neutral: This investment strategy is designed to exploit equity market inef-
ficiencies and usually involves being simultaneously long and short matched equity portfolios
of the same size within a country. Market neutral portfolios are designed to be either beta
or currency neutral, or both. Well designed portfolios typically control for industry, sector,
market capitalization, and other exposures. Leverage is often applied to enhance returns.
• Event-Driven: This strategy is defined as equity-oriented investing designed to capture
price movement generated by an anticipated corporate event. There are four popular sub-
categories in event-driven strategies: risk arbitrage, distressed securities, Regulation D and
high yield investing.
• Fixed Income Arbitrage: The fixed income arbitrageur aims to profit from price anomalies
between related interest rate securities. Most managers trade globally with a goal of generat-
ing steady returns with low volatility. This category includes interest rate swap arbitrage, US
and non-US government bond arbitrage, forward yield curve arbitrage, and mortgage-backed
22Visit http://www.hedgeworld.com for more information.
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securities arbitrage. The mortgage-backed market is primarily US-based, over-the-counter
and particularly complex.
• Global Macro: Global macro managers carry long and short positions in any of the world’s
major capital or derivative markets. These positions reflect their views on overall market
direction as influence by major economic trends and/or events. The portfolios of these funds
can include stocks, bonds, currencies, and commodities in the form of cash or derivatives
instruments. Most funds invest globally in both developed and emerging markets.
• Long/Short Equity Hedge: This directional strategy involves equity-oriented investing on
both the long and short sides of the market. The objective is not to be market neutral.
Managers have the ability to shift from value to growth, from small to medium to large cap-
italization stocks, and from a net long position to a net short position. Managers may use
futures and options to hedge. The focus may be regional, such as long/short US or European
equity, or sector specific, such as long and short technology or healthcare stocks. Long/short
equity funds tend to build and old portfolios that are substantially more concentrated than
those of traditional stock funds.
• Managed Futures: This strategy invests in listed financial and commodity futures markets
and currency markets around the world. The managers are usually referred to as Commodity
Trading Advisors, or CTAs. Trading disciplines are generally systematic or discretionary.
Systematic traders tend to use price and market specific information (often technical) to
make trading decisions, while discretionary managers use a judgmental approach.
•Multi-Strategy: The funds in this category are characterized by their ability to dynamically
allocate capital among strategies falling within several traditional hedge-fund disciplines.
The use of many strategies, and the ability to reallocate capital between them in response
to market opportunities, means that such funds are not easily assigned to any traditional
category.
• Fund of Funds: Just as the name implies, this is a hedge fund that invests in other hedge
funds. Diversification can be across styles by including funds with different strategies, or can
be within a single strategy but spread among various hedge funds employing that strategy.
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Aggregate Liquidity Based on Amihud's (2002) Illiquidity Measure
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Fig. 1. This figure plots two series of U.S. equity market liquidity levels over the period 
from January 1987 to December 2006. Each month’s observation is obtained by averaging 
individual stock liquidity measures for the month and then multiplying by mt/m1, where 
mt is the total dollar value at the end of month t-1 of the stocks included in the average in 
month t, and month 1 corresponds to August 1962. An individual stock liquidity measure 
for a given month is either the average of the ratios of the daily absolute return to the 
trading volume or a regression slope coefficient estimated using daily returns and trading 
volume data within that month. 
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Table 1: This table reports some summary statistics for both TASS live and defunct hedge
funds over the period between January 1994 and December 2006: sample size, the mean
and standard deviation of annualized means, annualized standard deviations, annualized
Sharpe ratios and lag-one autocorrelations.
Annualized Annualized Annualized
mean(%) stdv(%) Sharpe Ratio ρ1(%)
Fund Sample —————— —————— —————— ——————
Style Size mean stdv mean stdv mean stdv mean stdv
Convertible Arbitrage 169 6.50 8.21 6.50 5.15 0.85 2.06 34.55 20.35
Dedicated Short Bias 31 -2.95 8.92 21.57 12.17 -0.23 0.49 7.98 10.59
Event Driven 453 11.22 10.42 8.23 9.27 1.47 2.71 18.94 18.93
Emerging Markets 279 9.88 18.74 20.70 15.32 0.61 1.04 14.32 16.36
Equity Market Neutral 255 6.83 8.23 7.38 5.14 0.65 1.10 2.84 22.16
Fixed Income Arbitrage 204 6.66 7.81 6.41 7.45 1.80 4.62 18.99 21.52
Fund of Funds 1078 7.64 7.63 7.58 7.19 0.95 1.20 17.74 16.16
Global Macro 223 5.61 12.81 13.67 9.59 0.20 0.86 4.85 17.63
Long/Short Equity Hedge 1444 10.16 13.70 15.74 11.79 0.63 0.83 8.41 17.05
Managed Futures 395 5.79 13.83 20.16 19.12 0.20 0.79 -0.10 14.74
Multi-Strategy 167 11.97 13.77 9.51 10.43 1.46 1.90 11.97 23.86
Total 4698 8.60 12.11 12.34 12.08 0.81 1.69 12.25 19.26
Table 2: This table reports some summary statistics only for TASS live hedge funds over
the period between January 1994 and December 2006: sample size, the mean and standard
deviation of annualized means, annualized standard deviations, annualized Sharpe ratios
and lag-one autocorrelations.
Annualized Annualized Annualized
mean(%) stdv(%) Sharpe Ratio ρ1(%)
Fund Sample —————— —————— —————— ——————
Style Size mean stdv mean stdv mean stdv mean stdv
Convertible Arbitrage 76 8.45 5.32 6.20 5.81 1.51 2.53 39.21 21.08
Dedicated Short Bias 16 -5.28 6.52 19.12 10.73 -0.84 1.46 0.00 24.29
Event Driven 271 13.98 12.17 7.10 7.59 2.41 4.58 17.77 21.58
Emerging Markets 164 21.66 21.37 15.21 11.95 1.64 2.45 11.38 20.17
Equity Market Neutral 142 8.91 6.40 6.38 4.88 1.12 1.50 0.19 26.02
Fixed Income Arbitrage 126 9.84 7.25 4.20 3.52 2.55 5.26 15.49 26.20
Fund of Funds 756 10.03 6.98 6.18 4.48 1.88 9.19 17.57 17.61
Global Macro 111 8.76 10.39 10.86 5.98 0.22 1.51 2.12 18.98
Long/Short Equity Hedge 798 14.98 15.65 12.79 7.85 0.99 1.06 6.81 20.68
Managed Futures 162 15.09 32.82 16.95 9.66 1.20 4.63 -1.32 18.09
Multi-Strategy 121 13.17 9.57 7.50 8.67 2.47 4.12 12.67 25.44
Total 2743 12.74 14.71 9.61 8.13 1.54 5.48 11.62 22.05
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix of Risk Factors
This table presents the sample correlation matrix of Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) benchmarks:
the excess return on the S&P500 index (SP500), the excess return on the US Dollar index
(USDX), the excess return on the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI), the excess
return on the Lehman Corporate Intermediate Bond Index (LHUSCAAI), the return spread
between the US Aggregate Long Credit BAA Bond Index and the Lehman Treasury Long
Index (SPREAD), the first difference of the CBOE Volatility Index (FDVIX), and the liq-
uidity risk factors LIQRISKps and LIQRISKamh that are respectively constructed using
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Amihud (2002) liquidity measures.
SP500 USDX GSCI LHUSCAAI SPREAD FDVIX LIQRISKps LIQRISKamh
SP500 1.000
USDX 0.054 1.000
GSCI -0.009 -0.165 1.000
LHUSCAAI -0.060 -0.243 0.062 1.000
SPREAD -0.474 -0.078 -0.072 -0.262 1.000
FDVIX -0.703 -0.092 -0.014 0.098 -0.477 1.000
LIQRISKps -0.609 0.045 0.055 0.003 -0.208 0.420 1.000
LIQRISKamh -0.527 -0.071 0.063 -0.005 -0.122 0.350 0.892 1.000
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Table 4
Summary Statistics for Portfolio Performance by Hedge Fund Styles
This table reports, for each hedge fund style, some summary statistics during the period
from 1996 to 2006 for the portfolios that are optimal from the perspective of the seven
types of investors described above in the context: mean, minimum, maximum, standard
deviation, annualized Sharpe ratio, skewness and kurtosis. The portfolios for each type of
fund investor are formed by assuming that investor uses the benchmark factor defined as the
return on the value-weighted S&P500 index to form expectations about future moments for
asset allocation. Investors rebalance their portfolios every 12 months and use the preceding
24 months to form expectations about future moments.
Fund Portfolio Mean Min Max Standard Sharpe
Style Strategy (%) (%) (%) Deviation Ratio
Skew Kurt
ND 0.825 −31.28 14.67 5.28 0.340 −1.505 12.99
PD-1 0.909 −18.07 12.78 4.20 0.495 −1.161 7.81
PD-2 0.929 −13.53 10.14 3.16 0.682 −1.412 10.01
Convertible Arbitrage PS-1 0.880 −20.33 13.58 4.49 0.440 −1.111 7.88
PS-2 0.954 −25.71 25.37 5.45 0.410 −0.359 10.26
PA-1 1.211 −21.99 14.17 4.22 0.736 −1.224 10.86
PA-2 0.556 −12.96 10.90 3.64 0.236 −0.859 6.11
ND 1.087 −18.85 14.94 3.79 0.711 −0.873 9.07
PD-1 0.834 −16.25 8.99 2.87 0.636 −1.730 12.41
PD-2 0.763 −16.21 8.11 2.76 0.570 −2.062 14.06
Event Driven PS-1 1.374 −14.15 12.84 5.07 0.726 −0.428 3.54
PS-2 1.166 −20.00 16.82 5.35 0.554 −0.701 5.89
PA-1 1.385 −17.11 18.79 6.42 0.578 −0.102 3.88
PA-2 1.604 −9.41 12.41 3.89 1.149 −0.026 3.32
ND 0.832 −47.21 22.54 7.83 0.232 −1.814 13.55
PD-1 1.093 −34.75 16.57 5.31 0.511 −2.405 18.05
PD-2 0.959 −32.44 13.44 4.86 0.463 −2.623 19.20
Emerging Markets PS-1 2.104 −42.87 34.94 9.27 0.671 −0.170 7.77
PS-2 0.777 −22.34 22.25 7.01 0.231 −0.206 4.09
PA-1 1.879 −14.11 26.08 7.59 0.716 −0.801 4.12
PA-2 1.978 −39.90 24.15 7.34 0.787 −1.045 10.72
ND 0.718 −7.33 13.69 3.62 0.394 0.698 4.74
PD-1 1.050 −5.43 8.91 2.34 1.109 0.128 4.49
PD-2 0.943 −5.01 9.07 2.18 1.016 0.457 4.87
Equity Market Neutral PS-1 1.781 −12.39 15.51 4.31 1.187 −0.096 5.11
PS-2 1.291 −9.44 10.02 3.21 1.061 −0.244 4.05
PA-1 1.585 −13.34 17.07 4.00 1.102 −0.429 6.82
PA-2 1.263 −13.78 13.20 3.10 1.068 −0.491 9.89
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Table 4 (Cont.)
Fund Portfolio Mean Min Max Standard Sharpe
Style Strategy (%) (%) (%) Deviation Ratio
Skew Kurt
ND 1.137 −7.44 15.93 3.99 0.724 0.339 3.77
PD-1 0.656 −5.82 13.08 2.93 0.414 0.620 5.21
PD-2 1.055 −6.78 13.31 2.65 0.982 0.529 7.15
Fund of Funds PS-1 0.657 −30.44 18.31 7.19 0.168 −0.724 6.27
PS-2 0.881 −10.27 17.81 4.00 0.500 1.227 6.80
PA-1 1.289 −30.44 28.64 6.67 0.511 −0.395 9.95
PA-2 0.822 −11.85 10.13 3.47 0.514 −0.188 4.39
ND 0.667 −9.58 13.61 2.77 0.446 0.213 7.36
PD-1 0.636 −23.42 26.93 3.76 0.302 0.018 34.17
PD-2 0.728 −23.17 26.93 3.87 0.376 −0.009 30.27
Fixed Income Arbitrage PS-1 0.912 −6.48 12.44 2.78 0.754 0.404 5.45
PS-2 0.738 −12.86 15.83 3.41 0.437 −0.479 8.95
PA-1 0.996 −8.17 13.67 3.07 0.778 0.335 5.48
PA-2 0.607 −14.34 15.28 3.37 0.308 −0.652 9.72
ND 0.910 −15.63 16.80 5.15 0.405 −0.217 4.61
PD-1 0.833 −8.24 11.15 3.82 0.475 0.326 3.46
PD-2 0.883 −12.79 12.93 3.69 0.542 0.074 5.53
Global Macro PS-1 0.816 −12.77 18.81 5.23 0.134 0.262 3.51
PS-2 0.873 −21.41 18.71 6.05 0.506 0.414 5.01
PA-1 0.512 −11.87 16.93 5.32 0.338 0.574 5.31
PA-2 1.151 −16.60 22.47 5.78 0.324 −0.299 5.48
ND 1.249 −31.34 17.23 6.44 0.507 −0.688 7.61
PD-1 1.026 −10.10 11.16 3.46 0.724 0.095 4.42
PD-2 1.448 −10.92 10.91 3.25 1.224 −0.147 5.15
Long/Short Equity Hedge PS-1 1.474 −14.86 28.69 6.74 0.600 0.831 5.20
PS-2 1.202 −42.69 102.8 12.19 0.254 3.993 39.42
PA-1 1.052 −11.96 20.11 5.44 0.473 0.733 4.39
PA-2 1.338 −14.96 17.31 5.54 0.644 −0.177 3.52
ND 1.071 −13.71 20.96 6.09 0.435 0.412 3.76
PD-1 0.785 −14.45 15.72 4.57 0.362 0.126 4.34
PD-2 1.043 −15.83 21.83 4.78 0.535 0.565 7.03
Managed Futures PS-1 0.558 −21.29 35.14 6.97 0.125 0.649 7.42
PS-2 0.355 −23.79 64.09 9.13 0.018 2.607 20.16
PA-1 0.743 −23.61 53.90 8.33 0.182 1.811 14.61
PA-2 1.086 −19.35 33.51 7.14 0.379 0.754 6.62
ND 1.222 −17.63 13.25 4.47 0.710 −0.359 5.27
PD-1 1.407 −17.63 11.42 3.33 1.146 −1.022 10.57
PD-2 1.361 −16.01 10.91 3.40 1.071 −0.928 8.48
Multi-Strategy PS-1 3.222 −17.63 61.87 8.14 1.236 2.951 22.57
PS-2 2.290 −17.63 51.36 7.07 0.970 2.592 19.79
PA-1 3.133 −17.63 83.13 9.79 0.997 4.247 35.40
PA-2 3.220 −11.65 101.8 9.72 1.036 7.978 81.71
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Table 6
Out-of-sample Performance of Portfolio Strategies by Hedge Fund Styles
This table reports, for each hedge fund style, the alphas of portfolios which are optimal
from the perspective of the seven types of investors described above in the context and the
coefficients of liquidity risk factor LIQRISKps (or LIQRISKinn) that is constructed using
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure. αhl is the intercept obtained by regressing
portfolio excess returns on the Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) Benchmarks, αfh is the intercept
obtained by regressing portfolio excess returns on the Fung and Hsieh (2004) Benchmarks,
αpshl and α
inn
fh are the same intercepts, but adjusted for liquidity risk premium. β
hl
ps and β
fh
inn
are the coefficients of the liquidity risk factor in the extended Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) and
Fung and Hsieh (2004) models. The symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively reflect significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Hasanhodzic and Lo Fung and Hsieh
Six-Factor Model Seven-Factor Model
Fund Portfolio ——————————– ——————————–
Style Strategy αhl α
ps
hl β
hl
ps αfh α
inn
fh β
fh
inn
ND 0.35 -0.18 0.65∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.45 0.59∗∗∗
PD-1 0.53 0.05 0.58∗∗∗ 0.24 -0.08 0.47∗∗∗
PD-2 0.58∗∗ 0.29 0.35∗∗∗ 0.41 0.18 0.35∗∗∗
Convertible Arbitrage PS-1 0.50 0.07 0.52∗∗∗ 0.23 -0.04 0.40∗∗∗
PS-2 0.70 0.23 0.56∗∗∗ 0.28 -0.02 0.45∗∗∗
PA-1 0.86∗∗ 0.55 0.38∗∗∗ 0.63∗ 0.39 0.37∗∗∗
PA-2 0.20 -0.10 0.37∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.21 0.31∗∗∗
ND 0.59∗∗ 0.30 0.35∗∗∗ 0.33 0.19 0.20∗∗
PD-1 0.42∗ 0.13 0.35∗∗∗ 0.20 0.04 0.24∗∗∗
PD-2 0.39 0.07 0.38∗∗∗ 0.17 -0.03 0.30∗∗∗
Event Driven PS-1 0.76∗ 0.24 0.63∗∗∗ 0.63∗ 0.34 0.44∗∗∗
PS-2 0.46 -0.03 0.58∗∗∗ 0.43 0.16 0.41∗∗∗
PA-1 0.79 0.32 0.57∗∗∗ 0.69 0.42 0.39∗
PA-2 1.09∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
ND 0.31 -0.29 0.72∗∗∗ -0.17 -0.52 0.52∗∗
PD-1 0.75 0.37 0.46∗∗∗ 0.25 0.05 0.30∗
PD-2 0.66 0.37 0.34∗∗∗ 0.16 0.04 0.17
Emerging Markets PS-1 1.73∗∗ 1.16 0.68∗∗∗ 0.91 0.67 0.36
PS-2 0.62 0.26 0.44∗∗ -0.11 -0.09 -0.03
PA-1 1.37∗ 1.16 0.25 1.00 1.04 -0.06
PA-2 1.61∗∗ 1.12∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.94∗ 0.70 0.35
ND 0.33 -0.01 0.40∗∗∗ 0.14 -0.11 0.38∗∗∗
PD-1 0.81∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.04 0.65∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.08
PD-2 0.69∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.08 0.57∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.12∗
Equity Market Neutral PS-1 1.72∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 0.18 1.42∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 0.12
PS-2 1.25∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 0.05 0.92∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.11
PA-1 1.49∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 0.11 1.22∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.18
PA-2 1.00∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.08 0.98∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
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Table 6 (Cont.)
Hasanhodzic and Lo Fung and Hsieh
Six-Factor Model Seven-Factor Model
Fund Portfolio ——————————– ——————————–
Style Strategy αhl α
ps
hl β
hl
ps αfh α
ps
fh β
fh
ps
ND 0.87∗∗ 0.65∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.45 0.26∗∗
PD-1 0.38 0.14 0.29∗∗∗ 0.14 -0.02 0.24∗∗∗
PD-2 0.89∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.39∗ 0.31∗∗∗
Fund of Funds PS-1 0.53 -0.17 0.84∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.41 0.58∗∗
PS-2 0.59∗ 0.39 0.24∗∗ 0.38 0.29 0.13
PA-1 1.16∗ 0.74 0.50∗∗∗ 0.73 0.50 0.34
PA-2 0.62∗ 0.38 0.29∗∗∗ 0.44 0.34 0.15
ND 0.47∗ 0.32 0.18∗∗ 0.18 0.11 0.11
PD-1 0.20 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.02
PD-2 0.32 0.22 0.13 0.24 0.20 0.06
Fixed Income Arbitrage PS-1 0.73∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.06 0.56∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.09
PS-2 0.68∗∗ 0.51 0.21∗∗ 0.28 0.17 0.17
PA-1 0.82∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.05 0.64∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.08
PA-2 0.45 0.29 0.20∗∗ 0.25 0.13 0.17
ND 0.95∗∗ 0.58 0.44∗∗∗ 0.19 -0.02 0.31∗∗
PD-1 0.65∗ 0.25 0.48∗∗∗ 0.26 0.03 0.34∗∗∗
PD-2 0.79∗∗ 0.46 0.41∗∗∗ 0.37 0.10 0.40∗∗∗
Global Macro PS-1 0.41 0.06 0.43∗∗∗ -0.18 -0.37 0.29∗
PS-2 0.77 0.41 0.44∗∗∗ 0.47 0.32 0.22
PA-1 0.64 0.28 0.43∗∗∗ 0.27 0.03 0.35∗
PA-2 1.20∗∗ 0.78 0.51∗∗∗ 0.34 0.09 0.38∗
ND 0.95∗ 0.50 0.55∗∗∗ 0.27 0.09 0.27
PD-1 0.53∗ 0.23 0.36∗∗∗ 0.33 0.19 0.21∗∗
PD-2 1.01∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
Long/Short Equity Hedge PS-1 1.15∗ 0.46 0.84∗∗∗ 0.62 0.40 0.32∗
PS-2 1.35 0.69 0.79∗∗ 0.21 0.05 0.24
PA-1 0.49 0.09 0.48∗∗∗ 0.62 0.47 0.22
PA-2 1.02∗∗ 0.53 0.59∗∗∗ 0.60 0.38 0.31∗
ND 0.94∗ 0.74 0.24 0.67 0.48 0.28
PD-1 0.63 0.55 0.10 0.35 0.28 0.11
PD-2 1.04∗∗ 0.92∗∗ 0.14 0.63 0.51 0.18
Managed Futures PS-1 0.72 0.60 0.16 0.39 0.19 0.28
PS-2 0.73 0.70 0.03 0.54 0.45 0.13
PA-1 0.91 0.97 -0.07 0.76 0.76 0.00
PA-2 1.28∗ 1.18∗ 0.12 0.90 0.78 0.18
ND 0.85∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.47 0.27 0.28∗∗
PD-1 0.99∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.17∗
PD-2 0.91∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.13 0.77∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.09
Multi-Strategy PS-1 2.69∗∗∗ 2.65∗∗∗ 0.04 2.43∗∗∗ 2.51∗∗∗ -0.12
PS-2 1.54∗∗ 1.48∗∗ 0.08 1.64∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ -0.12
PA-1 2.58∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗ 0.07 2.33∗∗∗ 2.43∗∗∗ -0.16
PA-2 2.65∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗ 0.13 2.54∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗ -0.15
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Table 7
Amihud (2002) Liquidity Risk Factor
This table reports, for each hedge fund style, the alphas of portfolios which are optimal
from the perspective of the seven types of investors described above in the context and the
coefficients of liquidity risk factor LIQRISKamh that is constructed using Amihud (2002)
liquidity measure. α is the intercept obtained by regressing portfolio excess returns on
the Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) Benchmarks, and αamh is the same intercept, but adjusted
for liquidity risk premium. βamh is the coefficient of liquidity risk factor in the extended
Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) model. The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively reflect significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Portfolio Strategy
Fund —————————————————————————–
Style ND PD-1 PD-2 PS-1 PS-2 PA-1 PA-2
α 0.35 0.53 0.58∗∗ 0.50 0.70 0.86∗∗ 0.20
Arbitrage Convertible αamh 0.01 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.42 0.67
∗ -0.01
βamh 0.48
∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
α 0.59∗∗ 0.42∗ 0.39 0.76∗ 0.46 0.79 1.09∗∗∗
Event Driven αamh 0.41 0.21 0.15 0.44 0.13 0.50 0.86
∗∗
βamh 0.26
∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
α 0.31 0.75 0.66 1.73∗∗ 0.62 1.37∗ 1.61∗∗
Emerging Markets αamh -0.11 0.49 0.44 1.33
∗ 0.35 1.22∗ 1.26∗∗
βamh 0.57
∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.21 0.48∗∗∗
α 0.33 0.81∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
Equity Market Neutral αamh 0.13 0.79
∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗
βamh 0.27
∗∗∗ 0.02 0.05 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.02
α 0.87∗∗ 0.38 0.89∗∗∗ 0.53 0.59∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗
Fund of Funds αamh 0.76
∗∗ 0.24 0.75∗∗∗ 0.08 0.44 0.86 0.45
βamh 0.14
∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
α 0.47∗ 0.20 0.32 0.73∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.45
Fixed Income Arbitrage αamh 0.36 0.13 0.24 0.68
∗∗ 0.54 0.77∗∗ 0.31
βamh 0.15
∗∗ 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.19∗∗ 0.07 0.20∗∗
α 0.95∗∗ 0.65∗ 0.79∗∗ 0.41 0.77 0.64 1.20∗∗
Global Macro αamh 0.71
∗ 0.39 0.59∗ 0.19 0.54 0.43 0.85
βamh 0.33
∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
α 0.95∗ 0.53∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 1.15∗ 1.35 0.49 1.02∗∗
Long/Short Equity Hedge αamh 0.68 0.32 0.81
∗∗∗ 0.62 0.91 0.21 0.65
βamh 0.38
∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
α 0.94∗ 0.63 1.04∗∗ 0.72 0.73 0.91 1.28∗
Managed Futures αamh 0.86 0.60 0.97
∗∗ 0.60 0.66 0.91 1.22∗
βamh 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.17 0.10 -0.01 0.08
α 0.85∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗ 2.58∗∗∗ 2.65∗∗∗
Multi-Strategy αamh 0.83
∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 2.63∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗ 2.49∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗∗
βamh 0.04 0.07 0.13
∗ 0.08 0.16 0.13 0.24
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Table 8
The Exclusion of the January Effect
This table reports, for each hedge fund style, the alphas of portfolios which are optimal
from the perspective of the seven types of investors described above in the context and
the coefficients of liquidity risk factor LIQRISKps that is constructed using Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure. α is the intercept obtained by regressing portfolio
excess returns on the Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) Benchmarks, αps is the same intercept,
but adjusted for liquidity risk premium. βps is the coefficient of the liquidity risk factor in the
extended Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) model. Data in every January are dropped to exclude
the January effect as documented in Keim (1983), Tinic and West (1986) and Eleswarapu
and Reinganum (1993). The symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively reflect significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Portfolio Strategy
Fund —————————————————————————–
Style ND PD-1 PD-2 PS-1 PS-2 PA-1 PA-2
α 0.14 0.29 0.40 0.35 0.55 0.73∗ 0.05
Convertible Arbitrage αps -0.27 -0.07 0.18 0.02 0.21 0.49 -0.19
βps 0.69
∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
α 0.55∗ 0.33 0.28 0.71 0.35 0.89 1.10∗∗∗
Event Driven αps 0.34 0.13 0.05 0.32 0.00 0.52 0.82
∗∗
βps 0.35
∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
α 0.18 0.61 0.55 1.30 0.56 1.15 1.52∗∗
Emerging Markets αps -0.25 0.34 0.35 0.89 0.27 0.99 1.14
∗
βps 0.71
∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.28 0.63∗∗∗
α 0.31 0.78∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗
Equity Market Neutral αps 0.07 0.77
∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗
βps 0.39
∗∗∗ 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.02
α 0.68∗ 0.13 0.79∗∗∗ 0.16 0.39 0.93 0.49
Fund of Funds αps 0.53 -0.04 0.62
∗∗ -0.30 0.23 0.61 0.34
βps 0.25
∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗
α 0.42 0.17 0.29 0.52∗∗ 0.52 0.59∗∗ 0.26
Fixed Income Arbitrage αps 0.32 0.10 0.21 0.51
∗∗ 0.39 0.58∗ 0.15
βps 0.17
∗∗ 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.22∗∗ 0.02 0.16∗
α 0.75∗ 0.43 0.55 0.35 0.64 0.63 0.98∗
Global Macro αps 0.48 0.12 0.30 0.09 0.33 0.35 0.61
βps 0.44
∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
α 0.82 0.41 0.98∗∗∗ 0.99 1.32 0.26 0.64
Long/Short Equity Hedge αps 0.48 0.18 0.73
∗∗∗ 0.48 0.78 -0.03 0.28
βps 0.58
∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
α 1.05∗ 0.65 1.12∗∗ 0.35 0.35 0.58 1.11
Managed Futures αps 0.89 0.59 1.03
∗∗ 0.28 0.35 0.66 1.04
βps 0.26
∗ 0.11 0.15 0.11 -0.01 -0.13 0.12
α 0.82∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗ 2.51∗∗ 2.74∗∗∗
Multi-Strategy αps 0.72
∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 2.68∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗ 2.48∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗
βps 0.18
∗ 0.14∗ 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.12
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Table 10
Financial Crises and the Effect of Liquidity Risk
This table reports, for each hedge fund style, the alphas of portfolios which are optimal
from the perspective of the seven types of investors described above in the context and
the coefficients of the liquidity risk factor LIQRISKps that is constructed using Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure. α is the intercept obtained regressing portfolio
excess returns on the Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) Benchmarks, αps is the same intercept,
but adjusted for liquidity risk premium. βps is the coefficient of the liquidity risk factor in
the extended Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) model. Data in the months of 7/1997, 8-9/1998
and 3/2000 are dropped. The symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively reflect significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Portfolio Strategy
Fund —————————————————————————–
Style ND PD-1 PD-2 PS-1 PS-2 PA-1 PA-2
α 0.52 0.63∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.55 0.74 0.92∗∗ 0.25
Convertible Arbitrage αps 0.08 0.20 0.46
∗ 0.16 0.30 0.64∗ -0.01
βps 0.53
∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
α 0.74∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.84∗ 0.49 0.95 1.25∗∗∗
Event Driven αps 0.47
∗ 0.30 0.24 0.29 -0.03 0.45 0.91∗∗∗
βps 0.32
∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
α 0.70 0.88∗∗ 0.79∗∗ 1.75∗∗ 0.72 1.32∗ 1.82∗∗∗
Emerging Markets αps 0.28 0.61 0.61
∗ 1.34∗ 0.41 1.16 1.44∗∗
βps 0.50
∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.37∗ 0.19 0.46∗∗
α 0.28 0.75∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
Equity Market Neutral αps -0.04 0.72
∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
βps 0.38
∗∗∗ 0.03 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.11 0.07
α 0.76∗∗ 0.27 0.83∗∗∗ 0.57 0.43 1.04 0.59∗
Fund of Funds αps 0.54 0.04 0.64
∗∗∗ -0.06 0.25 0.65 0.33
βps 0.26
∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
α 0.69∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.55∗
Fixed Income Arbitrage αps 0.59
∗∗ 0.66∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.42
βps 0.12 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.16
∗
α 1.05∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.55 0.98∗ 0.78 1.26∗∗
Global Macro αps 0.76
∗ 0.41 0.51 0.24 0.73 0.48 0.85
βps 0.35
∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.29∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
α 0.97∗ 0.52∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗ 1.17 0.65 1.00∗∗
Long/Short Equity Hedge αps 0.59 0.25 0.72
∗∗∗ 0.54 0.49 0.21 0.55
βps 0.45
∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗
α 0.88∗ 0.51 0.96∗∗ 0.40 0.28 0.56 1.04∗
Managed Futures αps 0.70 0.44 0.87
∗ 0.17 0.07 0.47 0.83
βps 0.21 0.08 0.11 0.28 0.25 0.11 0.24
α 0.91∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 2.68∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ 2.58∗∗∗ 2.73∗∗∗
Multi-Strategy αps 0.79
∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 2.63∗∗∗
βps 0.14 0.11 0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.12
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneous Beliefs, Trading
Volume, Price Volatility and Liquidity
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3.1 Introduction
A pervasive characteristics of financial markets is the presence of heterogeneous beliefs among
investors. One simple example of heterogeneous beliefs is the variety of opinions among fi-
nancial analysts and macroeconomists regarding future movements of earnings per share,
interest rates, exchange rate, and gross national product despite the fact that all these ana-
lysts have access to the same economic data. It is by now well recognized that heterogeneous
beliefs among investors play an important role in the formation of asset prices and their dy-
namics, and in the generation of trades among investors. Empirical evidence also strongly
supports this recognition. Buraschi and Jiltsov (2002) find that differences of opinion can
help explain the dynamics of option trading volume while Pavlova and Rigobon (2003) pro-
vide empirical support for a model of international stock prices and exchange rates with
heterogeneity in beliefs.
There has been a steadily growing literature on models with heterogeneous beliefs among
investors regarding some fundamental and non-fundamental aspects of a financial economy.
This includes the earlier single or multiple-period discrete-time works of Harris and Kreps
(1978), Varian (1985, 1989), Delong et al. (1990), Harris and Raviv (1993), the continuous-
time works of Wang (1994), and the subsequent continuous-time developments of Murphy
(1994), Zapatero (1998), Basak (2000), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Buraschi and Jiltsov
(2006). Recently, Vayanos and Vila (2007) and Xiong and Yan (2009) extend this direction
research to bond markets.
The economics and finance literature has widely adopted the Bayesian inference frame-
work to model investors’ learning processes about unobservable economic variables, such as
productivity of the economy and profitability of a specific firm. One line of the literature
(e.g., Harris and Raviv (1993), Detemple and Murthy (1994) and Basak (2000)) assumes
that investors hold heterogeneous prior beliefs about unobservable economic variables. In
these models, investors continue to disagree with each other even after they update their be-
liefs using identical information, but the difference in their beliefs deterministically converges
to zero. In another strand of the literature (e.g., Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Buraschi
and Jiltsov (2006) and Xiong and Yan (2009)), heterogeneous beliefs arise from investors’
different prior knowledge about the informativeness of signals and the dynamics of unob-
servable economic variables, and such heterogeneity, as shown by, for example, Acemoglu,
Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2007), could never converge.
This paper is primarily built upon Kurz and Motolese (2008) which model heterogeneous
beliefs using the second approach, and its objective is to study the effects of heterogeneous
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beliefs on the trading volume, price volatility and liquidity of stocks. Consider an economy
where the true probability measure of the sequence of stock payoffs is nonstationary and
unobservable. The nonstationarity of economic systems is the source that makes the sequence
of stock payoffs to be a nonstationary process which is difficult to be identified by rational
investors due to limited data. Historical data can be used to deduce some unique stationary
empirical measure, but most investors would not believe that such an empirical measure is
adequate to forecast future stock payoffs. Instead, investors hold heterogeneous beliefs when
making investment decisions. For each investor, the transition function of his expectation
about next period economic state variables is uniquely pinned down by his individual belief.
The equilibrium can be solved by treating individual states of belief and its average as state
variables.
In equilibrium, stock price is linearly positively correlated with market belief which is
defined as the average of individual beliefs. When investors’ average belief about future stock
payoffs is higher than the econometrician’s belief1, they will value stocks more aggressively
and then the equilibrium stock prices would appear “expensive” to the econometrician. This
result is similar to that one obtained by Xiong and Yan (2009), which shows that bond prices
aggregate investors’ heterogeneous beliefs and, in particular, reflects their wealth-weighted
average belief about future short rates. A natural result following the average-belief-related
stock price is that price volatility is positively correlated with the volatility of market belief:
price volatility increases when market belief is more volatile.
Investor’s optimal stock demand is an increasing function of the difference between his
individual belief and market belief: the more optimistic than the market he is, the higher
demand he has. Stock trading volume is determined by changes in the difference, and its un-
conditional expectation decreases with the volatility of market belief. In this model, trading
volume has nothing to do with belief dispersion among investors, this result is different from
previous findings that trading volume increases with the belief dispersion (e.g., Chordia et
al. (2007), Xiong and Yan (2009)).
It is also shown in this paper that stock liquidity, measured by the absolute value of stock
transaction price minus its fundamental value, decreases with the volatility of market belief.
More volatile market belief means higher price pressure and less liquidity given that price
pressure is a liquidity measure and higher price pressure means less liquidity.
The theoretically predicted relations between the volatility of market belief and the trad-
ing volume, price volatility and liquidity of stocks are empirically checked using the analyst
1The econometrician’s belief is derived with empirical data using statistical models. Refer to Section 3.2
for the details.
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forecast data on quarterly earnings per share provided by the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate
System, the empirical results support these relations and are robust to methods of estimating
market belief and its volatility and to alternative liquidity measure.
This study differs from the existing literature in the following ways: first, it is shown in
this paper that market belief and its volatility rather than belief dispersion are the key factors
influencing the trading volume and price volatility of stocks. In particular, as mentioned
above, trading volume is not affected by belief dispersion in this model; second, this paper
also shows that stock liquidity, measured by price pressure, is positively correlated with the
volatility of market belief. It seems that no study has formally checked the relation between
heterogeneous beliefs and stock liquidity before; third, the objectives of this paper and Kurz
and Motolese (2008) are different although they use similar theoretical models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 develops a theoretical model to
study how heterogeneous beliefs among investors affect the trading volume, price volatility
and liquidity of stocks. Empirical results are presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 concludes
this paper with further discussions and comments.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Setting
Following Kurz and Motolese (2008), consider an infinite horizon exchange economy where
a stock or a portfolio of stocks is traded, of which market price is pt and which generates an
exogenous risky sequence of payoffs {Dt, t = 1, 2, · · · } under a true probability measure Πˆ.
For simplicity, assume that the total supply of stock shares is normalized to one.
In this economy, a key assumption is that investors do not know the true Πˆ of the process
{Dt, t = 1, 2, · · · }, and they hold heterogeneous beliefs about it. Instead, the historical data
on a set of observable variables including Dt is known to all investors, and it plays a role of
the common knowledge basis of investors with heterogeneous beliefs. With a long history
of observations of the variables, all investors compute the same empirical moments and the
same finite dimensional distributions of the observed variables. Using the standard extension
of measures they deduce from the data a unique empirical probability measure denoted by mˆ
on infinite sequences. Kurz (1994) has shown that this measure mˆ is stationary. This is the
empirical knowledge shared by all investors. Moreover, we assume that the data reveals that,
under the probability measure mˆ, {Dt, t = 1, 2, · · · } constitutes a first order Markov process
where Dt+1 is conditionally normally distributed with mean µ + λd (Dt − µ) and variance
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σ2d. To simplify, let’s define dt = Dt − µ, the sequence {dt, t = 1, 2, · · · } is hence zero mean
with an unknown true probability Π and an empirical probability m. The assumption that
{Dt, t = 1, 2, · · · } constitutes a first order Markov process implies that under the empirical
probability measure m the dynamics of {dt, t = 1, 2, · · · } is also characterized by a first order
Markov process with transition function
dt+1 = λddt + 
d
t+1, (3.1)
where dt+1
m∼ N (0, σ2d). It is clear that Emt (dt+1) = λddt.
It is well known that our society has undergone changes in firm organization and tech-
nology, which are rapid with important economic effects, making {dt, t = 1, 2, · · · } to be a
non-stationary process. This indicates that the distribution of dt is time dependent, such
variability makes it almost impossible to learn the true probability distribution, this is why
investors do not know Π.
Assume that there are N investors in the economy, at date t investor i buys θit shares
of stock which will pay him dt+1 + µ at date t + 1 for each of θ
i
t. The riskless interest rate
R = 1 + rt is assumed to be constant over time such that there exists a technology by which
an investor can invest the amount Bt at date t and receive with certainty the amount BtR
at date t+ 1. The consumption of investor i at date t is set equal to the income earned from
the portfolio
(
θit−1, B
i
t−1
)
held from date t − 1 to t minus the cost spent for the portfolio
(θit, B
i
t) created at date t
cit = θ
i
t−1 (pt + dt + µ) +B
i
t−1R− θitpt −Bit
and his wealth at date t is defined as
W it = c
i
t + θ
i
tpt +B
i
t
and hence the transition formula of wealth takes a form as follows
W it =
(
W it−1 − cit−1
)
R + θit−1Qt, (3.2)
where Qt = pt+(dt + µ)−Rpt−12. Given some initial values (θi0,W i0) and with an exponential
2As Wang (1994), we call Qt+1 the excess share return as it is the excess return on one share of stock
instead of the excess return on one dollar invested in the stock.
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utility function, investor i will choose (θi, ci) to maximize the expected utility
U = Eit
[ ∞∑
s=0
−βt+s−1e− 1τ cit+s|=t
]
(3.3)
subject to a vector of state variables ψit and their transition functions which will be specified
later. β is a time discount factor and =t is a σ-field generated by the information available
up to time t.
3.2.2 The Equilibrium without Heterogeneous Beliefs
Before solving the full model specified in the following sections, let’s first consider the case
in which investors’ beliefs are homogeneous, and they only use the information embedded in
the empirical data of dt to make their investment decisions.
Assume that R=1+r>1 and 0< λd <1, the approach suggested by Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) can be adopted to solve the equilibrium3. The optimal stock demand of each investor
and the equilibrium stock price are stated in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION I: Given the empirical transition equation (1) for dt and the constrained
conditions R=1+r>1 and 0 < λd < 1, the optimal stock demand is identical across investors
θ∗t =
Rτ
rσ˜2Q
[Emt (Qt+1) + u
∗
0 + u
∗
1dt] , (3.4)
where [u∗0, u
∗
1]=−b˜Ω˜Λ˜0, and σ˜2Q = b˜2Ω˜ is the adjusted conditional variance of the excess share
return Qt+1. b˜, Ω˜ and Λ˜0 are defined as
b˜ = a∗d + 1, Ω˜ = σ
2
d/
[
1 + σ2dv˜11
]
, Λ˜0 = [v˜01, λdv˜11] , V˜ = [v˜00 v˜01; v˜01 v˜11] ,
where V˜ is determined in the following equation:
M˜
R
− V˜ + 2
[
γC˜ + ln
( r
R
)]
i˜11 = 0,
M˜ =
1
b˜2Ω˜
[
a˜T − b˜Ω˜Λ˜0
]T [
a˜T − b˜Ω˜Λ˜0
]
+
[
Λ˜Tψ V˜ Λ˜ψ − Λ˜T0 Ω˜Λ˜0
]
,
where C˜=−ln(rβG˜)
γR
, a˜=[P ∗0 (1−R) + µ, (a∗d + 1)λd − a∗dR]T , Λ˜ψ=[1 0; 0 λd], G˜ = (1+σ2dv˜11)−
1
2
3To ensure the existence of the equilibrium of a linear difference model, it is required that the exogenous
variable, here dt, does not exponentially grow, dt satisfies this condition when 0 < λd < 1.
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and i˜11 is a 2×2 matrix with the element (1, 1) being one and other elements being zero.
Given that the total supply of stock shares is normalized to one, the equilibrium stock price
is unique and takes a form as follows:
p∗t = P
∗
0 + a
∗
ddt, (3.5)
where the constant term P ∗0 and the coefficients a
∗
d are defined as
P ∗0 =
µ+ u∗0
R− 1 −
σ˜2Q
RNτ
, a∗d =
λd + u
∗
1
R− λd
Proof: This proposition can be proved as a special case in the Appendix in Section 3.5.1. ‖
It is evident that when investors’ beliefs are homogeneous, the optimal demand of stock
is identical across investors as it is independent of investors’ individual beliefs. For each
investor, his demand can be divided into two parts: one is the investment demand driven by
the expected excess share return Emt (Qt+1) and another is driven through hedging against the
fluctuations of dt, the coefficients u
∗
0 and u
∗
1 determine the magnitude of hedging demands. It
is shown in Figure 1 that the values of u∗0 and u
∗
1 for relevant values of the model parameters
are very close to zero and then almost negligible. To insert the equilibrium stock price p∗t
(3.5) into the demand function (3.4) and to simplify lead to θ∗t = 1/N , that is, over time,
when the beliefs of investors are homogeneous, each investor will constantly demand 1/N
of total stock supply and no trading will occur among investors except for the first period
when the initial stock endowments of investors may be different from 1/N.
The equilibrium price p∗t derived in this case consists of two components: the first one
is P ∗0 which can be further divided into two parts: the first part
µ
r
is the present value of
expected total future cash flows discounted at the risk free interest rate, the second part,
approximated by the term -
σ˜2Q
RNτ
as u∗0 is close to zero, represents the discount on the stock
price to compensate for the risk in its future cash flows and the discount increases with the
adjusted conditional variance σ˜2Q of Qt+1 and decreases with the risk tolerance τ of investors
and the number of investors N , this result is consistent with our intuition; the second
component of the equilibrium price depends on dt. The effect of dt on the equilibrium price
p∗t is determined by the coefficients a
∗
d. As we see above, the coefficient u
∗
1 is almost equal
to zero, therefore the coefficient a∗d is always strictly positive as shown in Figure 1 and then
p∗t increases with dt.
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3.2.3 Modeling Heterogeneous Beliefs
Apparently, most investors don’t believe that the empirical stationary model (3.1) is adequate
to forecast the future as {dt, t = 1, 2, · · · } is non-stationary with unknown probability Π.
Each investor holds his personal belief about dt+1. Define that the belief of an investor is
rational if his subjective model is consistent with the data and if simulated, its simulated
data reproduces the stationary probability m deduced from historical data. All investors are
assumed to be rational in this economy4.
In this model, individual beliefs are treated as state variables, and an individual belief
about an economic state variable is described as a personal state of belief which can uniquely
pin down the transition function of this investor’s belief about next period economic state
variables. A given personal state of belief does therefore identify the type of an investor.
Note that unlike in asymmetric information models, investors are willing to reveal their
forecasts in this model, however, other investors don’t view such forecasts as a source of new
information and will not update their beliefs. As individual beliefs are publicly available, the
distribution of individual states of belief is then an economy-wide observable state variable.
Investor i’s state of belief is defined as git which is characterized by the following dynamics
git+1 = λZg
i
t + 
ig
t+1, (3.6)
where igt+1 ∼ N
(
0, σ2g
)
are correlated across i reflecting the correlation of individual beliefs.
The unconditional expected value of git is zero. Assume that investor i knows his own g
i
t and
the market distribution of glτ across l for all time τ ≤ t. Investor i’s state of belief git pins
down his own perception of date t+ 1 payoff dit+1 in the following way
dit+1 = λddt + λ
g
dg
i
t + 
id
t+1 (3.7)
where idt+1 ∼ N (0, σˆ2d) and σˆ2d is the same for all investors. Obviously, we have that
Ei
[
dit+1|=t, git
]− Em [dt+1|=t] = λgdgit (3.8)
where the first and second terms in the left side are respectively the investor i’s forecast of
dt+1 and the forecast made under the empirical probability distribution.
Average (3.6) over investors and denote by Zt the mean of the cross-sectional distribution
4The theory of Rational Beliefs (RB in short) used in this paper is due to Kurz(1994, 1997) and Kurz and
Motolese(2008), and Kurz and Motolese(2008) has listed all rationality conditions imposed in this model.
For simplicity we do not discuss these conditions.
3.2. THE MODEL 91
of git and refer to it as the market state of belief (or market belief in brief). The dynamics of
Zt is given by
Zt+1 = λZZt + 
Z
t+1 (3.9)
with Zt+1
m∼ N (0, σ2Z). Assume that the correlation of individual beliefs is non-stationary and
the true distribution of Zt+1 is unknown, then the process {Zt, t = 1, 2, · · · } is non-stationary
as well. Since both dt and Zt are observable, so does the joint empirical distribution of these
two state variables. Assume that this joint distribution is described by the following system
of equations
dt+1 = λddt + 
d
t+1 (3.10)
Zt+1 = λZZt + 
Z
t+1 (3.11)
where the error terms dt+1 and 
Z
t+1 are jointly normally distributed as follows(
dt+1
Zt+1
)
m∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
[
σ2d 0
0 σ2z
])
(3.12)
Again, most investors do not believe that the stationary models (3.10) and (3.11) are the
truth, and they form their personal beliefs. Similar as before, investor i’s state of belief
git pins down his perception of the two state variables
(
dit+1, Z
i
t+1
)
and his belief takes the
following form
dit+1 = λddt + λ
g
dg
i
t + 
id
t+1 (3.13)
Zit+1 = λZZt + λ
g
Zg
i
t + 
iZ
t+1 (3.14)
git+1 = λZg
i
t + 
ig
t+1 (3.15)
where the error terms idt+1, 
iZ
t+1 and 
ig
t+1 are jointly normally distributed as follows 
id
t+1
iZt+1
igt+1
 ∼ N

 00
0
 ,
 σˆ
2
d σˆdZ 0
σˆdZ σˆ
2
Z 0
0 0 σ2g

 (3.16)
The stochastic transition functions (3.13)-(3.15) together with the wealth transition process
(3.2) constitute the constrained conditions of investor i’s optimization problem (3.3).
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3.2.4 The Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Beliefs
In this section, we will solve the equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs. When investors hold
heterogeneous beliefs, each investor maximizes his optimal consumption-investment choice
based on his individual belief about (dt, Zt), and hence the stock demand of investors can
be different from each other since their beliefs may be different.
We use the perception models (3.13)-(3.15) about the state variables (dt,Zt,gt), average
them over investors and use the definition of Zt to deduce the following relations:
Et (dt+1) = λddt + λ
g
dZt (3.17)
Et (Zt+1) = (λZ + λ
g
Z)Zt (3.18)
where Et (•) is an average market expectation operator. Besides the constrained conditions
R > 1 and 0 < λd < 1 as in the case without heterogeneous beliefs, it is also assumed that
0 < λZ + λ
g
Z < 1 to make sure that Zt is on average stationary.
PROPOSITION II: Given the perception equations (3.13)-(3.15), the relations (3.17)-
(3.18) and the constrained conditions R>1, 0 < λd < 1 and 0 < λZ + λ
g
Z < 1, the optimal
stock demand of investor i is:
θit =
Rτ
rσˆ2Q
[
Eit (Qt+1) + u0 + u1dt + u2Zt + u3g
i
t
]
(3.19)
where σˆ2Q is the adjusted conditional variance of the excess share return Qt+1.Given that the
total number of outstanding shares is normalized to one, the equilibrium stock price is unique
and takes a form as follows
pt = P0 + addt + aZZt, (3.20)
where the constant term P0, the coefficients ad and aZ are defined as
P0 =
µ+ u0
R− 1 −
σˆ2Q
RNτ
, ad =
λd + u1
R− λd , aZ =
(ad + 1)λ
g
d + u2 + u3
R− (λZ + λgZ)
.
Proof: See the Appendix in Section 2.5.1. ‖
Note that the results in this proposition are similar to the previous results derived without
heterogeneous beliefs except that in the full model, besides the investment demand associated
with Eit (Qt+1) and the hedging demand against the fluctuations of dt, the optimal stock
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demand of investor i is also linked to market belief Zt and his own personal belief g
i
t which
are both subjective, different beliefs will lead to different demands. The equilibrium stock
price also depends on market belief Zt, and how Zt affects pt is determined by the coefficient
aZ . There are no analytical solutions for the parameters u = [u0, u1, u2, u3] and then ad and
aZ , we use the Monte-Carlo method to numerically compute these parameters for relevant
values of the model parameters, and the results are shown in Figure 2. This figure shows that
aZ is strictly positive for relevant values of the model parameters, it can be thus concluded
that pt increases with market belief Zt.
3.2.5 Trading Volume
Inserting the price formula (3.20) into the demand function of investor i (3.19) and to
simplify, we obtain
θit =
1
N
+
Rτ
rσˆ2Q
[(ad + 1)λ
g
d + aZλ
g
Z + u3]
(
git − Zt
)
(3.21)
The optimal demand of investor i in the equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs is not equal
to 1/N any more, indeed it depends on the difference between his individual belief git and
market belief Zt. As shown in Figure 2, the numerically calculated (ad + 1)λ
g
d+aZλ
g
Z +u3 is
strictly positive for relevant values of the model parameters, this means that when investor
i is more optimistic than the market, his demand will exceed 1/N, and vice versa. However
if beliefs are identical across investors, then, same as in the case without heterogeneous
beliefs, the demand of each investor is 1/N. Trading will take place among investors when
the differences between individual beliefs and market belief change over time. Note that the
concept of ‘trading’ here is different from the demand, high demand does not mean actual
buying in, and vice versa. Since the total number of stock shares outstanding is normalized
to one, what refers to as trading volume is actually turnover rate. For investor i, the stock
volume he will trade at time t, denoted by V it , is
V it = |θit − θit−1| = CV
∣∣(git − git−1)− (Zt − Zt−1)∣∣ , (3.22)
where CV =
Rτ
rσˆ2Q
| (ad + 1)λgd + aZλgZ + u3|, and the aggregate trading volume denoted by Vt
is
Vt =
1
2
N∑
i=1
V it (3.23)
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The sum of V it is divided by two because buying and selling can be only accounted once.
Note that, in this model, higher belief dispersion doesn’t mean larger trading volume. This
result is different from previous findings by, for example, Chordia et al. (2007), Xiong and
Yan (2009). For investor i, we have that
V
i
= E
(
V it
)
= CV
√
2
pi
σV , (3.24)
var
(
V it
)
=
(pi
2
− 1
)(
V
i
)2
, (3.25)
where σ2V =
2
(1+λZ)(1−λ2Z)
[
(1 + λZ + λ
g
Z) (1− λZ)− λZ (λgZ)2
]
σ2g +
2
1+λZ
σ2Z , and it is identical
across investors. The variance of trading volume thus increases quadratically with its mean.
The aggregate expected trading volume in the market, which is denoted by V , is given by:
V =
1
2
N∑
i=1
V
i
=
1
2
NCV
√
2
pi
σV (3.26)
Figure 3 plots the numerically computed aggregate expected trading volume V against the
variance of market belief σ2Z for relevant values of the model parameters. Increasing σ
2
Z has
two opposite effects on V : σV increases while CV decreases. That CV decreases with σ
2
Z is
due to the fact that the adjusted variance of excess share return σˆ2Q increases with σ
2
Z while
(ad + 1)λ
g
d + aZλ
g
Z + u3 decreases with σ
2
Z as shown in Figure 2B. The net effect is that V
decreases with σ2Z , that is, the expected trading volume declines when market belief is more
volatile.
3.2.6 Price Volatility
There exist two types of price variability: one is the instantaneous variance and another is
the unconditional variance (i.e. price volatility). The instantaneous variance is important in
analyzing trading strategies while price volatility is often adopted in empirical testing. In the
following, I will only show the results for price volatility as the results for the instantaneous
variance are just similar.
First, consider the price volatility for the case in which individual beliefs are homogeneous.
Given the price process (3.5), price volatility, denoted by σ2p∗ , is
σ2p∗ = V ar (p
∗
t ) =
2a∗2d
1 + λd
σ2d (3.27)
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Figure 4A plots the numerically simulated price volatilities for relevant values of the model
parameters. Clearly, stock price tends to become more volatile when the variance of dt under
the empirical probability m increases. Note that the relation between σ2p∗ and σ
2
d looks like
linear, this is because the effect of σ2d on a
∗
d is infinitesimal, and for any relevant values of
the model parameters, a∗d almost doesn’t change with σ
2
d. In the case without heterogeneous
beliefs, price volatility is uniquely determined by the innovations to dt.
However, in the real financial markets, stock price is more volatile. To see this point, we
calculate the volatility of market price pt (denoted by σ
2
p) under the probability distribution
m as follows:
σ2p = V ar (pt) =
2a2d
1 + λd
σ2d +
2a2Z
1 + λZ
σ2Z (3.28)
Therefore, the volatility of market price is attributed to not only the innovations to dt, but
also the innovations to market belief Zt. The numerically computed σ
2
p is plotted in Figure
4B. The first obvious result to be found in this figure is that the volatility of market price
increases with both σ2d and σ
2
Z . Second, σ
2
Z has a larger effect on σ
2
p than σ
2
d while the effects
of both σ2Z and σ
2
d are nonlinear due to the nonlinear effect of σ
2
d and σ
2
Z on aZ as shown
in Figure 2B. The third and also most important result is that for any given value of σ2d,
market price could be much more volatile than the hypothetical price given in equation (3.5)
when market belief Zt is reasonably sufficiently volatile, this can be found out by comparing
the results in Figure 4A and Figure 4B.
3.2.7 Liquidity
As Kyle (1985) argues, liquidity is a slippery and elusive concept, in part because it encom-
passes a number of transactional properties of financial markets. These properties include
tightness (the cost of turning around a position over a short time period), depth (the size of
an order flow innovation required to change prices a given amount), and resiliency (the speed
with which prices recover from a random, uninformative shock). The liquidity measure used
in this paper is closely related to its first property-tightness5. Define Λt as follows:
Λt = pt − p∗t , (3.29)
which is the (signed) deviation of the realized (or market) price (3.20) from the hypothetical
price (3.5) implied by the empirical data, and our measure of stock liquidity is defined as the
5There does not exist any measure which is able to capture all the three types of liquidity properties.
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absolute value of this deviation |Λt|6. In the financial markets, at any time point, the real
value of a stock is unobservable, the price p∗t can be however regarded as an over time average
of the real values of the stock provided that the empirical probability m is indeed an average
over an infinite sequence of true probability mˆ regimes, reflecting long term frequencies. The
liquidity measure in this paper is similar to that one adopted by Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009). |Λt| measures price pressure or transitory price effect which is the essence of liquidity
according to Grossman and Miller (1988), and Hendershott and Menkveld (2009).
Given the price formulas (3.5) and (3.20), we have
|Λt| = |∆P0 + ∆addt + aZZt| (3.30)
where ∆P0 = P0−P ∗0 and ∆ad = ad−a∗d. Apparently, the liquidity |Λt| of stock is a function
of the market state of belief Zt. Setting |Λt| = 0, that is pt = p∗t , leads to
ZEt = −
∆P0
aZ
− ∆ad
aZ
dt (3.31)
The liquidity problem will arise when market belief Zt deviates from Z
E
t . Given the formula
(3.30) and the joint normality assumption about dt and Zt, we have
µ|Λ| = Em (|Λt|) = σΛ
√
2
pi
exp
(
− µ
2
Λ
2σ2Λ
)
+ µΛ
(
1− 2Φ
(
−µΛ
σΛ
))
, (3.32)
and the unconditional variance of |Λt| is
σ2|Λ| = var
m (|Λt|) = µ2Λ + σ2Λ −
(
µ|Λ|
)2
, (3.33)
where µΛ = ∆P0 and σ
2
Λ = (∆ad)
2 σ2d
1−λ2d
+ a2Z
σ2Z
1−λ2Z
. The proof can be found in the Appendix
in Section 3.5.2. As plotted in Figure 5, the expected value of |Λt| increases with σ2Z , this
means that stock is expected to become illiquid when market belief is more volatile. This
result, together with the results in Section 3.2.5, allows us to conclude that the higher σ2Z is
associated with less trading volume and illiquidity. The phenomenon of the coexistence of
less trading volume and illiquidity has been documented in the financial markets, the model
in this article provides an alternative explanation for this phenomenon.
Different from the inventory risk and asymmetric information theories, it is shown in this
model that even when there is no inventory risk or information asymmetry, liquidity can be
still a relevant problem in the financial markets as a result of heterogeneous beliefs among
6Indeed, |Λt| measures illiquidity, but for simplicity, we still call it liquidity measure.
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investors. To our knowledge, this paper is the first one to demonstrate such relation between
heterogeneous beliefs and stock liquidity.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, the theoretically predicted relations between the volatility of market belief
about stock payoffs and the trading volume, price volatility and liquidity of underlying stocks
derived in Section 3.2 will be empirically checked using the analyst forecast data provided
by the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S).
The mission before selecting data is to choose a poxy variable for stock payoffs, of which
analyst forecast data should be available. There are two candidates for such proxy variable:
one is dividend per share (DPS) and another is earnings per share (EPS), and both of them
are used by financial researchers. DPS is however affected very much by the dividend policy
which is difficult to control for when we make empirical tests, more importantly, the analyst
forecast data on DPS only has short history and the coverage of analysts for DPS forecast
is rather low. Due to these reasons, EPS will be used as a proxy variable for stock payoffs
in this paper.
With the actual and forecast data on EPS provided by the I/B/E/S, time-series models
are adopted to predict EPS, and the market state of belief about EPS can be constructed from
the predicted EPS. The volatility of market belief is estimated with both rolling regression
method and GARCH model, and finally empirical analysis will be done using the estimated
volatility of market belief.
3.3.1 Data
The empirical works in this paper focus on the S&P500 index stocks, this is mainly due to
the fact that smaller firms are covered with much fewer financial analysts so that analysts’
earnings forecasts don’t fully represent the views of most investors and hence market belief
estimated from such earnings forecasts may be biased.
The analyst forecast data on EPS are from the I/B/E/S U.S. Summary History database
which contains summary statistics for analysts’ earnings forecasts, including forecast mean,
median, standard deviation and the number of financial analysts. These data are in general
disclosed on the third Tuesday of each month. Each record also contains the revision date
on which the forecast was last confirmed to be accurate.
The actual EPS data are also taken from the I/B/E/S, and it is called the ‘Street’ EPS
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since it is tracked by analysts and priced by investors. The COMPUSTAT also provides EPS
data which is known as the GAAP EPS that is reported in firms’ financial statements. But,
as documented by Bradshaw et al. (2000), there exists a large and growing gap between the
‘Street’ EPS and the GAAP EPS since the former excludes cost items such as ‘non-recurring’
and ‘no-cash’ charges. Since analysts’ EPS forecasts are based on the ‘Street’ defined EPS, it
makes sense for us to use the ‘Street’ EPS data rather than the GAAP EPS data to predict
EPS that will be used to construct market belief although the GAAP EPS data seems more
transparent.
The EPS data (both actuals and forecasts) collected by the I/B/E/S have different peri-
odicities: quarterly, semi-annually, annually, etc. In this paper, we choose to use quarterly
EPS data because of two reasons: first, the coverage of analysts is relatively high for quar-
terly EPS forecast; second, in the accounting literature, most time series models have been
developed to predict quarterly EPS.
The stocks included in the sample must meet two criteria: 1) Quarterly continuous actual
EPS data for the 1983-2008 period; 2) Monthly continuous forecast mean data on EPS for
the 1993-2008 period. 114 S&P500 index stocks meet these two criteria, and Table 1 details
the industry composition of the sample along with GICS two-digit industry codes, stocks
from three industry sectors: ‘Industrials’, ‘Consumption Discretionary’, and ‘Consumption
Staples’, comprise more than 50% percent of the sample while there are just few stocks from
‘Telecommunication Services’ and ‘Utilities’ sectors.
Common stock data are obtained from the CRSP database.
3.3.2 Time-Series Models
To construct market belief Zt, we need to first predict quarterly EPS. One simple time-series
model which can do the prediction is the seasonal random walk with drift model which can
be written as follows:
E (Qt) = δ +Qt−4 (3.34)
where E (Qt) is the earnings forecast for quarter t, δ is a (typically positive) trend term, and
Qt−4 is the actual earning for quarter t−4. The advantage of this model is that it can capture
the seasonality characteristics in the quarterly earnings data documented by, for example,
Lorek (1979) among others. However, such a model is not very accurate, in general, because
seasonal differences in quarterly earnings, Qt−Qt−4, are affected by factors other than a trend
term. In particular, seasonal differences for quarter t typically exhibit diminishing positive
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correlation with the three prior quarters’ seasonal differences (Qt−1 − Qt−5, Qt−2 − Qt−6,
Qt−3 − Qt−7) and a negative correlation with the seasonal difference four quarters prior
(Qt−4 − Qt−8). Brown and Rozeff (1979) find that the following model, which incorporates
this autocorrelation structure, most accurately predicts the quarterly earnings per share:
E (Qt) = δ +Qt−4 + φ (Qt−1 −Qt−5) + θt−4 (3.35)
where Qt−k is the actual earnings for quarter t − k, t−4 is the earnings shock experienced
at quarter t − 4, and, in general, φ > 0 and θ < 0. This model contains an autoregressive
component: Qt−1 − Qt−5 which reflects the positive autocorrelations in seasonal quarterly
differences at the first three lags and a moving average component t−4 which is responsible
for the negative correlation in seasonal difference at the fourth lag. In this paper, both these
two time-series models will be used to predict quarterly EPS while the first one is for the
purpose of robustness test.
For each stock, the prediction of EPS for each quarter over the sample period between
1993 and 2008 is derived using the estimated coefficients from either a regression of Qt on
Qt−4 or a regression of seasonal changes in actual EPS for quarter t, Qt−Qt−4, on Qt−1−Qt−5
and t−4 (depending on which time-series model is used), and each regression is based on
40 quarters of historical EPS. A time-series of 64 estimates for each coefficient in both the
seasonal random walk with drift model and the Brown and Rozeff (1979) model are obtained
for each stock, the cross-sectional statistics of time series means of the estimated coefficients
is reported in Table 2. Consistent with the previous findings in the literature, the estimated
coefficients δˆ and φˆ are positive and the estimated coefficient θˆ is negative in general.
3.3.3 Market State of Belief
Denote by Eit(epst+1) investor i
′s conditional forecast of quarter t+1 EPS and by Emt (epst+1)
the prediction under the stationary empirical probability m. Investor i′s state of belief about
EPS is defined as7:
geps,it = E
i
t (epst+1)− Emt (epst+1) (3.36)
7This definition is inspired by Eq. (3.8)
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A positive geps,it means that investor i is optimistic about the earnings ar quarter t+1. Market
belief is defined as the average of individual beliefs across investors:
Zepst =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
Eit (epst+1)− Emt (epst+1)
]
= Et (epst+1)− Emt (epst+1) (3.37)
where Et (epst+1) is the average forecast across investors, and Z
eps
t reflects the market’s views
about the earnings at quarter t+ 1.
To construct Zepst , we need data on both Et (epst+1) and E
m
t (epst+1). The forecast mean
of quarterly EPS provided by the I/B/E/S can be used as a proxy for the average forecast
Et (epst+1), and as for E
m
t (epst+1), it can be predicted using the time-series models proposed
in Section 3.3.2. It is worthful to notice that the frequencies of Et (epst+1) and E
m
t (epst+1)
are different: the former is in month but the latter is in quarter. When constructing monthly
market belief, Emt (epst+1) needs to be subtracted from all monthly forecast means for quarter
t+ 1.
Figure 7 plots the graphs of market beliefs over the 1993-2008 period for all sample stocks
while the upper graph traces market beliefs estimated with the Brown and Rozeff (1979)
model and the bottom graph traces market beliefs estimated with the seasonal random walk
with drift model, this figure shows that market beliefs fluctuate dramatically over time.
Table 3 reports the cross-sectional statistics of time-series means, skewness, and kurtosis
of market beliefs. It is clear that the mean of market beliefs is not zero over short time period
although the theory requires to have a long-term time average equal to zero, the market is
on average optimistic about the future earnings. Moreover, market beliefs are distributed
with heavy-tail, indicating that market beliefs can take extreme values.
3.3.4 Volatility of Market Belief
The volatility of market belief is unobservable, but there are different methods to estimate
volatility in the finance literature. In this paper, as a benchmark case, we use rolling regres-
sion volatility estimators with window length τ for each stock j, namely,
ˆvart
(
Zepsj,t
)
=
τ∑
k=1
ωk
(
Zepsj,t+1−k − µj,t
)2
(3.38)
where µj,t =
∑τ
k=1 ωkZ
eps
j,t+1−k, the weights ωk decline geometrically with
∑τ
k=1 ωk = 1, and τ
represents the window length. A type of geometrically declining weights ωk = e
−αk proposed
by Foster and Nelson (1996) is used in this paper, and the window length τ is randomly set
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equal to four8. The volatility of market belief could be estimated using the squared periodic
market states of belief, however, since volatilities are in general persistent, as we have learned
from the stochastic volatility literature, such an estimator of volatility will be then biased and
inefficient, rolling regression estimators can somehow avoid this problem. Another advantage
of rolling regression estimators is that they don’t need intensive computations. In addition
to rolling regression method, as a robustness check, we also use a GARCH(p, q) model with
orders p = q = 1 to estimate the volatility of market belief, which takes a form as follows9:
Zt = φ0 + φ1Zt−1 + z,t (3.39)
z,t = σz,tvz,t (3.40)
where {vz,t} is a i.i.d N(0, 1), and {σz,t} satisfies the recurrence equation
σ2z,t = α0 + α1
2
z,t−1 + β1σ
2
z,t−1 (3.41)
Table 4 details the cross-sectional statistics of time series means of the estimated volatility
of market belief. It is shown in this table that the volatility of market belief estimated with
the GARCH(1,1) model is larger. Adding longer lagged market beliefs (i.e., Zt−2, Zt−3, ...)
into Eq. (3.41) can reduce the estimated volatility of market belief, but this doesn’t change
the conclusions made later in this paper. The magnitude of the volatility of market belief
varies dramatically among stocks, as indicated by the fact that the cross-sectional standard
deviation of the volatility of market belief is much larger than its mean, it seems reasonable
that the market states of belief for small and growing firms may be more volatile.
3.3.5 Trading Volume, Price Volatility and Liquidity
The data which will be used to compute the variables of trading volume, price volatility and
liquidity measures are taken from the CRSP database.
•Trading Volume: in this paper, stock turnover rate will be used as the measure of trading
volume, which is defined, for each stock, as the ratio of number of shares traded in a month
by number of shares outstanding, this definition is consistent with that one in Section 3.2;
•Price Volatility : defined as the variance of stock prices in a month;
8The results for τ = 2 or 6 are similar to what we have obtained with τ = 4, but the results with longer
τ are less significant, this may be caused by the possibility that the persistence of the volatility of market
belief decline fast so that the volatility estimated with long time prior data are very noise.
9The results with other reasonable orders p and q are similar
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•Liquidity : many liquidity measures have been developed in the literature, such as bid-
ask spread, effective bid-ask spread, depth, Kyle’s (1985) lambda, etc, each of them reflecting
a different aspect of liquidity properties. As explained in Section 3.2.7, the liquidity measure
used in the theoretical model is price pressure. Among existing liquidity measures, effective
bid-ask spread is a good proxy for price pressure. In the following empirical tests, we will use
the effective bid-ask spread developed by Roll (1984) as liquidity measure, and this effective
spread can be estimated in the following way: at time t, denote by pt transaction price for
a trade, which may be expressed as
pt = mt + qtc (3.42)
mt = mt−1 + ut (3.43)
where mt denotes the efficient price and ut are i.i.d zero mean random variables with variance
σ2u, qt is a trade direction indicator set to +1 if the customer is buying and -1 if the customer
is selling, and c is transaction cost which is not related to the dynamics of mt. It can be seen
from Eq. (3.42) that c measures the deviation of transaction price pt from the efficient price
mt and is a type of price pressure. Assume that buys and sells are equally likely, serially
independent, and that investors buy or sell independently of ut. Denote ∆pt = pt − pt−1, it
is easy to show that E (∆pt) = 0. The first order autocovariance of price changes is
γ1 = cov (∆pt−1, ∆pt) = E (∆pt−1∆pt)
= E
[
c2(qt−2qt−1 − q2t−1 − qt−2qt + qt−1qt) + c(ut−1qt − ut−1qt−1 + qt−1ut − qt−2ut)
]
= −c2 (3.44)
We obtain that c =
√−γ1. The first order autocovariance γ1 is not always negative, c will
be set to zero in case that γ1 > 0. For each stock, c is assumed to be constant within a given
month and is estimated using daily price data in that month;
In every month, to compute trading volume, price volatility and effective spread, stocks
are required to at least have 15 daily transaction data in that month, otherwise the values
of these variables are set to zero.
The columns 2–4 of Table 5 report the cross-sectional statistics of time-series means of
trading volume, price volatility, and effective spread. The monthly number of traded shares
on average represents around 10% of total outstanding shares, and the Roll’s effective bid-
ask spread is $0.232 per share. The cross-sectional average of price volatilities is surprising
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high, it is likely driven by the extreme price volatilities of some stocks, which can be seen in
Figure 8. The graphs of time-series trading volumes in Figure 8 show that turnover rate has
been increasing over the sample period, this is consistent with the findings by other studies
such as Lo and Wang (2001).
3.3.6 Regression Results
3.3.6.1 Univariate Tests
To begin the study of the relations between the volatility of market belief about stock payoffs
and the trading volume, price volatility and liquidity of underlying stocks, I first report the
results of simple time-series regressions which can be written as follows:
Yi,t = αi + βivZi,t + i,t (i = 1, ..., 114) (3.45)
where Yt is the value of dependent variable which is either trading volume or price volatility
or effective spread at month t. vZt is the volatility of market belief, which is estimated using
rolling regression method as specified in Section 3.3.4.
Table 6 reports the cross sectional statistics of estimated coefficients βˆi. The empirical
results are in general consistent with the theoretical predictions derived in Section 3.2. The
results for the case in which market belief Zt is constructed using the Brown and Rozeff
(1979) model are reported in the second column of Table 6.
As shown in Panel B, for most of sample stocks, price volatility is significantly positively
correlated with the volatility of market belief since approximately 84% of βˆi are positive
while 61% exceed the 5% critical value in one-tailed test, and the cross-sectional average of
βˆi is 662.7 with t-statistics equal to 7.09. Furthermore, the explanatory power of the typical
individual regression is impressive provided that the average R2 is more than 6.8%.
Stock liquidity generally declines when market belief becomes more volatile, this is shown
in the second column of Panel C: over three quarters of βˆi are positive while 42% exceed the
5% critical value in one-tailed test, and the cross-sectional average of βˆi is as well significantly
positive. On average, the volatility of market belief can approximately explain 3%-4% of the
variation of stock liquidity.
As plotted in Figure 8, there exists a time trend in stock turnover rate which has been
increasing over the 1993-2008 period and is then not stationary. For this reason, the empirical
studies of trading volume use some forms of detrending to induce stationarity. There exist
several detrending skills, including linear detrending, log-linear detrending, first differencing,
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etc10. In this paper, we use the method of first differencing to detrend stock turnover rate,
and the regression results for the detrended stock turnover rate are summarized in Panel A.
Trading volume decreases with the volatility of market belief for over 50% of sample stocks,
but the correlation between the volatility of market belief and trading volume is rather weak
because only less than 2% of βˆi are significantly negative. Moreover, the explanatory power
of the volatility of market belief on trading volume is least impressive in that the average R2
is even less than 0.5%. In contrast to the theoretical prediction in Section 3.2.5, the average
of βˆi is positive although it is insignificant. All these evidences show that there should be a
large component of noise and/or other influences in stock trading activity.
It is possible that the above results depend on the specification of the time-series mod-
els used to predict EPS, different EPS predicting models may lead to completely different
conclusions. Therefore, as a robustness check, the regression results for the case in which
market belief is constructed using the seasonal random walk with drift model are presented
in the third column of Table 6. Obviously, the results in this case are very similar to those
obtained previously. Indeed, in this case, the results are even stronger to support the theo-
retically predicted relations between the volatility of market belief about stock payoffs and
the trading volume, price volatility and liquidity of underlying stocks in the sense that more
βˆi exhibit theoretically predicted signs and are significant, and specially, the average of βˆi in
the ‘trading volume’ case is now negative and is significant at the 5% level.
3.3.6.2 Multivariate Tests
Although the empirical results so far support the theoretically predicted relations between
the volatility of market belief about stock payoffs and the trading volume, price volatility
and liquidity of underlying stocks, these relations remain to be further investigated since
other factors than the volatility of market belief, which may influence trading volume, price
volatility and liquidity, are ignored.
A. Trading volume
To study the behavior of trading volume is a crucial topic in the finance literature provided
that trading volume is one of the fundamental building blocks of any theory of market in-
teractions and is important in modeling asset markets. A prior, many empirical studies
focusing on the time-series behavior of trading volume document the positive price/volume
and volatility/volume relations. Different theoretical models (like sequential arrival of in-
10Refer to Lo and Wang (2001) for more discussions about these methods.
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formation models, a mixture of distributions models, asymmetric information models, and
differences in opinion models) have been developed to explain the relation between price and
trading volume, and these models predict a positive relationship between price and trading
volume. Some studies also report bidirectional causality between price and trading volume11.
The mixture of distribution models explains the positive relation between return volatility
and trading volume as they jointly depend on a common factor, i.e., information innovation.
The third control variable is market belief Zt. Although the role of Zt on trading volume is
not specified in the theoretical model, according to the experience learned from the financial
markets, it seems reasonable to believe that trading volume will increase when the market
expectation about the future earnings is optimistic.
Table 7 reports the cross-sectional statistics of the estimates for the betas of regressors.
It is clear that including additional explanatory variables does not have a major effect on
the negative correlation between trading volume and the volatility of market belief. Very
interestingly, the estimated betas of the volatility of market belief are significant at the
5% level for more stocks and its cross-sectional average turns to be negative although still
insignificant after controlling for the effects of stock price, return volatility and market belief
on trading volume. The average betas of stock price and return volatility exhibit the same
signs as we expect, and specially, trading volume strongly positively covaries with return
volatility. Trading volume typically increases with market belief of which influence is however
much less significant than other two control variables. Including additional explanatory
variables control variables makes the explanatory power of the typical individual regression
increase from less than 0.5% to more than 8%, this is a huge improvement.
B. Price Volatility
There exists extensive evidence on the relation between price volatility and trading volume.
Karpoff (1987), for example, cities many studies that document a positive relation between
price volatility and trading volume in financial markets, and this relation is robust to various
time intervals and numerous financial markets. For this reason, stock turnover rate is added
as a control variable when we run the regression of price volatility on the volatility of market
belief. The second control variable is size which is defined as the market value (in billions of
U.S. dollars) of stock measured on the last day of the previous month. size is included for the
following reason: size is correlated with institutional ownership, Falkenstein (1996) finds that
institutional investors display a revealed preference for larger firms. Dennis and Strickland
(2004) further find that firm-level volatility is positively related to increased institutional
11See, for example, Hiemstra and Jones (1994); Chen, Firth, and Rui (2001); Ratner and Leal (2001)
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ownership. Cheung and Ng (1998) find that size is positively correlated with price volatility.
Like in the ‘trading volume’ case, market belief Zt is also included as a control variable.
The robustness test results are reported in Table 8, these results confirmed the previously
documented findings that price volatility increases with turnover rate, but the correlation
is insignificant. The results about the effect of size on price volatility are mixed while the
average betas of size are not different from zero with high probabilities. Price volatility is also
positively correlated with market belief Zt, this result somehow contradicts our intuition: if
bull market is accompanied with high Zt and bear market low Zt, then price volatility should
decrease with market belief. One of potential explanations for this result is that optimistic
market belief, as shown in the robustness test results for trading volume, increases trading
volume which will in turn drive price volatility up. Importantly, after controlling for the
effects of additional explanatory variables, the positive correlation between price volatility
and the volatility of market belief remains for most of sample stocks given that more than
75% of estimated betas of the volatility of market belief are positive while 55% exceed the
5% one-tailed critical value. On average, the factors of the volatility of market belief, size,
trading volume and the market state of belief can explain approximately 15% of the variation
of price volatility, and a minor half of the explanatory power is from the volatility of market
belief.
C. Liquidity
Market microstructure theory suggests two possible influencing factors on stock liquidity,
namely, inventory risk and asymmetric information. The inventory explanation for liquidity
argues that more trading should lead to tight spread because inventory balances and risk
per trade can be maintained at lower levels. To account for the influence of inventory risk on
liquidity, we include stock turnover rate, which is a measure of trading activity, as a control
variable. Sadka and Scherbina (2009) argue that investors disagree more when the problem
of asymmetric information is more serious, we can thus use the analyst forecast dispersion
(available in the I/B/E/S) as a proxy variable for information asymmetry12. Moreover, as
suggested by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahyanman (2000), the lagged, contemporaneous and
leading market return and return volatility are also included as additional control variables.
The market return is intended to remove the spurious dependence induced by an association
between returns and liquidity measure. This could have particular relevance for the effective
spread since it is a function of the transaction price. Its changes are functions of individual
12The data of other proxy variables for asymmetric information, like number of transactions and PINs,
are not available.
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returns, known to be significantly correlated with the board market returns. The lags and
leads are designed to capture any lagged adjustment in market return. The return volatility
is a nuisance variable possibly influencing liquidity. The last control variable is market belief
Zt.
Table 9 reports the cross-sectional statistics for the robustness test results. It is evident
that including additional explanatory variables does not have a major effect on the posi-
tive correlation between stock liquidity and the volatility of market belief: effective spread
is positively correlated with the volatility of market belief for about two thirds of sample
stocks and the positive correlation is significant for more than one third of sample stocks.
The effects of all control variables but return volatility on stock liquidity are however op-
posite to what expected. For example, larger trading volume widens effective spread. This
result is not so surprise as it looks like. As shown in Table 8, trading volume significantly
increases price volatility which can in turn widen effective spread. Similar argument can be
applied to explain the positive correlation between effective spread and market belief and
the market return since trading volume likely increases when the market is optimistic and/or
when the financial markets boom. Effective spread unexpectedly decreases with the analyst
forecast dispersion, suggesting that either the analyst forecast dispersion is not a good proxy
variable for information asymmetry or effective spread is not greatly affected by information
asymmetry.
3.3.6.3 Volatility of Market Belief Estimated with GARCH(1,1) Model
All the results about the relations between the volatility of market belief about stocks payoffs
and the trading volume, price volatility and liquidity of underlying stocks obtained so far are
mainly based on the volatility of market belief estimated using rolling regression method.
To verify whether these results depend on the specification of estimating methods for the
volatility of market belief, this paper also reports in Table 10 the cross-sectional statistics of
the relevant regression results for the case in which the volatility of market belief is estimated
using a GARCH(p, q) model with orders p = q = 1 (as specified in Section 3.3.4).
The main conclusions to be made from Table 10 can be summarized as follows:
First, the theoretically predicted relations between the volatility of market belief about
stock payoffs and the trading volume, price volatility and liquidity of underlying stocks hold
again: for most of sample stocks, trading volume and liquidity decrease but price volatility
increases with the volatility of market belief. Furthermore, the negative correlation between
trading volume and the volatility of market belief holds and is significant for more stocks,
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and the average betas are now significantly negative in all cases;
Second, the volatility of market belief, estimated using GARCH(1,1) model, can explain
much more proportion of the variations of price volatility and stock liquidity. For instance, in
the simple regressions without any additional control variables, the average R2 approximately
increases from 7% to 14% in the ‘price volatility ’ case and from 3.5% to 7% in the ‘liquidity ’
case, almost doubled.
Third, the magnitude of the correlation between the volatility of market belief and price
volatility and liquidity varies dramatically across sample stocks, maybe this can explain why
the average betas of the volatility of market belief in both the ‘price volatility ’ and ‘liquidity ’
cases are less significant although their values are larger than those obtained when we use the
volatility of market belief estimated with rolling regression method as explanatory variable.
Using the volatility of market belief estimated with GRACH model does not change the
conclusions.
3.3.6.4 Alternative Liquidity Measure
In order to check the robustness of the positive correlation between the volatility of market
belief and stock illiquidity, we shall use another liquidity measure, namely, Amihud’s (2002)
liquidity measure in the empirical test. This measure on day d for stock j is defined as the
ratio of its absolute daily return to the daily trading volume (in billions of U.S. dollars), and
it is designed to capture the price impact of the order flow. The average illiquidity of stock
j in month m, denoted by ILLIQjm, can be formulated as follows
ILLIQjm =
1
Djm
Djm∑
d=1
|Rjmd|/V OLjmd (3.46)
where Djm is the number of trading days in month m for stock j, Rjmt is the return on stock j
on day d of month m and V OLjmd is the respective daily trading volume (in hundred millions
of U.S. dollars). Amihud (2002) shows that this liquidity measure is positively related to
measures of price impact and fixed transaction costs. To avoid the potential non-stationarity
of this measure caused by market capitalization growth over the sample period, ILLIQjm
will be multiplied by a scaling factor which equals the ratio of the market capitalization of
stock j in the beginning of month m to its value in the last month of the sample period.
The cross-sectional statistics of time-series means of ILLIQ is reported in the column 5
of Table 5 while the bottom right graph in Figure 8 traces the time-series of ILLIQs. We
observe that, for a specific stock, the scaling factor of hundred millions of U.S. dollars is so
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large that its ILLIQ value is much larger than the ILLIQ values of other stocks, this is
why the graph of ILLIQ looks uncomfortable.
The cross-sectional statistics of the regression results for ILLIQ are reported in Table 11.
Let’s first consider the case in which the volatility of market belief is the unique explanatory
variable. The correlation between the volatility of market belief and stock liquidity is again
negative for a major number of sample stocks and significant for about 30% of sample stocks,
and the explanatory power of the typical individual regression varies within a similar range
as before. One exception is that the cross-sectional average betas of the volatility of market
belief turn to be negative, but, they are insignificant.
After controlling for the effects of additional explanatory variables on ILLIQ, the number
of positive betas of the volatility of market belief even increases in three out of four robustness
regressions, and the percentage of significantly positive betas declines to 18%-26% which are
still fairly high. Note that, in this case, the signs of the average betas of all control variables
but return volatility are reversed. Now, stock liquidity significantly positively covaries with
trading volume, this result may be not strange as, according to the definition (3.48), ILLIQ
is inversely related to trading volume. As expected, stock liquidity decreases with the analyst
forecast dispersion. Indeed, both ILLIQ and the analyst forecast dispersion are supposed
to be positively correlated with a common factor – information asymmetry.
The results for ILLIQ, although impressive, are less significant than those obtained for
the Roll’s (1984) bid-ask effective spread, this may be because ILLIQ, as a measure of the
price impact of order flow, is not a pure price pressure measure and therefore contains other
components on which the volatility of market belief has less effect.
3.4 Conclusions
This paper studies the impact of investors’ heterogeneous beliefs on the trading volume, price
volatility and liquidity of stocks. Following Kurz and Motolese (2008), a simple theoretical
model is proposed to demonstrate that stock price is linearly positively correlated with
market belief about stock future earnings. Moreover, trading volume and liquidity are shown
to decrease with the volatility of market belief while price volatility increases with it. Using
the analyst forecast data on quarterly EPS provided by the I/B/E/S, we find the evidence
to support these theoretical predictions. The empirical results are robust to diverse methods
of estimating market belief and its volatility and to alternative liquidity measures.
The stocks selected in this paper are from S&P500 index and are generally issued by large
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publicly held companies. It will be very nature to extend the sample to include more stocks,
particularly those of small and medium-sized companies, to check whether the conclusions
made in this paper hold for wider range of stocks. Having more stocks also makes it possible
for us to study whether the relations between the volatility of market belief and the trading
volume, price volatility and liquidity of stocks vary across industry categories and differen-
sized firms.
As shown, market belief, in addition to its volatility, also influence the trading volume,
price volatility and effective spread of stocks, but theoretically the relations among these
variables are not justified. This issue needs to be explored in more details in the future.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Proof of Proposition II
For simplicity, we ignore in this appendix index i identifying the investor who carries out the
optimization. The dynamic programming problem is as follows: given initial values (θ0,W0),
maximize
Ut = Eθ,c
[ ∞∑
s=0
−βt+s−1e− 1τ Ct+s|=t, gt
]
subject to the following constraints
Wt+1 = (Wt − Ct)R + θtQt+1
Qt+1 = pt+1 + (dt+1 + µ)− ptR
and ψt = (1, dt, Zt, gt)
T . The stochastic transition functions for dt, Zt and gt are defined as
dt+1 = λddt + λ
d
ggt + 
d
t+1
Zt+1 = λZZt + λ
Z
g gt + 
Z
t+1
gt+1 = λZgt + 
g
t+1
In the following, we define that
Λψ =
 1 0
T
0 Λ
 , t =
 1
ˆt
 , ˆt =
 
d
t
zt
gt
 ∼ N

 00
0
 ,
 σˆ
2
d σˆdZ 0
σˆdZ σˆ
2
Z 0
0 0 σ2g


Step One: Simplification We define that, for an unknown symmetric matrix V
Λ =
 λd 0 λ
d
g
0 λz λ
z
g
0 0 λz
 , V =
 v00 v
T
0
v0 V11

Hence ψt+1 = Λψψt + Λt+1, Λ being a 4× 4 matrix with a I3×3 matrix in the right bottom
and zeros otherwise.
Assume that pt = P0 +addt+azZt and we will verify this formula later when we solve for
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the equilibrium. Using this price formula, we can compute the excess share return in terms
of the state variables
Qt+1 = addt+1 + azZt+1 + P0 + dt+1 + µ− (addt + azZt + P0)R
= aTψt + b
T t+1
where a and b are defined as follows
a =
(
P0 (1−R) + µ, (ad + 1)λd −Rad, azλz −Raz, (ad + 1)λdg + azλzg
)T
b = (0, ad + 1, az, 0)
T
Hence, we have that Et (Qt+1)=a
Tψt. Also, we use the notation bˆ=(ad + 1, az, 0)
T . Consider
the following trial solution for the value function of the dynamic programming problem
J (Wt;ψt; t) = −βt−1exp
{
−αWt − 1
2
ψTt V ψt
}
Compute the expression
−αWt+1 − 1
2
ψTt+1V ψt+1 = −α (Wt − Ct)R− αθt
[
aTψt + b
T t+1
]
−1
2
ψTt Λ
T
ψV Λψψt − ψTt ΛTψV Λt+1 −
1
2
Tt+1Λ
T
 V Λt+1
= −At − eTt ˆt+1 −
1
2
ˆTt+1V11ˆT+1
where At and et are defined as
At = α (Wt − Ct)R + αθtaTψt + 1
2
ψTt Λ
T
ψV Λψψt
et =
(
αθtbˆ
T + ψTt Λ
T
0
)T
with Λ0 = (v0, V11Λ), which is a (3x4) matrix.
Step Two: The Bellman Equation The Bellman equation for this problem with γ = 1
τ
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can be written in the form
Jt = Max{θt,Ct}
[−βt−1exp{−γCt}+ E (Jt+1|=t, gt)]
= Max{θt,Ct}
[
−βt−1exp{−γCt} − βtEt
(
exp
{
−At − eTt ˆt+1 −
1
2
ˆTt+1V11ˆt+1
})]
It can be shown that
Et
(
exp
{
−At − eTt ˆt+1 −
1
2
ˆTt+1V11ˆt+1
})
= |1 +∑V11|− 12 exp [1
2
eTt (1 +
∑
V11)
−1∑ et − At]
Also
1
2
eTt (1 +
∑
V11)
−1∑ et = 1
2
(
αθtbˆ
T + ψTt Λ
T
0
)
(1 +
∑
V11)
−1∑(αθtbˆT + ψTt ΛT0 )T
=
1
2
α2θ2t bˆ
TΩbˆ+ αθtbˆ
TΩΛ0ψt +
1
2
ψTt Λ
T
0 ΩΛ0ψt
where Ω = (1 +
∑
V11)
−1∑.
Hence, we have an expression for the exponent term
1
2
eTt (1 +
∑
V11)
−1∑ et − At = −α (Wt − Ct)R− αθt [aT − bˆTΩΛ0]ψt
+
1
2
α2θ2t bˆ
TΩbˆ− 1
2
ψTt
[
ΛTψV Λψ − ΛT0 ΩΛ0
]
ψt
The first order condition with respect to θ leads to
−α
[
aT − bˆTΩΛ0
]
ψt + α
2θtbˆ
TΩbˆ = 0
The demand of each investor thus equals (since Et (Qt+1) = a
Tψt)
θt =
1
αbˆTΩbˆ
[(
aT − bˆTΩΛ0
)
ψt
]
=
1
αbˆTΩbˆ
[
Et (Qt+1) + u
Tψt
]
with uT = −bˆTΩΛ0.
Note that the vector u is the same for the all investors since the assumption made in the
text is that all investors are identically the same except for their belief states gt and the last
equation shows that the vector u depends only upon parameters of the stochastic structure.
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Step Three: The Adjusted Variance and Constants Define that
σˆ2Q = bˆ
TΩbˆ
which is the variance of the excess return function where the covariance matrix used is not∑
but rather Ω. We now have
α2θ2t bˆ
TΩbˆ =
1
bˆTΩbˆ
{
ψTt
[
aT − bˆTΩΛ0
]T [
aT − bˆTΩΛ0
]
ψt
}
Hence the optimized value of the exponent is simply
1
2
eTt (1 +
∑
V11)
−1∑ et − At = −α (Wt − Ct)R− 12ψTt Mψt
where
M =
1
bˆTΩbˆ
[
aT − bˆTΩΛ0
]T [
aT − bˆTΩΛ0
]
+
[
ΛTψV Λψ − ΛT0 ΩΛ0
]
Now take the derivative with respect to Ct and equate to zero to obtain
γexp {−γCt} = αRβ |1 +
∑
V11|−
1
2 exp
{
−α (Wt − Ct)R− 1
2
ψTt Mψt
}
Let G = |1 +∑V11|− 12 . Hence, the solution for Ct must satisfy
γCt = −ln
[
αRβG
γ
]
+ α (Wt − Ct)R + 1
2
ψTt Mψt
We finally have
Ct = − 1
γ + αR
ln
[
αRβG
γ
]
+
αR
γ + αR
Wt +
1
2 (γ + αR)
ψTt Mψt
Substituting the optimal consumption-investment policy back into the Bellman equation, we
obtain
α =
rγ
R
exp
{
−1
2
ψTt
[
M
R
− V + 2
(
γC + ln
( r
R
))
i11
]
ψt
}
= 1
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where i11 is a 4 × 4 matrix with the element (1, 1) being one and all other elements being
zero and C = − 1
γR
ln (rβG). This leads to the following equation for V 13
M
R
− V + 2
(
γC + ln
( r
R
))
i11 = 0
Step Four: The Equilibrium Pricing Average θt over all investors, given that the total
supply of stock is one, we obtain
rσˆ2Q
RNτ
=
[
Et (pt+1 + dt+1 + µ)−Rpt + (u0 + u1dt + (u2 + u3)Zt)
]
Use the relationships (3.19) and (3.20) to deduce a linear difference equation for pt
Et (pt+1) = Rpt − (λd + u1) dt − (λgd + u2 + u3)Zt +
rσˆ2Q
RNτ
− (µ+ u0)
This is a typical linear difference problem. The parameters and the market average pro-
cesses of dt and Zt satisfy the conditions, as specified in Blanchard and Kahn (1980), under
which there does exist an unique equilibrium solution for stock price which, like Eq. (3) in
Blanchard and Kahn (1980), takes a form as follows
pt =
∞∑
i=0
R−i−1
{
γT1 E (Xt+i|=t)
}
(3.47)
where
γ1 =
[
(µ+ u0)−
rσˆ2Q
RNτ
, λd + u1, λ
g
d + u2 + u3
]T
Xt = [1, dt, Zt]
T
The price function in Eq. (3.20) can be obtained by simplifying the price formula (3.47).
13The equation (ii) determining V in the appendix A of Kurz and Motolese (2008) seems incorrect.
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3.5.2 Some Moments of Absolute Normal Random Variables
Let Y be a normally distributed random variable with mean µ and σ2, that is, Y ∼ N(µ, σ2).
The expectation of the absolute value of Y is:
E(|Y |) =
∫ +∞
−∞
|y|√
2piσ
exp
[
−(y − µ)
2
2σ2
]
dy
=
∫ +∞
−µ
x+ µ√
2piσ
exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
dx−
∫ −µ
−∞
x+ µ√
2piσ
exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
dx
= 2
∫ +∞
−µ
x√
2piσ
exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
dx+ µ
[
1− 2
∫ −µ
−∞
1√
2piσ
exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
dx
]
It is easy to show that∫ +∞
−µ
x√
2piσ
exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
dx = σ
√
1
2pi
exp
(
− µ
2
2σ2
)
Thus, we have that the expectation of the absolute value of Y is given by
E(|Y |) = σ
√
2
pi
exp
(
− µ
2
2σ2
)
+ µ
[
1− 2Φ
(
−µ
σ
)]
The variance of |Y | is easy to calculate with E (|Y |)
var(|Y |) = E (|Y |2)− E (|Y |)2 = var (Y 2)+ E (Y )2 − E (|Y |)2
= µ2 + σ2 −
[
σ
√
2
pi
exp
(
− µ
2
2σ2
)
+ µ
(
1− 2Φ
(
−µ
σ
))]2
These results can be used to calculate the expectations of V it and |Λt| defined in Section 3.2.
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Figure 1A: This figure plots the numerically computed values for the coefficients u∗0, u
∗
1, P
∗
0
and a∗d against λd with r=0.1, µ=2, β=0.9, τ=2.0, σ
2
d=1.0, N=2.
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Figure 1B: This figure plots the numerically computed values for the coefficients u∗0, u
∗
1, P
∗
0
and a∗d against σ
2
d with r=0.1, µ=2, β=0.9, τ=2.0, λd=0.5, N=2.
118 CHAPTER 3. DIVERSE BELIEFS
0 0.5
1
0
0.5
1
0
0.5
1
λdλz+λz
g
u
0
0 0.5
1
0
0.5
1
−1
0
1
x 10−9
λdλz+λz
g
u
1
0 0.5
1
0
0.5
1
−1
−0.5
0
λdλz+λz
g
u
2
0 0.5
1
0
0.5
1
−1
0
1
λdλz+λz
g
u
3
0 0.5
1
0
0.5
1
0
10
20
λdλz+λz
g
P
0
0 0.5
1
0
0.5
1
0
5
10
λdλz+λz
g
a
d
0 0.5
1
0
0.5
1
0
10
20
λdλz+λz
g
a
z
0 0.5
1
0
0.5
1
0
10
20
λdλz+λz
g
(a
d
+
1
)λ
dg
+
a
Z
λ
Zg
+
u
3
Figure 2A: This figure plots the numerically computed values for the coefficients u0, u1, u2,
u3, P0, ad, aZ and (ad + 1)λ
g
d + aZλ
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Z + u3 against both λd and λZ + λ
g
Z with r=0.1, µ=2,
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Figure 2B: This figure plots the numerically computed values for the coefficients u0, u1, u2,
u3, P0, ad, aZ and (ad + 1)λ
g
d + aZλ
g
Z + u3 against both σ
2
d and σ
2
Z with r=0.1, µ=2, β=0.9,
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g
Z=0.3, σ
2
g=1.0, σˆdZ=σˆdg=0, N=2.
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Figure 4A: This figure plots the numerically computed price volatility σ2p∗ against σ
2
d with
r=0.1, µ=2, β=0.9, τ=2.0, λd=0.5, N=2.
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Figure 4B: This figure plots the numerically computed price volatility σ2p∗∗ against both
σ2d and σ
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Z with r=0.1, µ=2, β=0.9, τ=2.0, λd=0.5, λ
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Figure 6: This figure plots, for 114 S&P500 index stocks, the monthly cross-sectional average
number (mean or median) of financial analysts over the period from 1984 to 2008.
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Figure 7: This figure plots, for 114 S&P500 stocks, the time-series of market beliefs estimated
with both the Brown and Rozeff (1979) model and the seasonal random walk with drift model
over the period from 1993 to 2008.
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Figure 8: This figure plots, for 114 S&P500 stocks, the time series of dependent variables:
turnover rate, price volatility, Roll’s (1984) effective bid-ask spread, Amihud’s (2002) liquid-
ity measure over the period from 1993 to 2008.
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Table 1
G.I.C.S. Industry Breakdown of the Sample.
GICS
Two-Digit
Industry Number
Code Sector of Stocks
10 Energy 10
15 Materials 14
20 Industrials 24
25 Consumer Discretionary 19
30 Consumer Staples 14
35 Health Care 11
40 Financials 8
45 Information Technology 12
50 Telecommunication Services 0
55 Utilities 2
—
Total 114
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Table 2
Cross-sectional statistics of time series means of the estimated coefficients for the Brown and
Rozeff (1979) (BR) model and the seasonal random walk with drift (SRWD) model.
This table reports cross-sectional statistics of time series means of the estimated coefficients
for both the Brown and Rozeff (1979) model and the seasonal random walk with drift model.
The seasonal random walk with drift model can be written as:
E (Qt) = δ +Qt−4 (3.48)
where E (Qt) is the earnings forecast for quarter t, δ is a (typically) positive trend, and Qt−4
is the actual earnings for quarter t-4. The Brown and Rozeff model takes a form as follows:
E (Qt) = δ +Qt−4 + φ (Qt−1 −Qt−5) + θt−4 (3.49)
where Qt−k is the actual earnings for quarter t−k and t−4 is the white noise earnings shock
experienced at quarter t− 4. The sample consists of 114 S&P500 index stocks.
SRWD Model BR Model
——————– ———————————————
δ δ φ θ
# of negative medians 6 7 0 101
Mean 0.027 0.017 0.560 -0.224
Median 0.024 0.015 0.583 -0.258
Standard Deviation 0.024 0.018 0.191 0.153
Table 3
Cross-sectional statistics of time series means, skewness, and kurtosis of the market state of
belief.
This table reports cross-sectional statistics of time series means, skewness and kurtosis of the
market state of belief Zt. The market state of belief is estimated by subtracting the quarterly
EPS predicted with both the Brown and Rozeff (1979) model and the seasonal random walk
with drift model from the mean of analysts’ earnings forecasts, and the estimated beliefs are
respectively denoted by Zbr and Zsrwd. The sample consists of 114 S&P500 index stocks.
Zbr Zsrwd
————————————— —————————————
Mean Skewness Kurtosis Mean Skewness Kurtosis
Mean 0.021 1.581 14.996 0.035 0.984 12.612
Median 0.011 1.463 10.987 0.024 0.791 8.864
Standard Deviation 0.051 1.836 11.148 0.048 1.803 10.210
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Table 4
Cross-sectional statistics of time series means of the volatility of market belief.
This table reports cross-sectional statistics of time series means of the volatility of market
belief estimated using either rolling regression method or GARCH(1,1) model as specified in
Section 3.4. The sample consists of 114 S&P500 index stocks.
V olatilityzbr V olatilityzsrwd
———————————— ————————————
RR Method GARCH(1,1) RR Method GARCH(1,1)
Mean 0.033 0.061 0.020 0.040
Median 0.006 0.012 0.005 0.010
Standard Deviation 0.089 0.161 0.048 0.093
Table 5
Cross-sectional statistics of time series means of dependent variables.
This table reports cross-sectional statistics of time series means of four dependent variables:
trading volume (Turnover Rate), price volatility (Price Volatility), Roll’s (1984) effective bid
ask spread (Effective Spread), and Amihud’s (2002) liquidity measure (Price Impact). The
sample consists of 114 S&P500 index stocks.
Turnover Rate Price Volatility Effective Spread Price Impact
Mean 0.124 9.477 0.232 0.102
Median 0.100 6.019 0.207 0.038
Standard Deviation 0.084 18.208 0.145 0.307
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Table 6
Explaining the time-series variation of trading volume, price volatility and liquidity of stocks
with the volatility of market belief estimated using rolling regression method.
This table reports cross-sectional statistics of the following OLS regression results:
Yi,t = αi + βivZ
j
i,t + i,t (i = 1, ..., 114) (3.50)
where j = BR or SRWD. The dependent variable Yt is either trading volume or price volatility
or effective spread, vZt is the volatility of market belief estimated using rolling regression
method. Trading volume refers to the detrended turnover rate, price volatility is the variance
of stock price, effective spread is the square root of negative first order autocovariance of
stock price and will be set to zero if the autocovariance is positive. Cross-sectional averages of
estimated betas are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. ‘%positive’ (‘%negative’) means
the percentage of positive (negative) betas, while ‘%+significance’ (‘%-significance’) gives the
percentage with t-statistics greater than +1.645 (smaller than -1.645)(the 5% critical value
in one-tailed test). The sample consists of 114 S&P500 index stocks.
BR Model SRWD Model
Panel A: Trading Volume
vZt 2.777 -5.928
(0.76) (-1.66)
% negative 58.772 68.421
% −significant 1.754 0.877
R2(%) mean 0.359 0.336
Median 0.129 0.119
Panel B: Price Volatility
vZt(/100) 6.627 7.624
(7.09) (6.59)
% positive 84.211 85.965
% +significant 60.526 64.912
R2(%) mean 6.820 7.083
Median 2.989 3.021
Panel C: Liquidity
vZt 3.194 3.642
(5.53) (5.49)
% positive 75.439 77.193
% +significant 42.105 48.246
R2(%) mean 3.591 3.677
Median 1.206 1.516
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Table 7
Robustness test: trading volume
This table reports cross-sectional statistics of the following OLS regression results:
Yi,t = αi + βi,1vZ
j
i,t + βi,2Z
j
i,t + βi,3Pricei,t + βi,4vReti,t + i,t (i = 1, ..., 114) (3.51)
where j = BR or SRWD. The dependent variable Yt is the detrended turnover rate, vZt is
the volatility of market belief estimated using rolling regression method, Zt is the market
state of belief, Pricet is the monthly average stock price and vRett is the volatility of
stock return. Cross-sectional averages of estimated betas are reported with t-statistics in
parentheses. ‘%negative’ means the percentage of negative betas, while ‘%-significance’ gives
the percentage with t-statistics smaller than -1.645 (the 5% critical value in one-tailed test).
The sample consists of 114 S&P500 index stocks.
BR Model SRWD Model
vZt -0.682 -8.411
(-0.19) (-1.40)
% negative 60.526 70.175
% −significant 3.509 5.263
Zt 0.469 0.736
(1.27) (2.28)
Pricet 0.017 0.016
(7.71) (6.82)
vRett(/100) 23.571 22.993
(12.73) (11.78)
R2(%) mean 7.988 7.902
Median 6.951 7.362
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Table 8
Robustness test: price volatility
This table reports cross-sectional statistics of the following OLS regression results:
Yi,t = αi + βi,1vZ
j
i,t + βi,2Z
j
i,t + βi,3Sizei,t + βi,4V olumei,t + i,t (i = 1, ..., 114) (3.52)
where j = BR or SRWD. The dependent variable Yt is price volatility, vZt is the volatility
of market belief estimated using rolling regression method, Zt is the market state of belief,
Sizet is the market capitalization of stock in the beginning of each month, and V olumet is
the turnover rate. Cross-sectional averages of estimated betas are reported with t-statistics
in parentheses. ‘%positive’ means the percentage of positive betas, while ‘%+significance’
gives the percentage with t-statistics greater than +1.645 (the 5% critical value in one-tailed
test). The sample consists of 114 S&P500 index stocks.
BR Model SRWD Model
vZt(/100) 6.244 6.610
(6.85) (6.97)
% positive 75.439 79.825
% +significant 54.386 55.263
Zt 32.254 30.433
(3.44) (3.44)
Sizet 0.014 -0.055
(0.04) (-0.16)
V olumet 1.497 1.487
(1.31) (1.32)
R2(%) mean 16.180 15.938
Median 14.174 14.034
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Table 9
Robustness test: liquidity
This table reports cross-sectional statistics of the following OLS regression results:
Yi,t = αi + βi,1vZ
j
i,t + βi,2Z
j
i,t + βi,3MktReti,t−1 + βi,4MktReti,t + βi,5MktReti,t+1
+βi,6vReti,t + βi,7V olumei,t + βi,8Dispersioni,t + i,t (i = 1, ..., 114) (3.53)
where j = BR or SRWD. The dependent variable Yt is effective spread, vZt is the volatility
of market belief estimated using rolling regression method, Zt is the market state of belief,
MktRett−1, MktRett and MktRett+1 are respectively the lag, concurrent and lead values
of the value-weighted market return, vRett is the volatility of stock return, V olumet is the
turnover rate, and Dispersiont is the analyst forecast dispersion. Cross-sectional averages of
estimated betas are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. ‘%positive’ means the percent-
age of positive betas, while ‘%+significance’ gives the percentage with t-statistics greater
than +1.645 (the 5% critical value in one-tailed test). The sample consists of 114 S&P500
index stocks.
BR Model SRWD Model
vZt 2.496 2.912
(4.87) (5.21)
% positive 66.667 68.421
% +significant 34.211 41.228
Zt 0.202 0.250
(4.61) (5.47)
MktRett−1 0.154 0.150
(2.29) (2.22)
MktRett 0.275 0.272
(4.42) (4.38)
MktRett+1 0.050 0.046
(0.85) (0.79)
vRett(/100) 1.528 1.545
(11.78) (12.06)
V olumet 0.004 0.004
(1.22) (1.20)
Dispersiont -0.225 -0.223
(-1.10) (-0.96)
R2(%) mean 17.448 17.673
Median 15.351 16.191
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Table 10
Explaining the time series variation of trading volume, price volatility and liquidity of stocks
with the volatility of market belief estimated using GARCH(1,1) model
This table reports cross-sectional statistics of the following OLS regression results:
Yi,t = αi + βi,1vZ
j
i,t + βiV ectori,t + i,t (i = 1, ..., 114) (3.54)
where j = BR or SRWD. The dependent variable Yt is either trading volume or price volatility
or effective spread, vZt is the volatility of market belief estimated using GARCH(1,1) model.
V ectort is a vector containing different regressors for different dependent variables, and βi
is a coefficient vector. ‘Basic’ means the case in which the volatility of market belief is the
unique explanatory variable while ‘Robust’ means the robustness test. In the ‘Basic’ case, βi
is set equal to zero. Cross-sectional averages of estimated betas are reported with t-statistics
in parentheses. ‘%positive’ (‘%negative’) means the percentage of positive (negative) betas,
while ‘%+significance’ (‘%-significance’) gives the percentage with t-statistics greater than
+1.645 (smaller than -1.645)(the 5% critical value in one-tailed test). For the parsimonious
reason, only the statistics for the betas of vZt are reported in this table. The sample consists
of 112 S&P500 index stocks.
BR Model SRWD Model
——————— ———————
Basic Robust Basic Robust
Panel A: Trading Volume
vZt -20.594 -22.782 -36.773 -39.827
(-3.29) (-4.00) (-3.51) (-3.80)
% negative 74.107 72.321 77.679 76.786
% −significant 3.571 6.250 4.464 8.036
R2(%) Mean 0.297 8.118 0.319 8.077
Median 0.125 7.180 0.099 7.340
Panel B: Price Volatility
vZt(/100) 29.550 29.230 31.948 31.154
(2.38) (2.35) (2.05) (2.00)
% positive 78.571 75.000 79.464 73.214
% +significant 60.714 58.036 61.607 53.571
R2(%) Mean 14.262 22.543 13.625 21.482
Median 4.203 15.780 3.758 14.059
Panel C: Liquidity
vZt 14.513 13.793 17.083 16.207
(2.32) (2.16) (2.10) (1.96)
% positive 76.786 69.643 75.000 66.643
% +significant 48.214 42.857 53.571 40.179
R2(%) Mean 7.284 20.319 7.252 20.329
Median 1.854 16.034 2.121 16.759
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Table 11
Alternative Liquidity Measure
This table reports cross-sectional statistics of the following OLS regression results:
Yi,t = αi + βi,1vZ
j
i,t + βiV ectori,t + i,t (i = 1, ..., 114) (3.55)
where j = BR or SRWD. The dependent variable Yt is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure,
and vZt is the volatility of market belief estimated using either rolling regression method or
GARCH(1,1) model. V ectort is a vector containing a set of explanatory variables, and βi is
a beta vector. ‘Basic’ means the case in which the volatility of market belief is the unique
explanatory variable while ‘Robust’ means the robustness test. βi is set equal to zero for
the ‘Basic’ case. Cross-sectional averages of estimated betas are reported with t-statistics
in parentheses. ‘%positive’ means the percentage of positive betas, while ‘%+significance’
gives the percentage with t-statistics greater than +1.645 (the 5% critical value in one-tailed
test). The sample consists of 114 S&P500 index stocks.
Rolling Regression Method GARCH(1,1) Model
—————————————– —————————————–
BR Model SRWD Model BR Model SRWD Model
—————— ——————– —————— ——————–
Basic Robust Basic Robust Basic Robust Basic Robust
vZt -0.759 0.484 -0.193 0.353 -0.199 0.118 -0.262 -0.047
(-1.11) (0.98) (-1.01) (0.99) (-0.84) (0.33) (-0.48) (-0.11)
% positive 57.54 68.42 60.53 64.91 57.14 62.50 62.50 58.04
% +significant 31.58 17.54 30.70 21.93 26.78 22.32 30.36 25.89
Zt -0.086 -0.018 -0.117 -0.033
(-1.00) (-0.76) (-1.01) (-0.91)
MktRett−1 -0.250 -0.249 -0.253 -0.250
(-1.03) (-1.04) (-1.03) (-1.04)
MktRett -0.405 -0.409 -0.418 -0.421
(-1.11) (-1.11) (-1.11) (-1.11)
MktRett+1 -0.099 -0.089 -0.104 -0.091
(-0.83) (-0.79) (-0.85) (-0.80)
vRett(/100) 0.898 0.886 0.908 0.887
(1.91) (1.91) (1.89) (1.89)
V olumet -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(-3.59) (-3.57) (-3.57) (-3.55)
Dispersiont 0.598 0.667 0.551 0.657
(1.07) (1.06) (1.05) (1.04)
R2(%) mean 2.380 57.732 2.567 58.047 4.452 58.148 5.492 58.652
Median 1.521 59.582 1.472 60.562 1.411 59.989 1.658 60.883
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